The Battle of Cambrai.

Taihape Daily Times, 5 March 1918, Page 5

The Battle of Cambrai.

details of the attack. THE HUNS’ AMBITIOUS PLANS. OFFENSIVE VALUE OF TANKS. TRIBUTE TO GENERAL BYNG. v ' . t Received 10.20. LONDON, March 4. Sir Douglas Haig, in a despatch to ( the War Office, .dealing with the battie of Cambrai, mentions that it was proposed to stop the attack in fortyeight hours after commencement, or sooner if results did not justify, confer continuance after expiry of this tinuancc. In detailing his reasons : od, he states that positions captured north of Flesquieres were completely commanded by Bourlon Ridge and must be abandoned unless the ridge was gained. On the other hand, the enemy showed signs of withdrawing, and the loss of the ridge would probably cause the Germans to aban-! don their carefully-prepared defence | for a considerable distance northward. The enemy was not yet too strong in the Bourlon region to be overcome by the numbers' ‘at Sir Douglas Haig’s disposal. An additional important argument for continuing the attack was the enemy offensive in Italy. Moreover, two divisions under orders for Italy were placed at his .disposal, therefore, the prospect of securing Bourlon seemed good. Dealing with the enemy counterattack on 31st November, Haig says; At the northern end of Ronairs Ridge and in the Gonnelieu sector, swiftness of the enemy’s advance after the opening bombardment appears to have overwhelmed our troops, both In the line and in the immediate supports almost before they realised the attack had begun. The nature of the bombardment contributed to the success of the enemy’s plans. No steadily advancing barrage gave warning 1 of the aproach of German assault columns, whose secret asembly was assisted by the formation of the ground ! and the morning mist. A great num--1 ber of low-flying German aeroplanes ! rained machine-gun fire upon our infantry, while’--ah extensive use of smoke shells and ■ bombs made it difficult for' our troops to see what was" happening on other parts'of the bat-' tlefield. There is little doubt that | although attacks were expected generally, yet these were the,, battle, while this assault effected a local surprise. . Haig says the greatest credit is due 5 to troops at Masnieres, Bourlon and 1 Moeuvres for gallant service on this 1 day. Their steady courage and 5 staunchness saved possible serious : consequences.

Received 10.35. ; LONDON, March 4. Dealing with the results of the Cambrai Battle, General Haig says there is little doubt that it gave considerable indirect assistance to Allied forces in Italy, where large demands were made upon the available German reserves at the time when great concentration of German divisions was still being maintained in Flanders. Evidence is available that German divisions intended for the Italian theatre were diverted to Cambrai, and it is probable that further concentrations qf German forces in Italy was necessary at the most critical period when the tlalians were making their first stand on the Piave. Partial success of the enemy’s attack may tend to show that the garrison on this front was inefficient, either owing to want of numbers, or lack of training, or exhaustion. Sir Douglas Haig emphasises the point that captured maps and orders prove that the enemy aimed at far greater results than he achieved. Three convergent attacks were to be made on the salient formed by the British advance. Two of these were delivered approximately simultaneously near Gonnelieu and Masnieres, followed by still more powerful attack on Bourlon. The objectives of these attacks extended to the high ground at Beaucamp and Trescault. The enemy hoped to capture and destroy the whole of the British forces on the Cambrai salient. This bold, ambitious plan was foiled over the greater part of the front by the splendid defence of the British divisions engaged. Though the defence temporarily broke down, Vhe recovery made by weak forces still left there, within immediate reach, was most praiseworthy. 'After paying tribute to the manner in which General Byng conducted the operations, Sir Douglas Haig states: The great offensive value of tanks Is conclusively proved. In view of this experience the enemy will hesitate 1° deplete any portion of his front in order to free any of his troops for decisive action elsewhere.