THE INITIATIVE IN WAR.

Taranaki Daily News, 1 July 1916, Page 9

THE INITIATIVE IN WAR.

WHAT IT MEANS TO THE ALURS. (By Lieut.-('olonel A. A. Grace, ill Auckland Herald). The Russians' successes in Galicia and Volhynia, taken intn consideration with tin- defeat (if tlie German fleet in tile North Sea, points to a considerable effect upon the military situation of the Central Towers. With the Teutons it has been for a considerable time a question of "neck or nothing." This fact is evident from the prodifral attempts at Verdun, the belated offensive in the Trentino, anil the hazardous emergence of the German fleet. Indeed, each of these operations was in reality a forlorn hope, carried out on a gigantic scale; each failed, because in each case the forces to be contended against were too strong. These failures seem to demonstrate the fact, that the Central Powers arc unable to concentrate at any selected point or points of their battle-fronts as great forces as their foes can concentrate against them at such selected point or points—in the case at the naval operations the inferiority of the Teuton strength was well understood —and therefore it would follow that, the power of the initiative, which generally lies with the stronger, had, in reality, passed from the Germans to their enemies before the stupendous attack on Verdun was commenced. That the Allies' General Staff has successfully taken the initiative against the Austro-German armies, proves indubitably that the Teutons are quickly losing, if they have not already lost, the power of resuming the initiative. t! ICR MAN LOSS OF INITIATIVE. At iirst sight it may appear to some that the loss of this power is of 110 great importance, because the power of defence still rests with the armies which cannot assume the offensive. This is so, if tlirt armies which thus assume the defensive can, by doing so, accumulate strength. The prolonged defensive attitude of the Powers of the Great Alliance has resulted in their doubling or trebling thelir strength. But if the power of aggression is wrested from the Central Powers and they are toreed to assume a generally defensive attitude, it is very doubtful if, with fifteen per cent, of their population called to the colors, they can augment their depleted armies to such an extent as to enable them to resume the offensive to any serious degree. Loss of initiative means the loss of power to assume the agrcsive. without which there can be 110 victory. It can easily be shown that the Central Powers are outmatched by fully two to one in troops, guns, munitions, and military resources. That they have so long maintained the offensive will always he considered one of the most remarkable i features of the war. That they were per- ! mittcd to maintain it for so long will ! always be considered as a sign of j strength in the councils of Central General Staff of the Allies. ' j POSSIBILITIES ol. 1 ALLIED OFFENSIVE. I do not maintain that the Teutons will not again attempt to assume the aggressive. It is almost certain that they will so attempt—they will very possibly make, during the summer, an ultimate attempt to break the Russian line 011 the Dvina—but T do maintain that any such attempt it more likely to fail than was the last. Whereas, on the other hand, I see nothing to prevent the Great Alliance from assuming the offensive in anv part of the vast arena; nothing except conformity to the preconceived plan of campaign which has been adopted by the general staffs of all tho armies of the Alliance. The Russian offensive in Calicia. and Volhynia is a good beginning of that plan of campaign. There are still over three months of the summer to run. It is but sixty miles from Czernowitz to the summit of the Carpathians. With the Austrian armies of reserve plainly used up, the summer ■ campaign of 10111 may well carry the Russians into the plains of Hungary. That campaign has already deprived the Austrian* of half their army of Galicia, of their power to operate aggressively in the Trentino; it has caused the Germans to rush to the scene of the debacle troops who were badly needed 011 other battlefronts it has apparently paralysed the Germans in the west, and has materially affected the plans of Hiudenburg in Conrland, MORAL EFFECTS OF RUSSIAN STROKE. All those effects are material effects; but there have also been moral effects. The stroke in Galicia fell with remarkable unexpectedness. The German General .Stall' cannot tell where the next stroke may fall. That stall" is well aware of the Allies' power to assume the offensive wherever they please, and that knowledge must nceesarily bring hesitation and uncertainty to the German war-councils. If they heavily support Hiudenburg and Maekensen in the cast, they may t'md that the French and Brij tisli have assumed the aggressive in the| west. With their gradually diminishing armies of reserve they find it more than! ever difficult to make good, the wastages of their armies of the east and of thel west, and at the samo time to send support to their defeated Austrian allies. The already inadequate forces of the Bulgarians liave been drawn on in order that Austria may be supported; and that at a time when the Anglo-French-Servian army, based 011 Salonika, out-

numbers the entire. Bulgarian armv, and the Creek nation is assuming an attitude which may l>e interpreted as more favorable to the Allies. Kl'Tl-XT OK XAVAL BATTLE. But the effect of the Rusians' victory over the Anstro-(lernians must not be considered by itself, though it has greatly ail'eeted the Teuton's military plans. It must be considered in conjunction with tin- defeat of thejGerman Fleet in the Xorth Sea. That Hect, we are told by a reliable authority, has sustained damage to some -U! per cent, of its material, which means that it will not be able to put to sen in its full strength for a considerable time to come. In the meantime the fleets of the Allies, including the powerful Russian Baltic, squadron, may possibly attempt to extend their command of the sea to the waters of the Baltic Sea. The German coast in that sea extends for upwards of six hun- ; drcd miles, and needs must be defended, if not by the Gorman Fleet.'then by German coast-defence troops. But where is Germany to find such armies, which should, on a low computation, number a million troops, when she is evidently hard put to it to lind sufficient troops with which to make good the wastage of her armies in the field and the losses of her seriously defeated ally? Thus it will be seen that, even a threat made by the Allied navies, against the Gerinan Baltic, coast would have the efVeet of creating something nearly approaching a panic in the war councils of the. Teutons. What the future actions of the Allied naval and military leaders may be, no one can tell. They have struck and broken the Austrians in Galieia, and have jeopardised the entire German battlefront north of the Pripct.. They have, it in their power to strike from the west. That they may, at the. pschycological moment, strike at. the Baltic coasts of Germany is a thing quite possible, and an eventuality which must be considered in connection with every military combination which the Teutons may desire to form. Thus we see that the successes of the Russians and the action of the British Fleet have put quite a new aspect on the situation, a situation which has become full of terrible possibilities for the Germans, and which is full of hope for the nations of the Great Alliance.