THE ANNIVERSARY OF A GREAT DEFENCE.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LV, Issue 107, 21 September 1912, Page 3 (Supplement)

THE ANNIVERSARY OF A GREAT DEFENCE.

ISANDWIILANA AND RORKE'S DRIFT

Among the savage nations of the world there is perhaps liont? which shows a greater natural aptitude for warfare than the Zulu. who. for the hest part of a hundred year-, was tin; predominant military power in South-East Africa. From time to time we have, been engaged in hostilities with savages in various parts of the world, and, except in those eases where the enemy have adopted our tactics and arms to a certain extent, we have had little difficulty in overcoming them. The Zulus, however, were an exception to this rule—the tactics they employed were entirely original, the result of their experiences in inter-tribal warfare, and excepting a few more or less obsolete muskets, their weapons were the stabbing spear and knobkerri of their own manufacture, and yet in the war of 1870 they succeeded in entirely wiping out ;i British regiment, the South Wales Borderers.

A WORTHY FOE. The Zulu race first came into prominence a little over 100 years ago, when Chaka, the black Xapoleon, as he is called, became chief of what was then a small tribe of natives, and by careful organisation and iron discipline evolved one of the finest fighting machines the world has ever seen. By degrees the Zulu nation spread, wiping out all the black races that stood in their path,till a portion of the tribe worked as far North as Rhodesia, where their descendants, the Matabele, still remain. The success that invariably attended the Zulus in their inter-tribal warfare was due in the first place to discipline, and secondly to the use of the short stabbing spear in preference to the light assegai or throwing spear. The other black races in South Africa wh«n at war fought in an irregular mass with each man acting as he thought best, while the Zulus', under Chaka's regime, were drilled in regiments and moved in close formation under the leadership of a picked chief. The punishment for the slightest sign of cowardice was death, and defeat meant the subsequent execution of every man in the regiments engaged. The Zulu impi or army moved to the attack in the form of a crescent, with two large bodies of men in the centre, one behind the other, designated respectively the "Chest" and the "Loins." It was the duty of the two horns to encircle completely the enemy and envelop his flanks, when the "chest" would fall upon them with the broad, leaf-bladed assegai. Should the "chest" fail to carry out the work, the 'loins"—the larger body of the two—came forward over their dead bodies and fell on the enemy. Such tactics show considerable military knowledge on the part of Chaka, and for years he suffered no checks in his wars. True, his opponents were only natives, but it is doubtful if any troops armed in a similar manner could have withstood the shock of a Zulu charge. It would certainly be interesting to know how the ancient Romans with their short swords would have fared against these well-trained savages.

THE RISING OF THE STORM. From time to time the Boers engaged in desultory warfare with Dingaan and Cetcwayo, Chaka's successors, with varying success, and evidently coming to the conclusion that the Zulu was a foe not to be despised, they left their territory severely alone and pushed their boundaries northwards towards the Vaal and Limpopo. Meanwhile, the British colony of Natal grew up on the south-east corner of Zululand, and Cetewayo, the king of the country, pining like Alexander for fresh worlds to conquer, found himself shut in by the white races on both sides. For some time he had been harboring the idea of making war on the British, but fear of the white troops kept him in check till the year 1879, when Sir Bartle Frere, in his well-meant efforts to conciliate the Zulus, gave Cetewayo the impression that the English feared him. Savages, used aa they are to brutality and harshness amongst themselves, are unable to understand leniency and kindness in others, and almost invariably misconstrue it as fear. This has been proved on countless occasions in the history of our colonies, and many of our wars have been the direct result of a mistaken kindness towards colored races.

Cetewayo began to show his contempt for the British by frequent violation of the frontiers, and the murder of friendly natives, and finally despatched a large force to the British borders which, when asked for an explanation, he described as a hunting party. It wa9 perfectly plain that Cetewayo contemplated an invasion of Xatal, and, as that would mean the Murder in cold blood of every man, -woman and child in the track of the invading army, according to the custom of the Zulus," Sir Bartle Frere at once started to raise an army for the subjugation of Cetewayo.

The history of the Zulu war bears a close resemblance to practically every other campaign we have engaged in, and we started off in our usual style by greatly under-estimating the strength and prowess of our enemy. The force at toe disposal of Lord Chelmsford, who was in command, was roughly 16,000 men, of whom nearly 10.000 were native levies, deserters from the Zulu army, and Kaffirs and other tribes.

