A BORN LEADER.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVII, Issue 215, 18 February 1915, Page 6

A BORN LEADER.

GENERAL SIR JOHN FREXCH. HARD -FIGHTER' AND HARD THINKER. (The appended brilliant sketch of tin commander of the British Army on (h Continent, General .Sir John " French , v.-ns written by Captain C. S. Goldman.! M.P., for flint, enterprising American 1 journal, Collier's, whose special articles dealing with the war tiave not been equalled). Genera! French is best described in the familiar expression—"a. born leader >•! men." His most striking characteristics —dash, initiative, judgment—are those which insniro his men with affection ami his enemies with respect. The Boer loaders after the South African war, told us that of all the British generals they feared French, with his turning and sweeping movements and his mobile force, the most. Already the choice if '. General French to command the Expeditionary FoVce has been . triumphantly | vindicated, but T cannot help thinking I that 'had the Kaiser remembered his dashes |on Kiniberley and Koedesrand—two of the most brilliant cavmlrv dashes in military annals—lie would have be.-n slow to describe any force led bv this British ."-n-ral as ' contcmntiblc." Throughout th,. whole of the operations entrusted to his charge in South Airiw. f!cTi<-a: French %vas never at a loss Tie ],ad n j) rfect intuition for making th- rl<jlit move at tin; ri?'it time: hj» walked it>+o no (rap; there never was a surrender of any concrete hodv rf cavalry under his 'command, and his plans n-vor miscarried in anv particular in which their execution was' possible. This success was all the more remarkable becaus- under his initiative and guidance the British cavalry had in the middle of a hard-fought campaign to forsake th- older school of tactics in which th«. v had been trained and ii'lapt themselves to entirely novel and abnormal, conditions of I SOUTH AFRICAN CAMPAT"-X. _ T have always thought that French's 1 judgment of the enemy's! movements and intentions amounted to almost intuition. Often, when his operations appeared most reckless and hazardous, thev were proved to b;. most, carefully calculated. In particular, I remember our advancing in a valley toward the Klipriversberg on the way to Johannesburg. The rising ground on cither side of the , valley was occupied by Boer commandoes i who sniped at us, and finally brough* . guns into action, General French re- | fused to allow himself to be drawn into an engagement, but simply marched r>n 1 Surprise was generally expressed at th's ,; rather daring action, but the cxplann- | tion as he gave it to me was simpl> land characteristic. Through the valley I was a nek which he regarded as the key to his west ad\ zincing movement Had I waited," he said, "the Boers would have had time to shift.- T should have to fight anotlvr engagement v .t tec nek. and have lost, valuable time." He was quite right. We got to thnek at nightfall and v.- P got near Johannesburg and prevented the Boers from concentrating. At one time, with fhe Boers looking down on us from both sides, the position looked very hazardous for our little force, and T felt frankly, very anxious, lest they should (to any serious damage with their -runs Lilt next day, at daylight, there were ■„, Boers there. French felt instinctively that they were much more anxious to get north themselves than hold him un and, as usual, his judgment was right." Among the most charming of French's personal qualities is his absolute lank of anything like jealousy of others It was alwavs entirely indifferent to him who. got the credit for anv particular good piece of work, and he often seemed to shrink from anything like "limelight." this characteristic has been very marked in his recent dispatches from' France m which all the praise for the suc-i cesstul operations of our troops is given freely to hist subordinates, although had anything untoward occurred we may be quite sure that the Commander-in-Chief would have taken the whole responsibility.

rrc.mf.mbpr a striking instance of this quality during the march on Johannesburg, which I have just mentioned.' VVe were occupied on a turning one--.-tion at the Kliprivcrsberg on approaching Johannesburg. We were engaging the enemy, and were on the left in tuU yance of Lord Roberts's army. French found that the Boers were 'really retreating and that a vigorous attack would give him the credit of the capturof Johannesburg. But it would have cost a good many lives, and French be--I'crcd that by gently pushing the Boers back, the same objective could be reached with much less sacrifice. He therefore decided to wait for Sir lan Hamilton and his brigade, which he knew was coming up from the South-eastern I Orange river colony. He waited for I three hours, when Sir Ia„ Hamilton came up and a conference was held. It was arranged that Hamilton should be in the centre while French made a sweeping movement on the west to prevent the Boers from escaping in that direction, and so forcing them right b-v tion, and so forcing them back right across Johannesburg, and in front of the advancing British army. We made a wide sweeping movement and soon saw the enemy in retreat, turning backward and inward toward the town, but before the movement could be eoinplnf • ed, a n attack was ordered from the centre on the Boers, who were still tentatively holding o n to a rearguard position. The Gordon Highlanders led the attack and suffered heavily. French could have taken all the credit for himself of the capture of the town, but *t never occurred to him that personal credit was worth the life of a single British soldier.

