ITALIAN REVOLUTION.

Colonist, Volume IV, Issue 324, 27 November 1860, Page 3

ITALIAN REVOLUTION.

;At the date of our last publication Garibaldi, having completely effected the liberation of the ■ island of Sicily, had succeeded in landing on the i Calabrian coast with a few thousand followers, for the purpose of pushing forwardthe revolution on the mainland. Although it was known that be ;was poorly furnished with the'ordinary munitions ■of war and had no fleet, while both the royal army ; and navy which were opposed to him were large, powerful, and splendidly equipped, yet there were few who doubted that he would ultimately triumph. The king's army and navy, formidable i though they appeared, were well understood to be disaffected*to the Bourbon cause. The 'Italian i idea, had made sad ravages amongst both officers and men in either service. Nevertheless, it was scarcely expected that these vast armaments', would melt away at the mere approach of the Revolutionary troops, and that Garibaldi would in little more than a fortuight accomplish the liberation of j the whole of Naples. This consummation however has actually taken place. The dynasty which has solong tyrannised over the Two Sicilies has now been expelled from both. But more than this is ;to be chronicled amongst the events of the month.. The standard of the revolution having been .carried close to the borders of the States of the Church, the inhabitants of these states also have risen in insurrection and tendered their allegiance to Victor Emmanuel; Sardinian troops have defeated and scattered the Pope's army; and the last remnant of the temporal sovereignty of his holiness is at this moment, to all appearance, on the point of beiqg abolished. GARIBALDI'S MARCH TQ NAPLES. Gai ibaldi landed in Calabria on the 20th August ■ the fort of Reggio capitulated on the 21st;, Villa San Giovanni was occupied a couple of days after-wards'-two Neapolitan brigades surrendered at discretion; and Fort del Pizzo fell at the same ti me. These were the first advantages, of the Qari,baldians; and they prepared the way for the marvelous adyw on, the cajiUal. Garibaldi; reached.

Monteleojie, by the 27th ; but before that date insurrectionary movements had broken out in Basilieata and had- even extended throughout the whole of.-that province.. Meanwhile the royal army, or thatportion of it which could still be held together, Steadily withdrew. By the time that Garibaldi reached Salerno, all hope of defending the city of Naplt-s had been abandoned by the King, who now resolved to take refuge in Gaeta, a strong fortress, while lie gave orders that the 20,000 or 30,000 men whom he could still command (out of an army >vhich a few days before had numbered about 80,000) should be massed between Capua and Gaeta. Garibaldi entered Naples on the 7th September, accompanied only by a few officers of his staff. The reception which he met with from the Neapolitans, as will be seen from the correspondence which we quote below, was characterised by the most tremendous enthusiasm.

A good idea of the kind of opposition which Garibaldi had to encounter after his arrival on the mainland, and of the heroic manner in which he overcame it, will be gathered from the following extract from the letters of the special correspondent of the Times, whoaccompanied the invading army:— ! " Villa San Giovanni, August 23rd.—-Events are passing so rapidly that there is scarcely time to record them even in their general features. The whole Calabrese side ot the Straits is ours. 1 should mention that the whole line of defence on the coast is directed more against i'the sea than against the land. From Scylla to Reggio there is a succession of little forts, mounting from fifteen to twenty guns on an average, and, with the exception of that of Punta di Pezzo, which is on the beach, situated on the first heights above the sea. The road, the. only line for,. military operations, runs along the seashore, where likewise most of the towns and villages are constructed. Above all this line rises a succession of hills up the backbone of the Apennines, which runs nearly parallel with the Straits. From this description you can see that as soot, as a force has one point on the coast it can take this whole line of defence in the rear. The land side of the forts is but indifferently strengthened, and the forts themstlves are looked into from tho upper line of hills. To oppose, therefore, a resistance to an enemy it is necessary to do so from the heights; and even this has the inconvenience that, unless the most lofty heights are taken up, thefposition can still be turned. For the Neapolitans such tactics were doubly difficult, for the heights are the most favorable ground for us, where they cannot compete with us; but, besides, there seemed to be, little intention on the part of either Neapolitan troop 3 or officers to make a very desperate resistance. They had chosen Monteleone as their line of defence, and had, besides the garrisons along the line, two flying columns, each of from 1800 to 2000, under Generals Melendez and Briganti, the former more properly for the defence of the coast from Bagnara upwards, and the latter for the Straits. After the taking of Reggio this latter force had taken up a position above the fort of the Punta di Pezzo, on the plain which intervenes between the road and the heights. If the Neapolitan general had wished to be taken, he could not have chosan a more appropriate position, for by turning the heights of San Giovanni ho could not only be attacked and destroyed by the riflemen from above, but risked likewise having his retreat cut off. The position was so much the more critical as the men landed with Cosenzhad already taken possession of the heights.