The force was divided up into five columns, but it was the third or central column, under the command of Colonel Glyn, on whom the brunt of the fighting and the greater part of the casualties fell. This force was composed of 4700 men, including the two battalions of the 24th, now the South Wales Borderers, a detachment of colonial mounted troops, and a large party of native levies. Thirty years previously, almost to the day, this same regiment, the 24th, had been practically annihilated at Chilianwallah in the Sikh war, when they lost over 500 killed and wounded, and an obelisk stands in the grounds of Chelsea Hospital in memory of the men who fell in this battle.

THE DISPOSITION OF THE FORCES.

On January 10, 1879, the columns crossed the Buffalo river at Rorke's Drift, leaving one company of the 24th, under Lieutenant Bromhead, at this spot to guard the ford and keep up communication with Natal. The next ten dayv were spent in constructing a road across which provisions could be conveyed by transport, and on the morning of January 22, the third column camped at Isandwhlana at the foot of a hill. Lord Chelmsford then moved oil with a reconnoitring patrol to attack a kraal where spies had reported a large party of the enemy were, leaving Colonel Pulleine with portions of both battalions of the 24tli, some mounted Natal volunteers and two battalions of native levies in camp. So far the British force had met with but little resistance, and the quietness of the Zulus lulled the English into a sense of false security. They had almost begun to believe that the much vaunted fighting power of the Zulu was an exploded idea, and presumably for this reason no steps were taken to put the camp in a state of defence. The Boers, in their numerous affrays with

>tlie Zulus, had invariably fonnci! a laager by locking their waggons together in a square, which formed a citadel the fierce warriors fourfd exceedingly dillicult to pierce, but Colonel Pulleine neglected to do this, neither were entranehments ot' any description niade. At ten o'clock on the morning 01 me ill-fated January 22—: a day on which there, happened to lie, strange to say, a total eclipse of the sun as well as of the British forces—(jolonel Durnford arrived with a portion of his mounted men. Shortly afterwards a few mounted scouts rode in and reported large bodies of the enemy in the vicinity of the eamp, and almost immediately a huge mass of men appeared on the sky-line. Colonel Durnford, whose previous experience of native warfare should have warned 'liim of the danger that was threatening the earn)), immediately rode forward with a portion of his mounted men and some native levies to meet the advancing horde, and at the same moment the Zulus, with the precision of trained troops, threw out a line of skirmishers with the horns well advanced to accomplish t,heir encircling movement.

Between the camp and the Zulu host was a small ridge, and Colonel Pulleine sent forward a company of the Ist Battalion of the 24th to hold this position. No sooner had they reached the rise than the first wave, of the Zulu rush came upon them. The 24th used their Martinis to good effect, and at the first volley thirty or forty Zulus fell, but sheer weight of numbers told, and almost before the unfortunate company had time to reload, the savages were among them with the broad-bladed stabbing spear and the skull-cracking knobkerri. For a few minutes the Borderers fought' desperately and silently with the fixed bayonet, thrust for dear life at tie Mack bodies of their assailants, and then the dusky tribe swept on. leaving the ground dotted with scarlet figures distorted in the throes of death.

Meanwhile, the rocket battery, which fired a high explosive rocket, considered in these days most effective against a savage enemy, had been totally destroyed, and Colonel Dumford, deserted by his native levies, fell back to a donga, where two companies of the Ist South Wales Borderers were sent to reinforce him. For a short while they kept the enemy back by accurate and well-sustain-ed fire, the heavy leaden bullet of the Martini proving a far better man-stop-per than the light nickel projectile of our present rifle, but thousands of savages, trained to expect heavy losses, are not to be denied, and with a rush they swept,over the ill-fated party and rushed towards the camp.

A REGRETTABLE INCIDENT. The small party of Colonial Mounted Infantry, having run short of ammunition, and being refused a fresh supply by the officer in charge of the regimental ammunition column, mounted their horses and rode towards Borke's Drift a moment before the encircling horns of the Zulu army completed the circuit round the doomed camp. Their conduct in leaving the rest of the column to their fate subsequently met with considerable criticism, but as they had been refused a further supply of ammunition, their value as fighting troops was practically nil, and, moreover, their presence could not possibly have prejudiced the ultimate issue of the battle. A certain proportion of them stayed to meet their death beneath the shadow of the Tsandwhlana mountain, but the rest rode on to Rorke's Drift.

