BRITAIN AND GERMANY.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LII, Issue 54, 29 March 1909, Page 4

BRITAIN AND GERMANY.

DISPUTING THE RULE OF THE SEA. In view of the. present alaim in regard to naval matters in llritain. tin 1 following, taken from the Nineteenth Century of July, 11)07, will lie read with considerable interest. It slicds not .1 little light on the present situation, though written nearly two years ago: .".Many English, people who merely compare th L > number of warships |iossessed by Great llritain and Germany believe that Germany is not able to meet this country at sea, and they are ready to conclude tint I G rinany will never be

able to dispute with this country for the rule of tli t , sea and the possession or colonies, the wish being father to the thought. The importance of facts and figures is all'Ci-led by circumstances, and it cannot be too widely known and too often asserted in this country that the Baltic ami North Se„ Canal doubles the strength of the Gerin-in navy, for litis fact is ignored by most Englishmen, naval oll'icers included.

''Germany's maritime position makes it clear that, if that.country should be engaged in war with a naval Power of the lirst rank such as England, the decisive battle would probably lie fought near the principal naval base of Germany— Hint is, not in the North Sea, but in the Baltic. Foreseeing this possi-

bility, th« German navy has, by constant manoeuvring, inailc itself familiar with all the intricacies and difficulties of that sea, and of the entrances leading to it. ■Naturally it suited Germany admirably that Great Britain was shortsighted enough to believe that she bad no int'i-ests in that sea, and that British naval officers were as unacquainted with the Baltic as British military officers were «''tli the Transvaal before the outbreak 01 the South African Avar. As British mival oll'icers were quite unfamiliar with navigation in the Baltic, the naval officers of Germany could contemplate with some.confidence the possibility of a struggle with Great Britain I notwithstanding the great superiority of the British Heel. It is therefore easy

to understand that a feeling approaching dismay and consternation was created in Germany when, in July, 1905, it became known that the British Channel Squadron would cruise in the Baltic. Thinking Germans could not disguise, to themselves (he fact that llritish statesmen hail at hist discovered ilic great strategical importance of the Baltic, and that the llrilish Admiralty had determined to make the British fleet familiar with (hat sea. Under these circumstances it was only natural that Germany would have liked to exclude the British warships from (he Baltic by som 0 diplomatic arrangement which, though ostensibly beneficial to all the Baltic Powers, would only have served to make Germany all-powerful in the Baltic, to make llic Baltic fiea a German lake. "Durinn Iho next few vears Germany's

naval position will be one of considerable diflicully, anil may become one of very groat anxiety inttit,m t , of war. Germany is building at, vast expense a (left or some twenty ships, each of wliieli is to lie larger and stronger than our own Dreadnought. None of these monster ships will lie ahle to pass through the Baltic ami North Sea Canal, which is ton small for them. Therefore (lermany has resolved to widen and deepen that canal, which doubles the strength of her licet. After having spent £8.000.000 on the original construction of the canal, she will spend an additional .£11,000.000. or no less than £ 10,000,000 in nil. a sum much larger than that expended on the "Manchester ship canal, and sullicient to build tea Dreadnoughts. ,in order to make it praclienble foi the largest ships which she is planning. If is expected that eight vears will be required to reconstruct tin- Baltic and North Pea Canal. Tlierefor-c during the next eight vcnr.s flcrmanv will be unable to avail herself of the great advantages , fnrnish'd bv the Baltic and Xortli Sea Canal except for her smaller and older ships. Her inagnilicent new ships will for some eight years be restricted to one of the (lerin'an seas. Cnii-equently nermanv will, during the 'next eight, vears. do all in her power to avoid a conflict with a first-class naval Power. During I lie next, eight years ( lermany has cvrv reason to keep the peace. Only when the enlargement of the Tialtie and Nortli Sea Canal has been accomplished will she be ready 'for a great naval war, and then her maritime position will lie a very formidable one. Tn eight yeavs ber naval opponents may rcijuir,'. one licet of more than twenty Dreadnoughts to watch the month* of the Kibe and Weser and a second licet of more than twenty Dreadnoughts to watch thi! Kattegat. Tn the near future (lie British naval budget should have to be vastly increased.

