THE UNEXPECTED IN WAR.

Taranaki Daily News, 30 December 1915, Page 6

THE UNEXPECTED IN WAR.

.MORAL AND LEADERSHIP.

THE XI-ED FOR RAPID PLANNING. (Melbourne Age Special Representative). East Mediterranean, October 10. "Ready for all emergencies," a motto which every army leader worthy of the rank adopts, does not reduce the chances of the unexpected happening. Paradoxical as it may sound, it is the unexpected in war that is the expected, or at least anticipated. A leader may exhaust all the possibilities of a situation, and discard this one and that as not to be expected. We have a very good example of that from the Australian landing on April 25, both from our own and the Turkish viewpoint, The Turks, regarding the topography of the peninsula, decided that a landing would not be attempted on Anzac beach, though there were possibilities about Gaba Tepe. They fortified • the latter point, but they had to anticipate -the unexpected, and threw a small line of defence along the cliffs of Anzac. On the other hand, the Australian leaders were faced with a hasty readjustment of their orders on the beach, and when they reached the heights. The responsibility of the unexpected in war (presuming both sides have equally efficient leaders holding supreme commands) is traceable to one branch, the intelligence. A plan or scheme of the enemy is unexpected because it i 3 unknown —not, in these days of 'advanced military science, because it is unthought of.

At the outset it is necessary to disabuse the mind of the chances of their being much of the element of surprise in attacks. The Turks knew there was to be a landing 011 Gallipoli Peninsula, or in Asia Minor; but where exactly they could only calculate. The landing at Snvla Bay and the attempt at a great flanking movement from Anzac by the Australians and New Zealanders may be held up as an example of one of the few surprises of the war. The Turks admit they did not anticipate the point of attack, though they knew an attack must come. This, therefore, brings me to a conclusion that the only absolute surprise attacks in this war have been gained by submarines firing their torpedoes while submerged. Aeroplanes can lie seen approaching, the aerial torpedoes even give a few seconds (as do many guns and the shells) to seek cover. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LEADERS. To eliminate the unexpected, therefore, primarily rests on the shoulders of the leader. He has to concern himself with two matters before starting on an expedition information regarding the enemy, the number, strength, equipment, and disposition of his force, and the topography of the country. The intelligence officers collate all the available data concerning the Turks at Gallipoli. Throughout the regiments before the Australians left Mudros Harbor a mass of printed matter was distributed relating to the conditions likely to be met at the points of landing. Officers were even taken to view the land from warships. The aeroplane scouts brought back daily information regarding the enemy, his lines of defence and his lines of communication, just as now, twice daily, the aeroplanes send wireless reports of the artillery and enable the targets of the guns to be located to the nearest yard. One might ask, in the circumstances: How can the unexpected happen if the general commanding knows the science of war, and so can, as a good general, place himself in the shoes of the enemy's leader, knowing well (how accurately has surprised me and others who have seen the army in the field) liia strength, and can view the situation in all its tactical and strategical aspects? I repeat that in the expected is often found the unexpected. Knowing the possibilities of an attack at all times, and all means of meeting that attack, the unexpected is narrowed clown to the exact point at which attack is to be pushed home. Inversely a, defence may be a defence up to a point when it turns to a counter-attack. Therein lies the unexpected. Yet it is rather to be anticipated, or, rather, expected.

WHAT IS THE UNEXPECTED. Bluffs, feints, and the secrecy of movements of troops cover the unexpected as with a veil. The keen eyes of the air and ground scouts are always endeavoring to pierce that veil; spies are insinuating themselves into the ranks and into the confidence of the men and officers; orders, papers and information are being captured by the enemy. How, then, can the unexpected happen? Before the days of wireless, telephones, and aeroplanes, the marching of long distances, 20, 30, or 40 miles, under cover of night, and the transfer of a whole army from one enemy flank to the other, was a favorite operation and very disconcerting. Railways now can eliminate distance, but not the spying eye of the aeroplane observer. To effect a surprise on the enemy by au attack at a totally unexpected point is to confront him with the unexpected. The Germans tried it early in the campaign by the dangerous plan of inarching armies across their fighting front to make a thrust at Paris. They were beaten at the battle of the Mame. The Austalian and British troops at Gallipoli feinted at Anzac and Cape Holies, covering the landing of the new armies at Suvia Bay and the rapid advance of the Australians and New Zealanders on the right of the Anzac position. That was effected by the battle of Lone Pine, which undoubtedly led the Turks to believe that tile main attack of the British was to develop from that point. In reality it was only the covering attack to a much greater movement. The enemy rushed his reinforcements to the Anzac position, until the trenches bristled with bayonets and teemed with troops. The unexpected fell on their right flank. Another successful attack, illustrating the most dangerous of unexpected developments, was the threatened break ol the Turkish communications by the sub•marine warfare in the Sea of Marmora. "These may be compared to the raids on sliore from posts and positions such as have been made bv the Third Infantry Brigade and the Third Light Horse Brigade from the right at Anzac. Not to be described as battles, tlicv are called by the troops "stunts." A hundred men issue forth, armed with bombs, grenades, send dynamite, and, covered by machinegun fire, they reach, almost undetected, the enemy's trench, and do appalling damage in a terrible five minutes. It is unexpected, yet always to be anticipated, as one can'infer from the fluctuating rifle fire that continues throughout the nicrht along the fighting line. The sudden splutter of machine guns along the whole front and the increasing rattle of rifles immediately rouses the new soldier from a troubled (slumber, and he thinks an attack has come. The old soldier sits up, listens attentively, and grunts: "Turkish fire, seems bit nervous —believe we are going to make an attack " Then, having satisfied himself 011 nw.ijiaklw lie* down Very soon