By this time the camp commanded by Colonel Pulleine was surrounded on all sides by thousands of the enemy, who, exulting in their victory over the advanced troops, dashed forward with awful yells, regardless of their losses. The Martinis crashed in volleys, sweeping away whole lines of Zulus, but the rest rushed forward over the dead bodies of their comrades till bayonet and stabbing assegai met at close quarters. Even then the English soldier could still have held his own, had the numbers been anything like equal, for, although the rifle with fixed bayonet is not to be compared with the stabbing assegai as a weapon, the Englishman, whatever his height or physique, can always give a good account of himself At hand-to-hand fighting, be his enemy the fanatical Ghazi of Afghanistan, the blood-thirsty Soudanese, or the trained troops of European Powers, but in this case the odds were a hundred to one. The thin red line was swept back by the black wave, and, stabbing viciously, the Borderers broke up into small isolated portions- which held out for a short time fighting back to back.

THE LAST STAND. Colonel Pulleine, seeing that all was lost, gave orders to Lieutenants Coghill and Melville to endeavor to fight their way through the enemy with the colors, and, swerd in hand, these two gallant officers made a desperate effort to carry out his orders. For some distance they struggled in the •direction of Eorke's Drift, cutting down and shooting every Zulu who stood in their way, hut, despite their herculean efforts, they failed —for the following day their dead bodies, hacked with spears, were found in the river bed with the colors they had died to save by their sides. The end was now very near, and exactly what happened will never be known, as no man who took part in the last stages of the battle lived to tell the tale. From the accounts of Zulu prisoners after the war, it would appear that the ill-fated South Wales Borderers fought with the utmost desperation and inflicted tremendous losses upon the Zulu force before their ammunition failed. The bayonet in the hands of a man resolved to sell his life dearly is a deadly weapon, but from all accounts the Zulus, once they had completely cut off the column from retreat, and had them at their mercy, refused to come to close quarters, and shot down the British with rifles or despatched them with throwing spears. Considering that the greater part of the infantry were by this time without cartridges, "they were able to accomplish this without great loss. The artillery had lived up to their reputation—a reputation that has never been dimmed during the two hundred od years of its existence—and served their guns to the last. They had brought the guns into action early in the attack, and had inflicted terrific losses on the packed masses of Zulus as they advanced. Right to the very end they loaded and fired with precision and regularity, and when at last the victorious Zulus rushed in to assegai them, the brave gunners, so far from making any attempt to save themselves, were in the act of spiking their guns to prevent their being of any use to the enemy when the black horde fell upon them and slew them.

At two o'clock, Lord Chelmsford, returning with his reconnoitring party, came in sight of the camp, and being in complete ignorance of what had occurred, rode on towards the rows of white tents which were still standing as if no fight had taken' place. Small parties of men in red jackets could be seen through the glasses moving about the lines, and the column moved on unsuspectingly till a mounted man came in sight galloping furiously towards them. He proved to be an officer of the native levies, and he bore the awful tidings that the whole column in the camp were Zulus wearing the tunics of the dead soldiers, employing a ruse by which they hoped to surprise Lord Chelmsford's party. Late that evening Lord Chelmsford, having re-

eeived reinforcements, advanced to attack the camp in darkness. With him were a portion of the 2nd Battalion of the 24th who, owing to their presence on the reconnoitring patrol, had fortunately escaped the massacre that fid! to the lot of their brothers in arms. These men were burning to avenge the death of their comrades, and were longing to get among the Zulus with cold steel, but they found the camp deserted except for cold, stark bodies lying as they had fallen in the fight. In every case the corpses had been ripped up by spears, which is a Zulu custom, it being their belief that if a dead body swells up in the sun the slayer will himself swell up in. the same manner and die.

