"Taranaki Central Press” SATURDAY, APRIL 3, 1937. GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA.

Taranaki Central Press, Volume IV, Issue 398, 3 April 1937, Page 4

"Taranaki Central Press” SATURDAY, APRIL 3, 1937. GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA.

o The report by a Japanese newspaper that British persuasion and financial assistance are behind the decision of the Nanking Government to spend £2,000,000 in developing Hainan Island may well be true. It is at any rate significant that as far back as November of last year there were prolonged interviews between Dr. T. V. Soong, the Chinese Finance Minister, and Sir Andrew Caldecott, Governor of Hong Kong, and that it was generally understood in both the Chinese and the Japan ese Press that these interviews had to do with railway concessions in Hainan. Both to the Chinese and to the British Government the island has considerable strategic importance. It is the obvious headquarters for the southern division of the Chinese Navy; it is on the projected air route between Singapore and Hong Kong; and, in the hands of a hostile, power, it would be a menace to Hong Kong’s security. Moreover, in the last few years, Japanese economic penetration has made so much headway that nothing but a strong effort by'the Nanking Government to develop the island can save it from becoming a Japanese possession. But the Japanese newspaper renort is interesting, not so much I for its possible basis of fact, but for the indication it gives of the I general attitude of the Japanese Press towards Great Britain at the I present time. During the last six months Japanese newspaper | readers have been informed with the utmost definiteness that the I British and Nanking Governments have concluded a pact of mutual I assistance, that British interests have received vast mining concessions in South China, that British influence saved the Nanking Government from disruption at the time when Marshal Chang Kaishek fell into the hands of the rebels, that British.advisers and British money made possible the Nanking Government's scheme of currency reform, and that Great Britain and Russia have come to an agreement for the delimitation of their respective spheres of economic interest in China. The result of these reports is that relations between Great Britain and Japan are at present more strained th* n they have been at any time since the Manchurian crisis of 1931. It is, unfortunately, extremely difficult to get much authoritative information about the dire-tio nof British policy in China. The British public and the British Parliament are so much pre-occupied with the situation in Europe that the Foreign Secretary has not made, or been asked for, a statement on the subject for more than a year. There are two motives behind Britain’s policy in China: the first ; is the desire to protect British investments and to restore Great Bri- ! tain s fina_'ial primacy. The second is the belief that a strong i China is the essential basis of stability in the Far East and that j therefore it is desirable to keep the Nanking Government strong, j lo the extend that the second motive predominates, Great Britain i can claim to be working for peace and security. But it is as well I to remember that Chinese governments are marvellously adroit at i the game of nlaying off against one another Powers which are I interested in China for what they can get out of China. I