THE GREAT PRIZE.

Taranaki Daily News, 1 July 1916, Page 9

THE GREAT PRIZE.

WHY VKRDI'N WAS ATTACK Kl>. MORALLY A GIBRALTAR. TUK ROAD TO SIA'LVATM >N. Although the buttle of Verdun lias bi'cn in progress for 10!) day*—just on fifteen weeks—the i.'al strategic plan underlying it, apart from tin' methods adopted in carrying out the attacks, lias not yet been positively shown. A very interesting speculation oil this ]ioint is contained in an article in the American I'eview of Reviews, by Mr. Frank H. Simond*, ail American wrijter who has a reputation as a contemporary historian and interpreter of the war, and who lately visited Verdun. He says that the primary strategy of the attack, and for that matter of the defence, was bused upon political considerations rather than upon military. Mr. !>imonds holds that German writings and utterances all point to this: that France was ready, not to surrender more territory, perhaps not to pay an indemnity, hut to accept peace on terms that left her intact, Germany knew, he says in the American Review of Heviews, that Great Britain yas not ready to render ell'icient aid to her French ally, and she reckoned that France, defeated in a great 'battle, deprived of a great fortress, and once more lacking real aid from Britain, would become disheartened and disgusted with a struggle in which she alone bore the brunt. She knew also that Russia, because of the spring thaws, eonld not lend a hand to France, and that she could even transfer from the East to the West some divisions o! veteran and victorious troops, and to make transfers also from the P,alkalis. Thus she would in a measure repeat the situation of the Marne, and make another effort to eliminate the French from her enemies, even if not this time by a complete disaster. He lays special emphasis upon the firmly-rooted popular notion of Verdun as a fortress, as "the place where, eleven centuries ago, Charlemagne's Herman Empire was partitioned.'' Its capture would be "a symbol to millions of Hermans of the realisation of Teutonic destiny.' T hey believed, he considers they believed wrongly, that the effect of the loss ol Verdun would be equally powerful in the opposite sense upon France, and the belief underlay the whole strategy of the great efforts now in progress. It was nn effort to break the spirit of France, in the belief that the spirit was already weak. It is interesting to note further Mr. Si round's reasoning fur the attack being made upon Verdun for military reasons as political. Verdun was no longer the strongest point in the French line. 'Faking no notice for the moment of the natural strength of the position due to the nature of the country, he points out that it was actually not strong at all. It was a great salient, where the French could be driven back for a great distance continually under converging attacks, while the Germans need never in a general sense become exposed to any envelopment. Secondly, it was the most difficult of all parts of the French front to keep supplied. Originally two important railways supplied Verdun—onr from the west, from Paris the other north along the Meuse, When the Germans occupied St. Mihiel in September. I!tl4, they cut the latter line; and during the retreat from the Marne they halted at Varennes and Montfaucon, in positions whence their heavy artillery could interrupt traffic on the Paris-Ver-dnn railway. There remained only one narrow-guage line, steeply graded and incapable of carrying heavy war traffic, from Bar-le-Dne. Verdun was therefore dependent almost altogether upon motor transport. lie concludes that both the Herman anil the French high commands thought this was insufficient for the maintenance, of a really large army of defence. "Til some," he snys, "the point which the whole world outside of the military believed was strongest, was actually the weakest." The forts were empty of guns (used in the new field works), railroad communication was practically nil; in point of fact, the strength of Verdun was wholly illusory; but the illusion was universally established and promised to give any German success an importance that eonld not be exaggerated." Mr. Simoiids' article is too long to quote liberally, but his statements upon the defence may be summarised. They decided, he says (while admitting that the matter will long be disputed), to abandon the salient and straighten the l ne, owing to the inherent weakness of Verdun with its poor communications. To keep Verdun meant to spend many thousands of lives; to lose it meant, in the military sense, nothing; for the hills to the south were quite as suitable for defence. And for many days Paris and London believed that Verdun would be abandoned, and a knowledge of this was reflected in the German writings and communiques of the time. But the military authorities did not have their way. The political heads of the country realised that, whatever the military thought of Verdun, popular opinion considered it a Gibraltar, whose moral value was incalculable. l)e C'astlenau, the second in command, saw their point of view, and Mdertook to save Verdun, and lie took with him Petain, the actual defender of Verdun. By the time the Germans had captured Fort Douaumont, Petain had his army ready, and the advance' came to an abrupt stop. Mr. Simonds gives every credit for the saving of Verdun to the original defenders, who delayed the Hermans till the great reinforcing armies came up. But the successful defence, he says, was made possible by the preparations that had been made long before to make up for the absence of adequate railways. Months before the great attack the military authorities had reconstructed the one great highway running from St. Dizier and Bar-le-Duc, northwards to Verdun. They made it twice and three times its original width and made proper turn-outs, so that Verdun was bound to France by a magnificent road going north beyond the range of the Herman artillery all the way to the outskirts of the city itself. And General Herr, who commanded the sector, had worked out an intricate and marvellous system of motor transport. When the blow fell it was only necessary to mobilise the motor trucks, and in an incredibly short time thousands and thousands were in operation. And on this road, directed by General Herr, who quietly adopted the role of traffic superintendent, the whole of the vast economy of the army was transported without friction or disorder. Some idea of the nature of this grea.t task of transport is given by Mr. Simonds: "Coming north as I did from St. Dizier to Verdun, for more than fifty miles the road was a continuous line of trucks. Over almost the whole distance they were marching in single file, i with scarcely a break in the procession. On all the course I never saw a block or a delay. Rarely, very rarely, a truck was upset or broke down, and was turned to the side of the road and temporarily abandoned. In every village there were repair stations, but day and

niglit steadily, fairly rapidly, this endless chain of motor truck* filed past, bringing men, nnnitioiis, supplies. . . . . In the cities, such us Bur-le-Duc, (lie squares and the turns were marked by signs telling' the road to Venlun. Kven in tinv villages traffic policemen, soldiers, the mV'ers, kept the trallic separated, for ill addition to the Verdun sector, the St. Mihiel and the .Argonne sectors were led in part by the same route. . . It was rather like a huge torrent than like vehicular trallic, and it was the real salvation of Verdun, for it preserved Verdun from isolation, it remedied the essential defect due to the cutting of the two railroads, it replaced two useless arteries by a. third, which was absolutely sufficient. In (his war the world has talked mostly of German efficiency, preparation, foresight. Yet, to see this never-ending procession, these thousands and lens of thousands of motor vehicles proceeding on their way, assembled from somewhere, from everywhere, without delay, without difficulty, mobilised and put into operation, travelling with all the regularity of express trains, was to realise that the Herman* were not the only miracle- eompelleis, and that France, in her own way, was also working miracles. For this system 1' was ■tolu that General Herr was responsible, . . . For myself, I shall remember nothing of all that 1 saw at Verdun longer than this stream of motor transports, this interminable procession flowing on at an unvary "8 rate of perhaps twelve miles an hour, the tide which made it possible for the men who defended Verdun to hold their ground, and finally to match artillery with artillery, and numbers with numbers."