The Daily News. FRIDAY, JUNE 11, 1915. HOW LONG WILL THE WAR LAST

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVII, Issue 312, 11 June 1915, Page 4

The Daily News. FRIDAY, JUNE 11, 1915. HOW LONG WILL THE WAR LAST

Speculations as to the duration of the war are always readable, even if their logic fails to convince, but when an eminent military authority gives his deductions on this ever-interesting question the layman may listen with profit. In the Westminster Gazelle, '.Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, prole-sor of military history al Oxford University, writes very eiitertainly on how long the war is going to last. He points out that since the French Revolution, which first brought a whole nation into arms, there have been both short and long wars. Tn ]Sir, Xapolron determined, on August -2:;, („ go to war with Austria. The armi.-tice which concluded the war was signed on December (i, four days after the battle of Austerlilz. In ISOli Xapoleon gave orders for the assembly of the Grand Army 0 n August 111. The Prussian Army was crushed on October 14, though the war was prolonged by the intervention of Russia, and peace was not made until three weeks after the battle of Friodland, which was fought on June 1!, ISO". In ISM the war in which Prussia, defeated Austria, begun on June 1 I, and the armistice which ended the lighting was concluded on July 22. less than six weeks later, The great war in which Xapoleon was overthrown began by the French invasion of Russia in June, ISI2, ami ended by Xapoleon's abdication in April, ISI-t. The American Civil War dragged o* from IStil to ISfi.-,. The short wars, those of ISOo. 1 SOU and lS'li). have a common feature. In each of (bent the victorious -id,, had (he a.lvaiit;oo-s „f

pelcnce and divided coniniL. and of armies trained and prepared for war auainsl armies living on I radii ion-, and unready. It would seem as (hough swift succe-s required the combination in fawn- of one side or al ; (he elements of superiority. Tn (he great war against Xapoleon (he .Allies had (he a.hantat/e ibai in 1 SI2 Xapoleon had lo,! hisCr.nd Army in Ru-'-ia. After that I lie numerical odds again-!; him were very ;;veat, yet his power as a commander. though it could not prevent his ultmm'i. ruin. enabled him to prolong lib; resistance through (wo campamns. In (lie American Civil War the -South hal .the advantage of better preparation, nod at I first of better generalship, while the \ numerical odds were greatly in favor I

of the North, which-had-the-further advantage of being able to subject the south to an effective maritime blockade. The South was in Hie end completely beaten, but the process'of conquest took four years. Applying this knowledge of past wars to the present campaigns, Mr. Wilkinson finds that Germany and Austria had the advantage of a preparation more complete and elaborate than has ever been known, and for the first months of a very great numerical superiority. They have further the central position and practically a single command. They were able in the first few weeks to occupy almost the whole of Belgium, and a considerable area both of France, and of Russian Poland, and in the western theatre of war the German line is still substantially where it was in the late autumn. The German attempt to gain the kind of decisive victory which consists in breaking or crushing the adversary's army has failed in the west. The first attem.pt ended with the battle of the Mnrne, and the second with the battle of Ypres. Since then the Germans have been content with the defensive in the western theatre, and have tried hard, in conjunction with the Austrians, to obtain a decisive result in the eastern theatre. In spite of considerable local successes, no decisive victory has been obtained. The Russian front is everywhere unbroken. The effort to reach the communications of the Russian Army on the Vistula has hitherto failed of its purpose, and the Russian Army in Galicia holds the greater part of that province. The Austro-Germans seem to be still seeking a decision in their favor against the Russians such as they would nog doubt attain If they should succeed in seizing the railway from Warsaw to Pctrograd, or in pushing their turning movement in Eastern Galicia as far as the main • railway lines which pass through Lcmberg. In that event the Germans, victorious in the east, would be able to strike with greatly increased energy in the west, and.possibly there also to gain advantages which would render much less favorable than they now are the chances of the western Allies. The Russian Army has, however, hitherto proved itself so tenacious even in reverse that we may doubt whether the Germans will obtain against it the decisive success they desire. Assuming, then, that the Germans fail to break through the Russian front, and equally to turn one of the Russian armies, it become a question of the time required for the Allies, either in cast or west, to .pierce the German front, for no other operation offers much prospect of a decisive success. Against frontal attack, the only kind of attackpossible in present conditions, a very thin line seems to be impenetrable by infantry. A force of two men per yard . will hold its ground easily against attack by double that number, and, if 1 it can be reinforced and relieved when hard pressed ( will stop repeated and persistent attacks. A position can be , forced only by concentrating against it an overwhelming artillery fire, and even then a second position a mile or two in rear may cause, the assailant to have to begin his work over again. The German failure against Ypres is conclusive evidence of the very great strength of even a thin line, and the difficulties experienced by the British at Xeuvo Chapelle after their first successful advance prove that the defender may hope by prompt reinforcement to stop the gap made (by a breakage in his front line. Each such attack requires as a preliminary a great accumulation of ammunition, as well as the concentration of 1 many guns. The future operations may take one of two characters. The two armies may try to wear'each other out by a long process of local attack and counter-attack such as lias been going on for some weeks. Tint, if one side can develop a more effective generalship than the other, coupled with a better discipline in the various ranks of command and in the staffs, it might be possible for that side s 0 to manipulate . its reserves as to anticipate the enemy : in ■preponderance first at one point and then at another, and in that way fo ; gain a marked superiority. The one process, that of continuous local wear and tear, might last for many months. The other would alter ihc balance in a few weeks. A palpable advantage gained by either side would influence the neutral Powers. The process of local wear and tear without decisive strokes is exhausting for both sides, but so long as the Allies remain superior at sen tells to the disadvantage of Germany. It, therefore, the policy of decisive strokes is found impracticable, the Allies may have recourse to another plan indicated by the expedition to the Dardanelles. The success of that enterprise must have two consequences of much moment. It would no doubt determine the lialkan States to abandon their neutrality, and would, therefore, also open to the Allies a theatre of war in which Austria could be effectively attacked. Something like the collapse of Austria would then become probable, and the German defence would have to be prolonged from Galicia to the Adriatic. The co-operation of Ttaly with the Allies, which is always possible, though it should not be reckoned upon until it becomes a reality, would very greatly increa-e the pressure upon Germany, which would then be entirely isolated, liven in this extreme case, that of the cooperation of lialy, R,,nmania. Bulgaria and Greece with the Allies, some time must elapse before the invasion of Germany through Austria. The write-.- concludes:-—T am well aware of the vaguencsr. of these speculations. They have. Lower..;-, a -■re-ili..- purpose, r thick (hey show that we must be pre-|-red f«r ;> continuance of (he struggle. \ at Ihr v.tv !eas(, until (he end of (lie j autumn, because even in the ino-f favor- 1 able hypothesis, that of (he early en-1 trance into (he field in co-operation with (he \llies ~r ronc-lerable avmvs at pre-) scut neutral, months will be required! before I'oir aclh.ii will have produced its effe.l. The first result rd (heir ac- : cession (o the coalition would probably . be to ie-bice (ho German Government to attempt, to negotiate. Such offers would have (~ be refund, because the ] a - roe,eel.( between the Allie; implies ! Ifi'ms of peace snch as Gormnnv will not accept before decisive defeat.