A HEAVY TOLL. The casualties .sustained by the British in this ill-fated engagement were exceedingly heavy, considering the small force engaged. The South Wales Borderers (24th Regiment) lost 23 officers and 579 men; the Artillery, 2 officers and (51 men; the Colonial. Mounted Infantry, 4 officers and (15 men; the native levies, 57 white officers and 'X.C.O.'s and 021 natives; total, including a few engineers and hospital orderlies, 824 white and 021 colored. As the Zulus removed their dead after the battle and buried them in different kraals, it is impossible to tell what losses they sustained; but,, considering that over 800 British troops died fighting lil»e rats in a trap, it is fairly safe to assume that the Zulu casualties were in the neighborhood of 2000, and probably exceeded thai number. Whilst the desperate battle was taking place at Isandwhlana, Lieutenant Ohard, R.E., with Lieutenant Bromhead and 100 men of the 24th, stationed at Rorke's Drift, ten miles away, were grieving that a hard fate had compelled them to stay behind in charge of stores and the sick, whilst their more "fortunate" brethren were on the path that leads to glory. Little did they think then that in a few hours' time they would be engaged in a Titanic struggle against the most terrible odds, a defence that will. live in our memory so long as the British nation exists.

THE DEFENCE OF RORKE'S DRIFT.

Shortly after three o'eloek an officer of the Colonial Mounted Infantry rode up to Rorkes' Drift, reporting that a large force of the enemy were advancing towards Rorke's Drift. An hour later heavy, firing from the other side of the river broke out, and a small party of Colonia|fe came in sight retiring before a mass of Zulus. Their officer remained to help in the defense of Rorke's Drift, but the men rode off in the direction of Helpmakaar, together with a party of native levies.

On receipt of the news of the disaster steps were at once taken to put the camp in a state of defence —the hospital and storehouse were loop-holed, the windows being filled with sandbags, a temporary wall of biscuit boxes and mealie sacks wasi raised around the camp, and hasty entrenchments were made where needed. Before the arrangements were complete, however, the advanced guard at the camp came in sight, and immediately rushed at the camp. They were leceived by a steady and deliberate fire which drove them back with heavy loss, and swinging round they made an attack on the opposite side of the camp, where they were met by the bayonets of the defending party. Another rush was then made on the south side, and at the same moment a heavy but inaccurate rifle fire was opened on the little party from some rocky ground just outside the defence Ines. This took a part of the defenders in the rear, and at once caused losses which necessitated the evacuation of a portion of the hastily-constructed wall. From this time until the firing ceased at 4 a.m. the following morning, a series of desperate assaults were made on the camp, and at about six o'clock the hospital was set on fire. Owing to the gallantry of four privates of the 24th Regiment, R. Jones, W. Jones, Hook and Williams, who held the enemy at bay with their bayonets while the sick and wounded were being removed, the greater part of the patients were being saved. As the fighting went on and the men began to fall, it became necessary to build a sort of redoubt of biscuit-boxes and mealie bags inside the original wall, and to this citadel the small party were eventually forced to retire. Throughout the long night Lieutenants Bromhead and Chard kepF up their gallant defence, repelling rush after rush, till at daybreak the thoroughly disheartened Zulus drew off, leaving piles of dead and wounded round the camp. Two hours later Lord Chelmsford's column came in sight, and their relief at seeing the Union Jack still flying above the storenouse can well 'be imagined. Their hopes of finding the small party at Rorke's Drift still holding out when a force twenty times their strength had failed to do so were decidedly small. The strength of the party at Rorke's Drift was 8 officers and 131 men, of whom 35 were sick. Of this number only 17 were killed and 12 wounded, while the Zulu losses in dead alone were 350. The force that attacked Rorke's Drift was a part of the Zulu reserve from Isandwhlana, 4000 strong, who, arriving at the scene of battle too late to take part in it, pushed on to wipe out the small party by the river. At Isandwhlana the odds against the British were, roughly speaking, ten to one, whereas at Rorke's Drift they were thirty to one. In one case the whole English force was wiped out; and in the other it conducted a successful defence, accomplishing its own release with what was after all a trifling loss. This fact proves that had the unfortunate column erected the most meagre of fortifications round the camp at Isandwhlana, they could, without doubt, have held out successfully and inflicted a serious reverse on the Zulus at the outset of what transpired to be a costly and lengthy campaign. Isandwhlana constitutes a dark page in our history, but, like nearly all our reverses, there is the consolation that our men fought like heroes for the sake of their country and for the honor of their regiment.