THE PARIS SPEECH

Taihape Daily Times, 21 November 1917, Page 5

THE PARIS SPEECH

DEBATE IN THE COMMONS. ME. ASQUITH’S VIEWS. LONDON, November 19. Immense interest was manifested in the House of Commons debate initiated by Mr Asquith, on Mr Lloyd George’s Paris speech. The House and galleries were crowded. Mr. Asquith laid down two propositions which he hoped would not be controverted. Firstly, in war, the ultimate responsibility for what was done or undone, rested with the Government Secondly, it was vitally important that frequent and intimate consultations should be held between the Allied statesmen, and soldiers, and the coordination should be as complete as possible Nevertheless, he deprecated the establishment of any organisation interfering with the responsibility of the General Staff to the Government, or derogating in any way from the authority and responsibility of each of the Allied peoples to their respective Governments. Mr Asquith emphasised the fact that Mr. Lloyd George, in his Paris speech, did not ‘ mention the Navy, which in many respects dominated strategic considerations. Asquith asked which would decide in the event of disagreement between the Allied Staff and the General Staff?

Sir Edward Carson interjected: "The War Cabinet.” Mr. Asquith, continuing, said the object of the debate wag to dispel cer : tain misapprehensions arising out of the Paris speech. He pointed out that Mr Lloyd George equally shared the responsibility as regarded the invasions of Serbia and Eoumania, and affirmed that Mr. Lloyd George’s views regarding Serbia were not shared by any of the leading military authorities in England. The theory of a single front was perfectly sound, and the corollary thereof was that an ally at one end was helped by maximum effort at cither end. Mr. Lloyd George Had regaled the people of Paris with irrelevant rhetoric. His reference to the ' Western front suggested tha,t [ British and Dpminiqns/ blood and braiveiry! had been squandered when, strategically it, could have been better employed. Never were operations more carefully. conceived than those of Sir Douglas Haig and the French leaders. He doubted whether any Allied Council, wisely guided, would have interfered with either of the two great offensives in favour of more attractive adventures elsewhere. We had no reason to be ashamed of our war contribution, had kept the seas free, expanded our army into seventy divisions, placed our arsenals and credit at the disposal of our allies, and so we shall continue to the end.

THE PRIME MINISTER’S REPLY. HIS SPEECH DEFENDED. LONDON, November 19. Mr., Lloyd George, replying, said ■that more important than anything he had said at Paris was to decide whether greater unity of control was needed, and whether we were taking the right way to secure it. Se re-af-firmed that we had suffered by lack of co-ordination. The criticism he had directed against the past was not directed against the staff or any Allied commander. He had merely used certain illustrations showing the lack of co-ordination among the Allies had brought about disaster. The late Lord Kitchener had once suggested a scheme for central authority. The speaker was utterly opposed to the appointment of a generalissimo. Such a scheme would produce friction. Mr. Lloyd George said ho believed the United States would have preferred a council with executive authority, but he thought the circumstances at pre sent did not favour this. The new Council would actually, not merely, nominally, possess information which would be at the disposal of every one of the Allied staffs, and therefore a permanent Council was essential. Regarding the Italian front, there was a good deal that could be said about what Cadorna-had said, and what he thought or knew, • General Robertson could not press things with respect to another front, but under fife new Council he would be in a position to do so. He denied that he hacT blamed •the British for what had happened. It ‘was an unpleasant thing to remind Italy that it had cost twenty-five' hundred guns, but it was necessary, otherwise the Rapillo agreement would never have been passed. He know very well what would have happened, and he did not want it to happen. “I wanted this thing to be a reality. All this talk about easterners and westerners is utter balderdash. The field is north, south, oast and west, and our business is to put pressure on the enemy at every point of the compass and hurt him where we can. That is why we want a Central Council.”

The fact that Anglo-French troops had to rush to Italy to retrieve disaster, must affect the operations on

the Western front It had therefore been decided the present methods were utterly inadequate and inefficient. We must have a permanent, body constantly watching things advising upon them, and reporting to the Government. He emphasised that the representation of the Navy was not an afterthought; it was essential that all information regarding nayal operations and co-operation should be known to these military advisors. That was a different thing from the establishment of a naval council to co-ordinate naval strategy. We were suffering at present from the lack of such a council. Anyone who knew what was happening in the Mediterranean knew that there was a great deal to be said for such a council. He declared that he considered his Paris speech carefully and made it with deliberate purpose. Mr Lloyd George then reviewed the various resolutions adopted in favour of unity and co-ordin-ation, and the efforts in the direction thereof, which had come to nought. “I was afraid,” said Mr Lloyd George ‘■that this would occur again. We went to Rapallo with a document most carefully prepared and previously submitted to Cabinet. Substantially. the document which was adopted at Rapallo was the document prepared here. I made up my mind to take risks and and took them to reuse public sentiment, not merely here, but in ca, to see that this document--became an Act. I know nothing of military strategy; but I know something of political strategy, and to get public opinion interested in a proposal and convince them of its desirability is the essential part of political strategy. That is why I made that Speech, and it has done it. I was determined to deliver a disagreeable speech which would force everybody to talk about this scheme. They have talked about it in two or three continents. The result is that public opinion in is that the scheme is vital.

He withdrew not a single syllable of his Paris speech. He asserted that no soldiers in any war had had the strategical position less interfered with .by politicians,. Only on " two occasions had. heppcted against l The ad- : vice of : soldiers ain ; this-! wanr. One occasion was, ; in regard! ;;to: the- big gun programing, when, they thought they were manufacturing .too many and would be unable to man them. The other occasion was .whan he pressed upon soldiers the -jappointment of a civilian to reorganise- -the railways behind the lines. Policy and strategy were inextricably interwoven. Those trying to separate them and foster disunion were traitors, Mr Lloyd George deprecated attempts to foster suspicion .between -England ' and France. “If,?’ he said, “We act to- , gether, we need not -Tear what \ will happen. I see anxieties on the feorizon,,J never conceal these. It is better to tell the people what is happening. No anxieties will modify my conviction that only two things could defeat us. If the submarine menace wrenched the freedom of the seas our hopes would be shattered, but I have no further fear of the submarines. On Saturday we destroyed five of these pests The only other danger is the lack of unity, A motion for the adjournment was withdrawn. /•