the_ racket is hushed. It is the enemy anticipating tin; unexpected; for no intelligence system is complete, and their intelligence lias made no mention of an attack by us, It is like that every night, and lias been for four months. Then, again, mines are a menace, and not always possible to anticipate (especially in newly-captured trenches, when the enemy may have mined their own works in order to blow up the intruders)„ Listening tunnels arc constructed by the engineers, and trained men listen to the approaching enemy as they hear the methodical, dull, thump, thump of the picks. Sometimes it is a bluff, while the enemy is really approaching very slowly, quietly scooping out the earth from another direction. Unexpectedly he blows up a section of our trenches, but more frequently he miscalculates the distance and blows himself up. In this connection the practice of-sap-ping forward 100 yds towards the enemy —digging out to meet him by means of a zig-zag trench, which he cannot reach by gun fire, and can touch only with varying success by bombs—has sometimes startling and unexpected results. Hear Lone Pine trenches rival sappers met face to face in a tunnel. At Tasmania Post some of the 3rd Brigade suddenly dug into a TurkUli communication trench. The surprise was mutual, but they could not attack, and we could not advance along a narrow trench.

I think from such examples it will he 'plain that the unexpected does happen, but seldom it carries the genuine element of surprise as well. Mostly surprises are effected where the enemy does something totally contrary to, in his judgement, what the leader of the other side regards as probable. These are usually most unpleasant for the enemy, assuming the [character of miscalculations,

MEETING THE UNEXPECTED. In setting forth the unexpected I have almost shown at the same time the means of meeting the enemy's little surprises. Again the key to the situation is intelligence. General Staff officer No. 3 is charged with the duty in the field of collating intelligence. Through him comes all the intelligence gained from prisoners taken on the field. He has his interpreter by his side to translate any orders that may fall into our hands. He corrects errors on maps, plots new information gained from aeroplanes or from observation from the firing line, such ae the psition of guns or new enemy trenches.

In the first division during the early stages of the attacks Staff officer No. 3 went out to gain certain essential local knowledge of the Turkish trenches on the right towards Gaba Tepe. He organised a scouting party that had for its destination Maitos. It is only gaining knowledge that the enemy docs not credit us with having that we meet the unexpected from him. But the chief essential of countering the surprise is by thinking quicker than the enemy, No better illustration of the triumph of a correct, quick, and active appreciation of a situation can he pointed out than the story of the landing. The prearranged plans of attack, the allotment of areas to special brigades, all went astray by the troops landing at a different point to that planned. It is, I think, hardly widely known enough and appreciated that it was Brigadier-general (then Colonel) Maelagan, the first brigadier ashore with the covering landing party, who grasped the situation early in the morning, and on the very ridge that the troops now hold consulted with Bri-gadier-general M'Cay and Brigadier-gen-eral M'Laurin as to the disposition of the troops, or, rather the sections of command. His grasp of the situation, the adjustment of his mind to the actual conditions —so vastly different from the preconceived plan—might be said to have established Anzac. He 'thought better, more quickly, and surer than .the Turkish •leaders, inasmuch as they had not organised thair attack in full force till the Monday evening. He found himself in an unexpected situation (If I may mention it now, very unexpected and different surroundings to that pictured), faced with the unknown —that is the unexpected.

HOW THE TROOPS MEET THE UNEXPECTED.

The last aspect of the problem is the manner in which the fighting men meet the enemy's unexpected moves. In the sense that shells, iombs, and bullets are expected in the firing line, there is no surprise at their constant arrival in the trenches. And yet what more unexpected event than the coming of a 75 shell? The men meet all shells with curses and an increasing bitterness as they find the enemy's aim accurate. So close are our trenches to the enemy's that sometimes it was not possible for the moment to tell whether the shell was from a friendly or a hostile gun. Officers and men are every day faced with the unexpected. Contrary to all previous experience, the enemy one day keep up a fierce fire. Why ? The solution may never be discovered. The troops at Lone Pine knew that the Turks had overhead cover. They anticipated that. When ■unexpected obstacles bar the way, even an unrecorded dip in the country, do these in an advance deter trained men? No. Let me give an illustration. A Manchester regiment and a regiment of the 20th Division found themselves fighting side by side at Cape Ilelles, in an attack on a"section of trenches. The Manchester' officers knew that at a certain point in the advance they would emerge from dead ground and meet a terrible machine-gun fire. They were to expect this and keep going forward, The officers of the 2!) th Division knew it, too. Both lines left the trendies together, and the unexpected happened. A deadly ma-chine-gun fire cut the Manchester's ranks. They scooped out a little cover for themselves and halted under fire. Meanwhile the second line of the 20th Division, destined to support the first line, had left their trenches the regulation distance behind. The leaders saw the situation. Here was the unexpected. Not a moment's hesitation was shown, Had there been, it would have been .fatal. They charged with their men to the section of trenches which was to have been taken by the Manchester men. It was not a matter of courage, but of judgement—of meeting an unexpected situation. It leads one to the reflection of the value of an army whose officers and men are trained to face the unes> pected, and only years of training can do that. One might go on relating such situations, but I trust I have indicated enough to show how to high leaders and privates has come the initiative to meet and deal with what is most accurately described as a new phase of an old situation.

Shall I ever forget the face of a senior officer who came in smiling, wiping th» perspiration from his face? He had dashed round a knoll, the opposite siope to that on which I was standing, and which everyone knew open to ma-chine-gun fire. Every soldier knows the horrible nature of the mitrailleuse, has seen it in action, lias been under fire from it. The officer had had a new experience. He explained: "I have been chased by a machine gun along the beacli. Very unhealthy. Bullets all sides; but I. beat him." "Unexpected?" I ventured. ''Totally," be replied.