"It may he argued by the advocates of a cheap navy that fir™l Britain dues not. require a navv (if overwhelming strength; Hint in case of an Anglo-f!cr-man war I hi- British fleet should abandon its traditional policy; thai our fleets need not anarch out the flerman navy at il<s base, an undertaking which would olearlv rcipiiro that Circa I Britain should lav down at least two shipi. but more probably tliree ships, for every ship laid down by fiermany; that fWiniiny. which had become dependent upon her foreign trade for licr existence, could, in case of need. 1..' fought mor,, cheaply by a vigorous blockade carried on at a safe distance, where a surprise attack from cither opening o't the Baltic on a pari of the llriti-h tlcet would be impossible. Thii-c arguments seem plausible, but they are misleading, for it will not, be easy to slop flermany's foreign trade by'means of a blockade. flermany's principal trading ports arc not Hamburg and Bremen but Antwerp and Rotterdam, which lie in neutral territory, and which serve as outlet* to the Tiliine. by far (he most important trade route of j fiermany for her exports as well as her imports. As soon as the great flerman Canal svslrm which is to connect the Khine with Dortmund, with the Elbe and with the Danube—the Oerman inland canal system, 1 lll** the Baltic nnrt North Sea Canal, will serve rather strategical than commercial purposesis finished. Germany's foreign trade may. in Avar time, be made independent of 'Hamburg and Bremen. The trade going now; via Hamburg and Bremen may then be diverted to neutral ports. Saxony, for instance, will be able ia ship Tier manufactures and to receive her raw cotton, corn. etc.. via Belsiuin and Hoiland and tin- lihine instead of via Hamburg and tin- Elbe, and it may be doubted whether the neutral Bowers which provide Cerinnnv with cotton, corn. etc. will allow the British licet to interfere with a large and profitable trade which ostensibly 'is neutral. Croat Britato might conceivably "blockade not only Hamburg ami Bremen, but Antwerp, liotterdain. Amsterdam. Trieste. ; ,nd other neulrnl ports in eafiy reach of fiermany as well, and search the shipping there for flerman goods, but it seems lilrely that the vigorous protest- or the nations interested in the couiinmiucc of it lint trade, such as the Tnited Slates. | would soon lead to the rai-ing of thai blockade. ]

'■The foregoing details -how Hint flermaiiy's marilime position is already an exceedingly .-trong one. and that it seems likely llia't il will become increasingly strong, one might almost sav dangerously strong, in'lhc near future. Therefor,, the question arises: How can Hie va-l advantages which Clermnny enjoys owing io lier strong posiTion for defence and attack lie neutralised? Where is Ihe weak i-).ol in (lerniany's armor? The answer In f his question will promptly suggest itself if we remember the resemblance which (lerniany's position ill Ihe Baltic bears to Kussia's position in Hie l'.biek Sea. Exactly as Russia cannot be attacked in the "Black Sea.l except bv permission of Turkey. C.ormanv cannot be attacked in Hie Baltic] except bv permission of Denmark. It is therefore clear that both Ccrmany and Croat Britain have (lie very greatest iulerest in securing Denmark's goodwill. Little Denmark may. in an Anglo-Cer-uian war. ho al least as valuable an ally as anvoi ftho Croat Powers. Therefore il is clear thai both (lermany and Croat Britain nr ( . bound to do all in | llioir power Io .secure Denmark's sup-j porl in ens,, of war if possible bv a i treaty of alliance. Perhaps it has been

willi tins object in view Unit the Orman Kniperor lias, during (lie last few vcars.inaiu. tile most assiduoitis advances In bnlli (lie ■Rnviil House of Denmark and to lb,, Danish people, and thill, l'.v lii~ command, in everv rear a Herman naval demonstration of tlie <rrcnlcl nnteiiitiide and of unniislakealile iii-iiu-imr lake- place in I lit- "Baltic. Tlie present venr will nol form ail exception to llifi rule."