"THE BETRAYAL."

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LIV, Issue 172, 19 January 1912, Page 2

"THE BETRAYAL."

WHY IT WAS WITHHELD. LORD CHARLES BERESFORD SPEAKS ON "PAST PERIL." ] Lord Charles Beresford explained in a speech at Southsea why his much talked-of book on naval affairs, "The Betrayal," was withdrawn suddenly on the eve of publication. He gave at the. time the reasons that "a' most important correction is necessary," and "affairs have altogether altered since I wrote it." Lord Charles declared that when he had previously addressed them at Portsmouth he had' known all about the "verge of war crisis," but did not mention it, because under conditions that then .prevailed everyone should forget party, and support the Government of the day. So strongly did' he hold- this view, he went on to affirm, that he had refrained from publishing his book in which he ha<i set forth the true state of affairs. He would not have spoken now but for the conflicting statements of selfconstituted experts. It had Ibeen said that there was no crisis, but he pointed first to a speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer on July 21. That was a very good speech—a speech for the nation. Then there was the speech by the Prime Minister on July 27, which he thought conclusive that we were either on the eve of war, or in such a position that war might have come at any moment. Perhaps the late crisis, which had passed for the moment, might prove a blessing in disguise. We might get our services put on a proper footing. This did not require a great expenditure of money to accomplish. He would not suggest that we meant to attack or annoy any neighboring country, but we must be ready to resist attack. At the late crisis the British Fleet was divided. We had no reserve of coal. Thousands of tons of coal were sent from Wales to Scotland because there was none there. We had no military guards over our magazinesonly a. few policemen. We had no guards over dock gates and caissons, nor over railways, where the permanent way was liable to he destroyed at a moment of crisis. We had no mine clearers for our .ports or fairways, notwithstanding the fact that by the Declaration of London we were legalising piracy and inviting danger. And we had no oil supplies in the North, whereas the destroyers in that locality were consumers of oil fuel and not coal, and had to draw supplies from battleships. All this might be provided for by having a war staff at the Admiralty. Every other nation had one. It must be a bureau which was advisory, and not 1 executively responsible, one that could tell them wherein we -were short at all periods by taking stock and reporting: everv week. Now it was only at tne time of year, when the Estimates were made up, that the great officials were reminded—and that was how we gogfci into the position we were in the oMier "day. Take the! case of coal alone. We had always beerj short of coal even for peace required ments, and dangerously short for war requirements. The Admiralty without a war staff was like a house without a staircase, but in spite of the statements of self - constituted' experts, nothing had been done towards its creation as yet. However, he believed we would get it, and, at any rate, he was not going to let the matter rest until it was an accomplished /act. We ought to have at least 200,000 tons of coal always ready in reserve in the event of our being suddenly called into action, and most of it in floating depots, so that we could shift it to positions where it was needed. In the late crisis the Welsh coal strike was in full swing, and the railwaymen struck. Wo ought to .be .provided for everything, so that nothing might prevent the Fleet being ready in all details, whereas now we had battleships without cruisers, ships without coals and short of skilled men. Though he loathed their politics, he had confidence that the Government would do their best for the preservation of our great Imperial interests.