RUSSIA'S GRAIN ARTERY.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVII, Issue 306, 4 June 1915, Page 6

RUSSIA'S GRAIN ARTERY.

WHAT CONTROL OF TOE DARDANELLES MEANS.

In vie."' of tho influence exercised br ths problem of the Dardanelles on tile world's wheat ami Hour markets, the following extracts from an article by Mr. C. I'. Raikes. which appeared in the North-western Miller in February, 1913, are very interesting at the present juncture: —■

When one realises that the Russian wheat crop is often larger than that of the United States, it can easily be imagined what a great difference it makes to European wheat supplies when anything happens to prevent the enormous exports emanating .from that source from reaching the various United Kingdom and Continental markets.

Practically all the wheat that is exported from Russian and Damibinn ports has to pass through the Dardanells beforo it can reach the European markets. The length of the passage i/t strait known as the Dardanells, which connects the Sea of Marmora and the ./Egean Sea, is about <l7 miles. It varies in breadth from about five miles at the broadest part to leas than a mile at the norrowest. The passage is strongly fortified, and in very short notice a network of submarine mines can be laid, making the strait imputable to navigation. A much shorter passage, the Bosphorus, .connects the Kea of Maruora with the Black Sea. Although the passago of the Dardanelles in time of war is generally considered impossible, the feat Was accompli •lied., by the British fleet in 1807, when Admiral Duckworth forced his way through the strait, past all the forts, into the Sea ot' Marmora.

Strategically the Dardanelles is of the utmost importancce, as it commands the approach to Constantinople and the Mediterranean. Tn the year 1841 a treaty was signed by all the great Powers, giving Turkey absolute control of the Dardanelles, and as a result of that treaty no foreign warship has had the right to pass through the Dardanelles without the consent of the Turkish authorities.

The object of this article, however, is not to give a history of the Dardanells, but to show the importance of this passage for grain-carrying ships, and in order to do this it is necessary to give some information concerning the Russian wheat crop, which during the last few years has become such an important market factor. It is well known that it is most difficult to obtain accurate information concerning Russian crops, but this state of affairs is steadily improving, and the Russian government official figures can be depended on as more or less reliable.

Roughly speaking, Russia may be said to be responsible for about one-third m the supplies of wheat taken in by importing European countries, but these contributions have varied so widely in different years, and have been so nr.e'li at variance with estimated crop yields for those years, that the Russian figures have proved the weakest point in -ill statistical forecasts of wheat supplies. The imports from Russia into the United Kingdom within the last decade have, for instance, been as small as f1,G00,000 bushels (in 1001-02) and as large as 53,000,000 bushels (in 1001-Oo), and again as small as 10,000,000 bushels as late as m the cereal year ended August, 1012, with wide variations between these totals.

In the tlireo crop years 1009-10, 191011, iuid 1!)11-12, tlio imports of Russian wheat into the United Kingdom reached 1 10,0.>2,000 bushels, out of an import of (!r>(!,Sl (1,000. For the' three years 1001-02, l'UV'-O.'i, and 1008-04, the contribution was only 07.400,001) bushels out of an aggregate of 024,504,000. These figures will serve as an indication of the increased importance of Russia as a source of supply. Russia exports wheat from the Baltic across its European frontiers and from its Black .Sea and Azov ports, hut in comparison with the total the Baltic and the frontier are unimportant, ,i|id practically only the southern ports figure as real factors in the export situation. These are in fact the natural outlets for the Uu&sian exportable, surplus from the great wheat-growing districts or governments in the Black Sea belt.

This wheat belt is about 1,500 miles !n length and about 300 miles across at its greatest width, covering in all some 2(10,000,000 acres. Its cultivation has undoubtedly improved of late years, but still leaves very much room for improvement, and its actual producing capacity has not yet been nearly realised. Up to a few years ago a good Russian crop represented a yield of some 040,000,000 bushels, but that, according to official Government returns, has been considerably exceeded of late, except in 1910-11, when unfavorable conditions curtailed the yield. The yield in 19J!i was 221,080,000 bushels, and in ]9lO it was 702,804,000 bushels.

So much of the Russian exports being from southern ports, unimpeded transportation from the Black Sea is a matter of first importance, and thus anything affecting the passage of the Dardanelles is bound to lie a tremendous market influence. And not only are. South Russian shipments affected, but those from D:u\i>b'mn ports also. Shipments through the Dardanelles in 191112 totalled Mfi.2oS.ooo bushels ; in 191011 they totalled 2S4,Gtti,ooo bushels.