BRITISH ARMIES.

Taranaki Daily News, 12 January 1916, Page 6

BRITISH ARMIES.

NEED OF GENERAL STAFF. There can be no satisfactory co-ordina-tion between the efforts of the various fractions of our Army unless, at any rate, they are all under the command of the same executive chief, writes the military correspondent of the London Daily Telegraph on 10th November. He must be the responsible adviser of the Government in matters off strategy, and must' liuvo the duty of selecting the commanders of important- units. The department of the War Office known as the Military Secretary's Office, which deals with promotions and appointments of officers, should also be under his personal direction in chief.

There is much to be said for employing two chief ofiicers as first and second at the head of the Army, a ''Commander-in-Chief or "Inspector-General,'' with a Chief of the Staff as his next man and confidential assistant. This seems to have been the intention of , the creators of the Army Council, though the plan became addled in production. Since the war began three officers have held the post of Chief Staff Officer at Headquarters—Sir C. Donglas, as In-spector-General of the Forces. Sir J. Wolfe-Murray, and Sir Archibald Murray, late Chief of the Staff in Flanders, successively have been appointed Chief of the General Staff. The first two were never consulted as to -war plans or strategy, and were, in fact, only employed on administrative detail. The strategical department of the War Office was in abeyance during the first and critical year of the war, and tho only technical advice which the Cabinet got from tho War Office came either from the Secretary of State or from the Director of Operations, who was a retired colonel of Garrison Artillery; occasionally memoranda were forthcoming were written by promising juniors cn various questions. The advent of Sir Archibald Murray to the post of Chief of the General Staff at the War Office inaugurated a new departure, for then, at any rate, the Secretary of State acquired a responsible officer, who had already performed the duty of stategical adviser in the field, though in a comparatively subordinate position. The system, however, must remain weak and defective until a real chief undertakes the duty of commanding the [armies, with ample power as to their [employment and direction. It will be his principal duty to find suitable and competent subordinates, both on the Staff and in command of all units, from ! armies to divisions.

The German system of command is worth studying. "Main Headquarters," i.e., von I'aikenhayn and his secretariat, is in supreme control of all the German armies. The army commanders report direct to him. A modification of :this scheme, however, is to be seen on the Russian front,_ where first von Hindenburg, and later von Mjickensen, were given the authority of local Commander-in-Chief of the operations which they were directing. The supreme control, however, has always been retained by "Main Headquarters," < which is in constant contact by telegraph and telephone -with the leaders of highest rank iu the field.

Besides the failure of the machinery of our supreme direction, the next most contributing cause to our want of success on the battlefield is ttie unsatisfactory character of the executive staff with units of all grades. It is not now possible to organise a body of officers with the technical education and knowledge of the enemy's General Staff, but it is feasible to copy some of the best of his methods. Brieflv, the German plan is as follows: With each important unit army, army corps and division there is a Chief Staft' Officer of :tlio "General Staff" who is responsible fo. 1 tie issue of all executive orders, and especially of all operation orders. It is not true, as stated by Viscount Haldane, that there is a r!«id severance between the executive and the administrative staff; on the contour. there is-, the closest co-operation bcl'.coen the two principal branches. No Chief Staff Officer would be of any value unless lie were thoroughly versed in the administrative brandies upon which ho dej/ends for the exact performance of routine, duties, supply, transport, and ammunition. But the German system does provide that a delegation of these duties takes place to such an extent that the Chief Staff Officer of any unit and his personal as sistants have sufficient leisure to pay proper attention to working out plans of action for the troops in their charge. For the sedentary defence of fortified lines an obsolete system of executive command may sulliee, but directly movements of troops on a great become part of the plan of any operation, such as the attacks delivered by our army at Neuve Chapelle, Suvia Bay, and Loos, then nothing but the most effective command arrangements are likely to succeed, as we have found to our cost.

The need for the simplest mechanism and the most skilful men which our Army can produce is all the greater because the {roops now consist for the most part of new levies, and because oui Army is organised in a manner which is said io be suitable for the garrisons of the oversea dominions in peace time, but which is altogether unsuitable for Continental war. Every army, including the United States, iias brought its organisation up to the new standard long ago. The British Army alone wastes its strength 011 single battalion regiments and other fantastic relics of a past military age.