PERSIA.

Taranaki Daily News, 17 January 1916, Page 5

PERSIA.

TURKISH ADVANCE. IMPORTANT TOWN OCCUPIED. Received Jan. 10, 5.5 p.m. Amsterdam, Jan. 15. A semi-official message from Constantinople states that Turkish troops have entered Keraanshah. (Kcrmanshah, capital of the province of that name, is an important caravan centre on the road between Teheran and Bagdad. It is 270 miles ws.w. of Teheran, and has a population of C5,000.j

GENERAL TOWNSEND'S FORCE. According to a German report, MajorGeneral Townshend has 10,000 men in Kut7 The relief columns are at some undefined distance, in communication by heliograph as well as by wireless. If Townshend's force is of the strength stated, and is not handicapped by sickness and the case of the men wounded at Ctesiphon, it should be able to do something to join hands with the relief columns; provided, however, that it is well supplied with ammunition. A dearth of ammunition at Kut would change the whole situation, and ammunition may be the particular form of relief that Colonel Kembail and Aylmer are most anxious to bring. London newspapers deduce from the dispatches that Major-General Townshend is surrounded at Kut by superior numbers; a German wireless states that the Turks rely on capturing the garrison by starvation if not by assault; and Rome hears—what in other quarters was apprehended long ago—that the Turks are at this stage turning their principal attention not to the strong British position at Suez, but to the weak British position on the Tigris. Kut-cl-Amara is so advanced a base, and is so dependent on hundreds of miles of river communications, that an invading garrison surrounded by a numerically superior enemy cannot 'he regarded as> being in a very happy position. Even a temporary success or series of successes might fail to enable it to occupy, against the increasing forces Turkey can employ, a position so remote from the sea. Kut can have no value save as a steppingstone to Bagdad, and the step to Bagdad seems to be postponed sine die. Nor is it'clear that Britain could hold Bagdad if she reached it. On January I) Colonel Aylmer reported that the enemy was retreating, lint that ''heavy rain hinders the pursuit." The rainy season is hound to play a big part in the campaign. The Tigris begins to rise about the middle of November (Townshend captured Kut in September), and it is highest in May and June. In flood time the river becomes at places an inland sea, rendering navigation extremely difficult and uncertain. This would be a big handicap on the efforts of Townshend's boats to retreat, or of relieving boats to steam up the Tigris to Townshend. When the waters of the river spread over a wide area the navigable channel will be lost, unless the British command has had tlie forethought to mark it in advance. Even in that case the channel marks might be destroyed, or replaced in misleading positions, by a treacherous enemy. Nor would it lie necessary for the Turk to wait till the height of the rainy season in order to hinder navigation. Over a large distance the Tigris is confinecL by walls to a level above that of tile surrounding country. By means of the walls its waters can h_e confined or not, according to the irrigation needs of riparian settlement. By breaking the walls the. Turks could in many places make the keeping of the channel by no means easy for river steamers. These are sonic of the difficulties that confront Britain's effort to maintain a garrison deep in enemy country hundreds of miles from the sea, and connected therewith by a tortuous river-way passing through hostijf country, whose people like to help the winning side. Is the prestige likely to attach to the hoped-for capture of Bagdad worth the risk J