AN IRISHMAN WHO KKEPS COOT,. Another characteristic of French i» Hint lie never Vses his head in a diffi. cult position, although one:' or twice I have'seen him in a very tight corner. One instance that occurs to me specially was at Kliphcuvol, north-west of Pretoria. The cavalry was making a wide, sweeping movement west and northwest of Pretoria. It was about five o'clock in the afternoon and the sun was froinjr down. We wore advancing through a very narrow gorge-like valley, and the road edged the sloop edge of'a hill, while the ground sloped on the other side and in front the hills closed in. The advance patrols were out. who,, we suddenly heard a few shots, quickly followed liv more. The patrols were drawn in, and it looked as though wo were ambushed, for a terrific lire was opened on ns. (ieneral French and his staff had come into line with the advanced cavalry brigade, and we found ourselves at once under extremely severe rifle fire. French stood for it moment quite cool and collected, thinking out ' Imposition. Then messages were dispatched to the roar to prevent other troops from pressing forward. Then men were dismounted and lined the slop,, of (ho hill and the shelving ground bolov. Kooni was quickly made for the guns to come into action. After a very brisk eii.•ragement, we succeeded i„ frustrating the enemy. But anv hesitation or mistake on the part'of Oenoral French must have landed us in a very nasiy disaster. I have ficon several instances of traits in French's character, but it '■- only by such rather random romini: eenees that it is possible to appreciate the readiness and skill which make him so trusted and beloved by the whole forces under his command. Take, for example, his operations round; Doles-

bcrp;. Colcsbc.rg was all, and periiap.to our line in South Afiiea, what Niimm was to tin! original line of the Allic. in 4!c]giiim. It was practically the mail, junction of the railway system—north U. lUiiilr.vicy and iihodesia, cast to liloemI'ontein and the. Orange Free. State, and south to Tort Elizabeth, and th, whole of Cape Colony. No poini coulu possibly have been or more vital importance. North, of Colcsbcrg Genera Mcthucn and his army were op. rati ntto tht! relief of Kiniberley. If tin heights of Colesberg and the Xaainn poort Junction, which was French's pivot had fallen, Mcthucn and the northern army would have been at the mere, of the Boers; Kiniberley and Miifekhic. would probably have fallen, and lihe desia been isolated. The door int Western Cape Colony would have, been open to the liners, who could have poured through, kindling into flame the already glowing sympathies of the Dutch population, and, worse, perhaps, seizing the Hex River Mountains and threatening Cape Town.

STUBBORN AND DAUXTLESS. Between the Boer generals and tin full accomplishment of their dreams stood French with his wholly inadequate forces. With what vehemence, with wdiat policy, with wdiat discipline, with what dauntless courage, with whin intense and stubborn devotion to a single end, French fought this battle with the Boers is written on every stag; of the following campaign. The wee 1 -, of watching and outwitting, of prudcnl - aggression and reckless valour held back th" forces-of Grotokir and Schtieman, relieved the pressure on Methui'and Catacre, at the most critical moment of their fortunes, and at last ul-low-d Lord Roberts to enter undclayed upon his northern campaign. When ~< i n ct, TTn.pr-h was ready to make ludash to Kiniberley, the first phase of the struggle was already over. For the Boers in South Africa, no less than the Germans to-day, time was everything, and with the failure of the first the ultimate ruin of their arms was assured. To the'patience and skill in adversity and difficulty and the briiiiance and judgment in victory of General French, Britain must largely owe her final triumnh.

