MESOPOTAMIA.

Taranaki Daily News, 23 May 1916, Page 5

MESOPOTAMIA.

CAMPAIGN ON THE TIGRIS. RUSSIAN CAVALRY JOIN BRITISH. • A BOLD MOV£> Received May 22, 5.S p.m London, May 21. Neuter reports that Russian cavalry j have joined the British on the Tigris. ENEMY VACATE ADVANCED POST. SUCCESSFUL BRITISH ASSAULT. THE JOINING OP THE RUSSIANS. Received May 22, 7.20 p.m. London, May 21. Official: General Sir ,Percy Lake reports that on May 19 the enemy vacated Bothaissa, an advanced position on the right bank of the Tigris. General C. F. Gorringe followed up and carried the Diyailah redoubt. The enemy is still holding the Sonnaiyat position on the left bank. A force of Russian cavalry joined General Gorringe after a bold and adventurous ride.

POSITION EXPLAINED. RUSSIAN STRATEGY OUTLINED. THE TIGRIS THREATENED. FALL OF BAGDAD IN* SIGHT. It is difficult, without the aid of a map, to explain the position in Armenia and the Tigris-Euphrates sphere, because it really embraces all that stretch of country from the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf. But anyone wiho consults a map, even an ordinary map, cannot fail to notice the interesting dove-tailing nature of the operations. In Armenia the Russian right .wing holds the Black Sea port of Trebizond; the Russian centre holds Erzerum, and has just occupied Mamahatun (or Maniakhatun), half-way between Erzerum and Erzingjan, despite tlve strenuous efforts of the reinforced and Germanstifi'encd Turks, based on Enzinajan, to roll the Russians 'back; while tlid Russian left holds the Lake Van counltry, including Mush, and, it would.seem, Bitlis. To the left (that is, the east) of the Russian loft wing (which for the sake of convenience may be called the Mushrtitlis army) is the Russian avmy of north-west Persia, holding the Lake .Urmia country. The objective of the ■Mush-Bitlis army ia tire Tigris town of 'Diarbokir; and the objective of the army of north-west IPersia is the town of Mosul, lower down the Tigris. Still lower down the Tigris is Bagdad, which in the objective of a Russian army advancing from central Persia by way of Kermanshah, Kerind, and Khanikin. And Bagdad is also the objective of the British Tigris expedition, whose upriver advance has been so severely checked owing to the Tigris concentration at Bagdad instigated by Von der Goltz.

The Tigris, therefore, is threatened at lour points: At Diarbekir. by the MusliBitlis army; at Mosul, by the northwest Persian army; at Bagdad, by the central Persian army; and by the British Tigris army (Lake's). There is no clue to the numerical strengths and material equipments of the three Russian armies, and 110 information as to whether, separated tby considerable stretches of difficult country, they can co-operate tactically. Strategically, their co-operation is very effective, and the. Tigris Turks have a difficult military problem to face. It is not less difficult because of Von dcr Goltn's legacy—the concentration at Bagdad. If the Bagdad railway had been completed between Bagdad and Mosul, the Turkish position would bo much better, as armies and their Impedimenta could be shifted from Mosul to Bagdad, according to defensive requirements, with some degree of celerity. But it is extremely unlikely that, even German energy has been able to complete the railway between Bagdad, and Mosul, though it is probably complete over the section Bagdad to Samara. The albscnce of a railway means a great deal of dependence on river traffic, and up-river traffic on the Tigris from Bagdad to Mosul is a weak link in any chain of defence against attacks from Persia.

This fact is the more evident when it is seen that Mosul is a most critical point on the Tigris. If the Russians established themselves on the Tigris and the railway line at Bagdad, they would not cut off Mosul; but if they established themselves on the Tigris at Mosul (which is also on the railway route) they would cut off Bagdad also. All Turkish troops on the lower river would be isolated, unless they could find their way back to the Euphrates, an operation the practicability of which is doubtful. In view of this fact, the strategy of the Russians (had there been no starving British garrison at Kut-el-Amara, below Bagdad) would probably have been to feint at Bagdad, and—having by this means diverted the Turks thitlic»r —to strike the real blow at Mosul. To this moment it is not clear whether the Russian plan has b|en based on this high- strategy—a -strategic diversion towards Bagdad, and a main blow at Mosul—or on a consideration of expediency—namely, the indirect relief of Kut-el-Amara by a blow at Bagdad. One thing, however, is clear—the Russian operation at Bagdad, whatever its motive and its scope, did not progress rapidly enough to relievo Townshewl's garrison at Kut. But the blow at Mosul, which ought strategically to be the real serious businsss, is now showing' out ill the cablegrams in just that 'ltabt, Savjukduft. a Turkic. Aifottq

town on a tributary of the Tigris, iMen< pied by the Russians, is not more <thaal 100 miles from Mosul, and their advance columns are within 50 miles of tin Tigris. This is, undoubtedly, RussiaSa "slmrtcst and easiest road!" to & CQBH manding point iu the Tigris Valley. ; By the capture of Revanduz the Romans have spruug quite u dramatic little strategical surprise. While all the world wiw watching for the advance of their columns from Uitlis down the Tigris, their columns operating around Lake Urumitt from Tabriz Aave not been mentioned for many weeks, and bad almost been forgotten. Yet it' is these that have suddenly a-ppeared within striking distance, of the main Turkish lis® of communication with Mesopotamia. Arbcla lies 50 mile, due etat of Mosul, while "Rcvandouze," or Revanduz, lies about 40 miles nort)\-east of Arbella. The Russian columns have worked round bv- the south of Lake Urumia, and we may hope to see thent threatening Mosul very soon. The effects can hardly fail to 'be moat important. If the Russians are in any strength their occupation of Mosul iirtll practically paralyse the Turkish operations to the south. Already it k reported that the Turkish troops are be* ing sent north from Kut-el-Amara to oppose the Russians, and that ia probably true. We may look forward wtth some confidence to the fall of Bagdad at the end of the flood season, if not sooner. A few months ago the Central Powers were dreaming of great nbtorcements to be drawn from Turkey after through connection had bMa established with Constantinople. £odajr they are struggling vainly to kng Turkey on her feet.