BRITAIN’S FLEET.

Taranaki Central Press, Volume IV, Issue 398, 3 April 1937, Page 3

BRITAIN’S FLEET.

STRATEGIC BASES. Huge Expenditure. Of the £1,5.00,000,000 which Britain believei.i -she will have to spend on armaments during the next five yiears, at least £600,000,000 will be devoted to strengthening the Navy and improving . its strategic bases.' at Home and overseas, writes Mr Hector Bywater, the naval authority. In none of the many discussions in Parliam.>i|t on naval policy has any official indication been given of the standard of armed at sea which the Government aims to achieve. In the old days- British naval construction was always governed by a definite policy, fiankly -declared to the world. Down to the entente cordiale reached with France in 1904, Britain maintained a “two Power Navy,” that is, a Navy not inferior to the combined strength of the fleets possessed by the two Powers regarded as potential enemies of the first rank. Until the early years of this century that position Was jointly occupied by France and Russia, who were in close alliance. German Ambitions. But when -the naval ambitions of Kaiser Wilhelm 11. began to assume menacing dimensions, British interest was transferred to the German fleet, and in place of the old twoPower yardstick a new formula was evolved. From 1905 to the outbreak of the World war, the relative strength of the British Navy as against the German fleet oscillated between a superiorly of 60 to 100 per cent. In soape .years the British building programme was drafted on a “two keels to one basis,” in others i lower standard of relative power was accepted. At the end of the world war, the international naval position had changed so radical'y that the old formulas became n-eaningless. But in 1920 21, the big nival programmes of the United States and Japan compelled Britain to adopt a rough and ready standard of u a strength which was, broadly speaking, parity with the largest foreign !iav:y, namely that of the United States. This standard was accepted not because America was viewed as a prospective enemy, but because it ensured Britain an adequate margin of strength over any other foreign nava' Power, including Japan. After 1921 all uncertainty as to relative strength was dispelled by the Washington Treaty with its 5-5-3 ratio, to which up to now Britain has? adhered. Naval Outlook Alters. But in recent years the naval outlook has again altered so completely that it would have been quite impossible for Britain to keep to this ratio without imperiling her existence. Alhough the situation in the Pacific might be unchanged, there had been tensational developments in Europe, almost at Britain's doorstep, so to speak.' France and Italy had both built entirely new fleets, each of which was actually superior to the British Navy in fast, light surface vessels and submarines. Then came Germany’s vigorous rearmament at sea, paralleled by the creation of a Soviet Red fleet, Which from all accounts is really formidable. Matters were brought .to a head by the Mediterranean crisis of 1935-36, when for a time it looked as if Britain might have to fight singlehanded in defenca of her important interests in that sea. The British people were shocked to learn that to meet the challenge even of a secondclass Power it had been necessary to concentrate four-fifths- of -the Navy in the Mediterranean, leaving other vital areas, notably the Far East virtually unguarded. It was this- revelation, coupled -with sabre rattling in Italy, Ge-many and Japan, that forced the British Government to embark on the mightiest armaments programme ever launched by -this country in time of peace. Britain’s New Strength. Despite the absence of an official declaration, Britain’s future standard of relative naval strength seems clearly indicated. It postulates, the maintenance of something like a tWoPower standard in European waters, based for the -time being on the combined power of the German and Italian fleets, and the -restoration of British strength in the Pacific, where the advent of a strong battleship force, probably stationed: at Singapore* ap- | pears to be only a question of time. In other words, Britain proposed not only to make herself mistress- of the Narrow Seas —comprising the North Sea, the English Channel and the Eastern Atlantic— and to render her Mediterranean corridor less vulnerable -than ever before, but also to create an entirely new fleet for eventual service in the [Pacific. Repent events have convinced her that this is the minimum standard ar

naval strength consistent v-ith the safety of -the Empire and with the fulfilment of her obligations to the League of Nations, of -which she unquestionably remains a staunch adherent. No concern is felt about the American reaction to this great programme. If, as is fully expected, the United States should decide to match the new British Navy ton for ton, the decision will be acclaimed: rather than criticised here. It has long been recognised that a strong American Navy is a potent war deterrent, especially in the Pacific. Conversely, it is believed that the patent weakness of Britain in the Far East since the World War has directly encouraged Japanese Imperialism. Backbone of Battleships. Battleships for n the backbone of -the programme. Probably not. less than 10 of these ships will be built, raising the dread nought force to 25 units. A few years he,ice the Navy will have five molern and five older aeroplane carriers, embarking nearly 500 aeroplanes, besides- 60 modern and 10 over-age cruisers, and about 300 destroyers, the majority- being modern. The submarine fleet is also to be developed. The Navy’s personnel, now numbering 101,000 officers and men, may grow to 120,00 b. Side by side with this expansion of material and man-power, all the more important naval bases at home and abroad are to be modernised and re-armed, thus guaranteeing almost world-wide mobility to Britain’s new fleet. Finally, hug- reserves of naval munitions of all types, but particularly anti-aircraft equipment, are to be accumulated. It has been made clear officially that this immense programme, as well as the plan for a second to none air force, is to be completed down to the last detail, cost what it may. Britain, in short, after years of ap parent sluggishness and indifference to her own security and prestige, has staged a naval anti air come-back of such .magnitude as. to leave the world gasping. The tailpayer Who must foot the bill hopes and believes he is paying the premium on a world peace insurance policy.