“Taranaki Central Press” FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1937. NEUTRALITY DIFFICULTIES.

Taranaki Central Press, Volume IV, Issue 370, 26 February 1937, Page 4

“Taranaki Central Press” FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1937. NEUTRALITY DIFFICULTIES.

The neutrality proposals of the Pittman resolution in the United States will not clarify ,the situation either for American citizens or for foreign nations. They provide an embargo on arms and munitions, the refusal of loans to all belligerents, the closing of American ports to belligerent submarines and armed merchantmen, and the forbidding of American citizens to travel on belligerent ships or aircraft.

These prohibitions, which are to be exercised at the discretion of the President, are praiseworthy enough, but there is one other, which discloses the futility of the whole plan. It is the forbidding of American ships “to carry, goods likely to involve the United States in conflict.” What goods are these, and how will they be classified?

In the early months of 1914, the United States might have declared war on Britain, in the opin ion of the American Ambassador, if British diplomacy had not been subtle enough to let cotton go unrestricted from America to Germany. At that time the United States threatened to defeat the power of the blockade by invoki ing the Declaration of London, which she alone had ratified, and which Britain had strenously opposed.

The Declaration limited the right of seizure to such articles as were declared to be contraband of war. Curiously enough, cotton was omitted from the list, and so were copper and rubber. Even aeroplanes were not absolute contraband. The Declaration would also have prevented Britain from keeping foodstuffs out of Germany.

Four times the American Ambassador was instructed by President Wilson to demand Britain s unconditional acceptance of the Declaration, and four times Brita in refused. The Ambassador (Mr Page) was instructed to press again for acceptance, but he threatened, rather, to resign.

How Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Page extricated Britain from this dangerous situation is a matter of history, but no new principle of maritime law in war-time was established, and to-day there are as many ideas on the articles that ought to be contraband as there are nations.

Eye-Witnesses

The Judge who, in a Wanganui case, suggested that the jury should ignore discrepancies in the evidence of eye-witnesses and should take a “general average” of their stories, gave quite sound advice. The witnesses of accidents or quick incidents very rarely agree in their accounts; and the clear, straight-forward and complete story is liable to be the most inaccurate.

T he classical example was provided during a Congress of Psychology at Gottingen. The attack of an armed negro on a dancer, which had been fully rehearsed and photographed beforehand, was staged at a masked ball. Forty trained observers, who were told that their evidence was wanted by the police, made written reports. Only one of them made less than 20 per cent. of mistakes in recording the main facts and only six of the forty gave accounts that were even approximately correct. Thirteen of the scientists had more than 50 per cent, of errors, and twelve had 40 per cent, of errors. More amazing still, in twenty-four reports entirely fictitious details were introduced, the observers unconsciously substituting invention for fact. All ther e men were accustomed to scientific work in which accurate observation was essential, yet their eyes played them false. It is true that they had only twenty seconds in which to note details, but the incident was a striking one and the essential facts so clear that mistake might have been thought impossible. It is not surprising, then, that the evidence of untrained observers should be always open to supicion. Paradoxical as it may sound, no one is entitled to believe the evidence of his own eyes.