"Garibaldi moved out with whatever was movable from Reggio, taking with the main force the hill line above San Giovanni. San Giovanni, Azziarello, and Pezzo are three long straggling villages along the sea shore, extending backwards over the first low heights. Behind them rises a mountain spur full of gardens. These circumstances were taken advantage of to approach without being perceived, while the column which marched on the road along the seashore occupied the attention of the enemy. In order to make matters more secure, the Genoese Carabineers and two companies of Riflemen were sent on to take iup a position which should command the line of retreat. All these preparations being completed, the force advanced on all sides, but without firing took up a position at musket shot from the enemy. The latter opened out with his four guns as well as musketry. No answer from our side; Garibaldi had expressly forbidden it. Defeat was not enough; the object was surrender. The Neapolitans could indulge in no illusions; they were surrounded on all sides and the sea behind them. They seemed not to see this in the beginning, for a parlementaire of ours, who was sent with a white flag, received a bullet through his head. About two o'clock p.m., however, the whole truth of their position seemed to dawn upon them, a thing to which the passive attitude on our side contributed not a little. A parlementaire came over, and his first demand was an armistice, with the naive observation that they were expecting instructions from General Viale. The answer was that they were expecting in vain, as the latter gentleman had retraced his steps from Bagnara towards Monteleone; that besides, there had been already sufficient time to make up their jjmind, and if they did not surrender at discretion by half-past 3, they would be attacked and driven into the sea. The delay was granted because some more troops and guns, under Bixio, were expected. At the return of the parlemmtaire great movement was perceptible—soldiers and officers mixed up gesticulating and talking together. Although this lasted some time after the hour for surrender had passed, Garibaldi waited until about 5 p.m., when all at once shout arose of * Viva Garibaldi!' c Viva l'ltalia!' The parlementaire came to accept the condition of surrender. Garibaldi himself went down among the Neapolitans, and was almost torn to pieces by hugging and embracing ; soldier and officer, together with General Briganti,, fraternised. It was, above all, when the Neapolitan soldiers were told that those who wished could go home that the burst of joy was greatest. They left their arms and went oft in troops. The* Carabineers and Riflemen on the line of retreat, not knowing what had passed, fired into the first troop, but orders soon set matters, right, and the flying column was by nightfai dispersed in all directions, leaving about 2.000 stand of arms, 4 field-pieces, and 10 heavy guns in the fort. But more than all this is the moral effect of this surrender, and of the 2000 soldiers returning to their homes adoring Garibaldi, besides the position we have gained in the Straits. Indeed, the news has already come in that both the Forte di liumara and Scylla have been given up to us. Thus w© shall probably find no resistance till Monteleone, if even there. The surrender yesterday showed the spirit of the Neapolitan army in a new light. It was, as nearly as possible, defection in mass. Thus the whole country behind Calabria Citeriore and Basilicata is up; they have proclaimed the Dictatorship of Garibaldi, and have put themselves in communication with headquarters. Verily it is high time the King Francis should think of embarking.''