Britain's Food Supply.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVI, Issue 72, 14 August 1914, Page 7

Britain's Food Supply.

LV TIME OF WAR. Briefly stated, our position is that our annual consumption of wheat (including seed) is a little more than 30 million quarters. Of this we produce, from 6 to 7 millions, nearly three months' supply; 5 to hj% millions, or about two months' supply, tunic from Russia and the Balkan States: l-l to 15 millions from America (United States and Argentina), or about six months' supply; and about three millions from various parts of the British Empire, or rather more than one month's supply. These figures vary of course, in-different years, but they may be taken as an average, and they show that we depend for from seven to eight months' supply of wheat and flour on foreign—and possibly hostile—countries. When war broke out in the Crimea, out annual consumption was 19 million quarters, of which 1(1 or 17 millions were grown at home, and about 2 millions were imported; but in spite of the fact that wc then only imported about one month's supply, bread Tose "re m 6d to Is 3d per four-pound loaf. \ hat makes it still more ominous, is that at the time neither Russia, Germany, nor the United States, had any cruisers to harry our mercantile marine, but now all these countries have. CAN THE. NAVY PROTECT IT? Those who. know nothing about it, and some of those" w-ho do know but for political and other reasons wilfully close their eyes to facts, will say that a great •deal has been done; they point to out Navy Estimates, and say that they have reached unprecedented figures, and that we must rely upon our navy to safeguard our imported food supply. Without implying the least reflection upon tfhe Navy, I prefer to take the opinion on this point of naval men, and every prominent naral authority who has been asked for an opinion has certainly stated that the Navy could not guarantee the food supply. This has been given in evidence before the Royal Commission on Food Supply, and in the public Press, by .many officers of admiral rank, and I have never seen it controverted by any naval authority. Put briefly, their view is that if the Navy devoted its attention to convoying food supplies and to protecting Certain of our trade routes, they could probably ensure a certain proportion reaching our shores; but they all agree that the primary duty of the Navy ought to be to look for the opponent's fleets, crush them, or block them up in their own harbors, and to prevent an invading army from landing on our shores. Whichever of the two policies may be right, the food consumer is between the devil and the deep sea. If the Navy is occupied in convoying fleets 'f merchantmen it must be "condensed into sufficiently strong convoys to ensure victory over any opposing" fleet they happen to come into contact with. If not strong enough, we lose not only that portion of our Navy, but so much oi our food supply, and meantime the enemies' cruisers have been left to their own devices; so a weak convoy is useless. It -must not be forgotten that the speed of a convoy would he governed by the slowest man-of-war or merchantman in the fleet. This will mean flow progress under present conditions. for all sorts of craft bring our supplies Bow, and as we should not be given time to organise the carrying trade before the actual outbreak of war. we must Teckon upon present conditions at the commencement of hostilities. AN ENORMOUS LOSS. Let us grant, then, that if condensed into strong enough licet-; the Navv could ensure a proportion of supplies; 'but we could not count on any of the uncoilvoyed ships reaching us. Tliev would be cither captured or the owners would avoid the risk of loss by transferring to another flag, and by diverting t'h'e Bhip to a neutral port "for delivery in safer times; but they would be lost to us in the hour of need. In the meantime our own coasts are undefended, our distant possessions and coaling stations are left to look after themselves, our seaside ports and towns can be destroyM by a few of the enemies' men-of-war. and a foreign armv landed almost anywhere on our 'southern or eastern* coasts, practically without interference. Add to this 'the fact that the loss of a portion of our supplies, and the scare, of losing more, would send up ■ the price of what did come in to a liHkt I point than anything ever dreamed of bv i this generation. If, on the other hand, the Navv does' not devote itself to convoy work, the supplies will cease at once, for a few isolated cruisers and privateers could easily sink or capture most of the foodcarrying ships; while the rise in insurance and shipping rates, and war prices would put everything that happened to be in the country far .beyond tilie reach of four-fifths of the pupation.— \ XI Matthews, 'The Nation in Arms' '