A MASTER-STROKE OF STRATEGY.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVII, Issue 306, 4 June 1915, Page 6

A MASTER-STROKE OF STRATEGY.

TIIE PROBLEM. (By Charles Edward Pell, in Dunedin Star.) If tlie reader stands by the side of the i harbor watching a vessel steaming down 'the channel,,he may note, perhaps with, some surprise, a miniature wave roll 'ip. to his feet some time after the vessel < has passed, and dissipate itself among the stones. This, he will realise upon reflection, is the wash from the steamer which passed down the channel some time before. This wave, but for the obstruction of the shore, would have gone on spreading out over the waters indefinitely. In strategy it is much the same. An impulse given by a master-stroke or a blunder in one part of a continent will give rise to a wave of effects which will spread over the wliolri strategical field, and dissipate itself in its farthest .confines. The attack of tlie Allies upon the Dardanelles, in which "our boys" are taking part, is such a master-stroke, whose impulse, if successful, will have a vital effect over tlie whole theatre of war. It is a Napoleonic stroke, and nothing could bo farther from the truth than the assertion which is frequently made that its principal object is to release the Russian wheat. This is an incidental.result wliieh will follow upon success, but it is of quite minor importance. There is nothing in the price of wheat to justify such an operation in order to reduce it, and there should be ■ a whole crop of such minor advantages accuring from the operation if conducted with energy and skill. ■ Some hunderds of thousands of troops have been diverted from the chief war centres for the purpose of the Dardanelles campaign, and the ends to which these forces are being directed must boar some relation to the magnitude of the means employed, or the directors of our strategy stand revealed as incompetent muddlers. To T>e justified, the' operation must have, in the event of success, a profound effect upon the whole field of war. Therefore, we. will try to trace these effects, and endeavour to discover at what the directors of the Allies' strategy are aiming. The best jumping-off place for our survey will be the Carpathians, which constitute the very kernel-of the strategical situation on tho eastern front. Russian Poland forms a very difficult salient, flanked on the north by East Prussia, and on the south by tho Carpathians. A successful advance through this salient is a practical impossibility as long as its flanks are held by the enemy, who have the advantage of a splendid system of lateral railways, which would enable them to throw a vast body of troops upon any part of those flanks at the shortest notice, thus enabling them to secure that local superiority at the decisive point, which is the object of all strategy The Russians, through attempting such an advance have already come several times within an ace of complete disaster. Now, that part of the enemy territory which dominates the northern flunk of the Russian advance is practically unassailable. In East Prussia the excellent railway system, the natural barrier formed by the Mazurian Lakes, and their control of the Baltic, give the Germans such an advantage that a successful advance by the Russians is practically impossible. The middle frontier of Poland is confronted by an immensely powerful string of fortifications, whilst the flank of a Russian force advancing that way is threatened from East Prussia. But an advanco via Cracow and Brcslau would turn this line of fortifications, and this is the natural and best Russian line of advance. It is the best, but it is by no means an ideal line, in war a commander has frequently nothing but a choice of difficulties. What the difficulties of the Grand Duke are can.be readily illustrated. Let the reader take a map land draw a line just insido the Polish frontier running with that of East Prussia. Then

! iiother line joined to the first by a i'lngisli curve, kept well back from Thorn, and running down the middle f-ontier of Poland. Join to this a third line sweeping in a bold curve to the "orth of Cracow, and round below

' reslau in the direction of Prague. This hird line represents, roughly, the position which the Russian flank attack will tend to assume as it reaches round the German flank for Berlin. But the reader will notice that in doing so it turns its back upon the Austrians. Its flank and rear, then, must be guarded. 'Therefore, it will be necessary to sketch in a fourth line on the Austrian side of the Carpathians, to represent the Russian flank guard. The exact position does not matter, as the line can be shifted about in an experimental way, with the object of making different combinations. We shall then have constructed a good strategical working hypothesis showing the general position which the Russian armies will tend to assume as they advance, through the mere pressure of strategical necessity. Examining this line, we notice that it is of enormous length; and we know that on the Russian side the lateral communications are extremely bad, while on the German side they are splendid. It is open to the Germans, therefore, to mass men rapidly and secretly at any given point on the Russian line, and fall upon the selected spot in overwhelming force. They cannot do this to quite the same advantage at the time of writing, because the Russian line is not sufficiently far advanced. But the farther the Russian line is pushed forward, the longer and more difficult their communications become, and the easier those of the Germans. We will assume that their line lias reached the position which we have roughly sketched out, and that Von Hindenburg decides to deliver his blow oii the Russian flank from East Prussia. Looking at our lines, we at once see that a decisive German victory here would necessitate a hurried retreat of the Russian forces from the middle frontier of Poland. But this would compel the flank attack to retreat; and this, again, would expose the flank guard, which would have to retreat in its turn. Thus the whole Russian line might crumple up under this one successful blow. But there are other moves upon which Hindenburg might decide. The line which runs out towards Prague, and which indicates the position of the flank attack, may be lengthened or shortened according to the fancy of

