ITALY CANNOT WIN TRIPOLI

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LIV, Issue 249, 20 April 1912, Page 9

ITALY CANNOT WIN TRIPOLI

REVELATIONS BY ITALIAN GENERAL. A sudden and startling climax lias conic to tile war between Italy and Turkey, it being stated that victory to Italy is impossible. To those who bave followed closely the Italian campaign in Tripoli, the constant call for fresh troops in thousands, the unceasing .skirmishes by day and night with petty results, the monotony of waiting with nothing at the end by inconsequent advances on the fringe of the great desert and inevitable retreats, the disasters of deadly tropical disease, the wearing effects of army camps of alternate drought and floods, the scanty news which never told of adequate progress, and eventually dwindled to nothingless, the climax was not unexpected. Kut no impartial mind cared to voice anticipations of the eventful situation till it should be confessed by those in authority who had the conduct of the war in hand . General G'aneva, the Italian Commander-in-Chief in Tripoli, has now boldly exposed the position as impossible. 'He left his forces in the dismal field and crossed back to Rome to make liis revelation at the call of the Italian Government.

The nation knows the worst, and dismay prevails throughout the Sunny Land. Restlessness and discontent is manifest everywhere, from the capital to the villages.

'But there is no thought of yieldiii" the honors to Turkey, who, though un° able herself to gain a triumph on the "battlefield, can claim victory in Tripoli by the failure of Italy's hundred thousand soldiers to effect their purpose through many months. The only question asked is "How to bring Turkev to her knees?"

General Cancva's revelations are printed in T)ig type that occupies all the front page of the Italian journal, Avaifti. They are detailed in a despatch from tlie journal's correspondent reading thus: "When General Caneva came to Rome, at the invitation of the government, to confer with the Premier, the Minister? of War, Foreign Affairs, the Marine, and the Chief iof the General Staff, the disposition of the .Cabinet towards the Commander-in-Chief of the Tripoli expedition was not over-warm. 'They have always had confidence in the strategic ability of the general and a high estimate of his political sagacity, but they thought that he combined these fine qualities with an excessive slowness and undue caution. In a word, the Government thought the general's tactics far too dilatory. "In the very first interview that the geueial had with the leading personages of the Cabinet in Rome, the following question was plainly and squarely put to him: " 'Are you in a position, with the means nonv at your disposal, and with all the other means which you might ask for and which the Oovernment would not hesitate to give—are you in a position to provide that unequivocal and decisive victory of which Italy is in need if it is to impose an unconditional peace upon Turkey?' 1 • "General Caneva did not 'hesitate to give the resolute answer. 'Xo!' He said finally: " 'I cannot give to the nation that victory which is essential if peace is to ke imposed upon Turkey. All that I, for my .part, can answer for is the slow and gradual conquest of the whole territory of Tripoli and /C.yrenaica. If you want a brilliant success vou must seek it elswhere than in Libya,'because in a war of an essentially colonial character sueli as that which has been entrusted to me no armv could obtain a brilliant success—not at this moment -. not in a month's time! not in a veai- < never!" ' ' 1 The correspondent adds:" "I do not j know, and if I did I /would not say, what I were the arguments used by General I Caneva to demonstrate the soundness of 1 his thesis. But it is certain that he I firmly held to his belief in the absolute lnoppoi'tuuenss of all advance into the ' interior in search and pursuit of an' enemy that knows how to put himself out iof reach by reason of his great mobility.'