The story of the dash to Kimberley lias been told tco often to be repealed here. Yet that dash through waterless country, ending in the outflanking of Cronjc's riflemen and the race of exhausted troops to Paardebcrg ami Hie Drift by the Mcdder which resulted in the trapping of Cronje's forces by Lord Kitchener and Lord Roberts, was in itself an historical There Cronje and his RflflO men were held mi bv Freneh and "the contemptible litti" armv" of (150 men for a day and a ni«lit ' until at last the doom of the mightier force was sealed indeed. Even anion:; the huge conflicts of to-day, wo may t:tk ■ comfort and inspiration from the heroism of that tiny force, and the daring of their (leneral who, making a show of strength that was not there, flung himself forward in an attack that broke the nerve of his opponen'~. and ffrove them into the depression i'::''■ —".s their ruin. T'n'm that time on even the mobile frrcos rf the-Boers knew that they lia I foitii'l their master. T< would be eatiy in go on. for, looking back upon the South African war, one- fnds trial the rie'donts which most ovur to the mind, ihe exploits upon which one loves to dwell, are largely the-e. "onpecti '1 v.-itli the name of (!enerial French. I'no t-.ees him ngain on the ejiile horse of which he was so fond; one re-oils tli" impatience with wiiieh, though he might walk his horse upon the level, directly he reached rising ground he always went at a trot to the top as quickly as possible. He is essentially a man of action, a man who loves to attack rather tlian defend, a man of big imagination vho loves the apparently audacious move which is yet calculated in tin; coolest and most detailed manner. Yet while he is a dogged man who can with infinite patience and confidence pursue his plan sure that when the moment comes and not before lie will be able to strike. with decisive, effect, he has the knack of surrounding himself with a staff of firstrate ability, and bis unswerving lovalty and generosity to all who serve him, not less than his unfailing geniality and high spirits, endear him to all who knew him.

A MASTER OF RETREAT. I have just returned from France, where I have visited the CompeigneKoissons battlefields; and wherever I Went, I heard expressed on all sides the highest admiration of Sir John French —for his splendid spirit in co-operating J eo closely with General Jofl're and subordinating himself to the general strategical plan. Somebody once, at a London dinner while proposing his health, said Freneli was the "incomparable Ney" of the British Army. "That was after the lionWar, when he had again and again proved his skill as a leader of cavalry; but it is not every colonel that, makes a good general, or a good general supreme commander in the field. French has not only been a brilliant leader of cavalry, but has proved himself to be a general of no mean order. In fact, the war has produced the man. French in South Africa went his v.-ay regardless of praise—he was rarely mentioned i n dispatches; his operations were too swift, and secret for the war sorrespondent to get alongside, and it was not until the conclusion of the war that people began to reflect that no one had anything to say against Freneli. Silent, good-tempered, ami alert, tliciv he was, ready to do his duty if railed upon, but refusing to press his claims at all; he stands in the minds of l'.r.-,'-lishmen as a type of man on whom (hey can rely in moments of emergency—solid, steadfast and capable. When history comes to be written, we shall know all' the early blunders of tl<" war. The French false opening by raiding Alsace and Lorraine—how the Belgians said they could withstand the torrent for so long, but must be relieved by such and such a date—how the French were not ready and were not able to keep the appointment—what time the Belgians were being cut to pieces—how "the contemptible little British armv" was hurled across the Channel under French, and took a hand as they alighted from the footboards of the panting troop trains. General French must have known that it was not military strategy which took him to Mons, but sheer humanity. The storv of that retreat will stand out in the pa-res of hNtorv blazoned with brilliant deeds. The 'Spartans at Tlicrnioplyae and Sir John Moore at Corunna made great retreats, but T believe the coolness, order and precision of Sir John French's retreat from Mons will shim! beside either. Von Moltke always shook his Irnd with perfect seriousness when praised as a general: "Ah! T never had to retreat: that, is the true test of generalship.'' And when you come to think of it. it must be so. Our soldiers fought all diiv-s;-cmed to drive the eneniv back, and then retired. Thev naturallv wani-d to know whv. and if thev had not had conmlet.. foiirnleiH- i n their leader, would hr.v•■■ Inst heart. Again and a-rain the cavalry had to wheel round and fight the roar-guard actions—for it, is so fatally easy- for a quick walk to become a run—for a rehviit to beeoui" a, rout. "Keep them on the run" is the commonplace of warfare. The diflieultv is to set th- pi-.c.-. and find where von ran .-too Tic !i ■■'■ them nearlv to the walls of Paris, and then suddenly the Germans came to <■- conclusion that the retreat was nut. so successful as they ln:d hoped. Tndce.l, in the words of Chatham, 'They had done nothing, and augured much." And that was due to Sir John French*