i'the reader.- The longer the line is made the more room the Grand Duke will Kave for deployment, and he will have more good roads 011 which to operate. Further, he will occupy more, rich country from which lie will bo able to draw supplied. But the linger the line, the, iiio>e salient its position becomes between the Germans and the Austriuns. Studyiii;; the position oT the Russian Hang guard, it will be noticed that the nearer it i« placed to tho Carpathians the more salient the position of the flank attack, and 1 , the further it is pushed out into Aus- ' trian territory the less salient the position of the flank attack. No matter where it be placed, however, it will be open to the Germans to strike a blow at the flank attack by a rapid concentration of superior forces, or to pass troops right round the salient position of the Kussiaus and strike, at the flank with the help of the Austrians. These moves are in some measure more promising than that from East Prussia. Tor while the latter move might necessitate the retirement of the whole Russian line if decisively successful, yet this retirement might be accomplished without gret disaster. But overwhelming of r,hc flank guard would probably mean the cutting oil' of a vast portion of tho flank attack, and viie versa. Now, the farther the Grand Duke pushes his flank guard into Austrian territory, the more difficult it will be to reinforce it from the flank attack in the event of danger, and the greater the risk" of it being cut off in the event of the flank attack being overwhelmed. The nearer the flank guard is kept to the Carpathians, the easier it will be to reinforce one army from the other, but the greater will be the danger of the flank attack in the event ol' the flank guard being beaten in.

In short the Grand Duke has nothing but a choice of difficulties. His advance can only be successfully accomplished by the nicest adjustment of flank attack and Hank guard, the* one being thrust out or drawn in in skilful co-operation with the other. But no matter how skilfully the operation be conducted, it can only be successfully carried out, without the gravest danger of overwhelming disaster, by immensely superior forces. This Is the consequence of a very bad strategical position as opposed to a very good one. The task of the Grand Duke at the present relatbo strength of the opposing forces is an impossible one. If he is to succeed he must have assistance, or the present game if strategical see-saw may continue indefinitely. Before considering from where this assistance can most effectively come it will be advisable to glance .it Italy's position. At the moment of writing comes tlie news that Italy has declared for fie Allies, and, as she is able to put about a million men in the field immediately and anything up to two mililona ultimately, it might seem at first sight that this nviU have a powerful and immediate eliect ill improving the position of the Allies. But this impression is largely illusory, and Italy's position is another excellent example of tactical possibilities. largely discounted by strategical difficulties. The map shows that the Italian frontier province of Venetia is as marked and dangerous a salient as Rusian Poland, except for the fact that its southern flank is guarded by the sen, and that the Tyrol, which flanks it in the north, is itself partly flanked by the Italian province of Lambardy. Now, it is open to the Austro-Gcrmans to ignore the Russian flank guard for a period and throw their forces upon the Italianß. The Grand Duke could take advantago of this only by a dangerous advance over the Carpathians into Hungary—a move .which the Germans could meet by striking in the direction of Przemysl and threatening to cut oil' the flank guard. So there can be no effective co-operation between the Russians and the Italians. But an Austro-German attack upon Italy will have little chance of success, as the French can pass troops round by the back of Switzerland to her assistance.

We may dismiss the suggestion that Italy should send troops to the Dardanelles, as Kitchener has plenty of men available in his new army, and an Italian force would merely add to the liahel of tongues. Italy might land an army across the Adriatic or Croatia or at some other point further south with the object of co-operating with Serbia. But such a force would be liable to he driven into the sea by a rapid concentration of hostile forces. This operation will only be useful as a subsidiary move later in the war. If Italy is to play a useful part she must strike at the hearts of her enemies. There are really only two major moves open to her armies. These are a movement i through Venetia upon Vienna and a movement, preferably by a combined French and Italian force, over the Tyrol with the object of joining hands with the 'French forces in Alsace. This movement, if successful, would break the back of the strategical problem in the West. Tsut to be successful it will need to be carried out with very large forces, as large, in fact, as the roails and railways of the Tyrol will carry. If it is possible for the Austro-Garmana, to pass over a force sufficiently large to threaten Italy, it should be -possible to pass an equally large force in tlie other direction. The advance upon Vienna through Venetia is only possible in conjunction with the move through the Tyrol. A force advancing upon Vienna would be liable to be struck 011 its flanks by the Germans at almost any point of its march, and, with the Tyrol still in the hands of the lAustro-Germans, would be liable to be entirely cut off through a descent by them from the Tyrol into Venetia. Thus the Tyrol is to the Italians what East. Prussia is to the Russians, and more. Italy can have 110 large influence upon the course of operations until it is captured. But possession is apt to be nine points of the law in such a case, and the enemy have spent many mouths in fortifying their position. Therefore the sooner a combined Italian and French force gets to work the better.

We may be sure that a large AustroGprman force is already in the Tyrol, mui the number of reinforcements which they will require is no> liTcely to greatly ease the task of the firand Duke. Therefore the Allies must look elsewhere for the aid which they are bound to bring to him. Ormanv resembles a cagi'd tigress. She is securely held, anil cannot get out, hut it is extremely difficult to get in to her. We have to find some means of doing this -without getting our heads bitten off in the process.