Great Britain

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXVIII, Issue 66, 17 November 1915, Page 5

Great Britain

MR CHURCHILL'S STATEMENT. United Press Association. London, November 15. Speaking from a corner seat behind the Treasury Bench, Mr Churchill said that the fact that lie had not taken a place in the front Opposition Bench did no imply criticism. of those who did. He earnestly hoped that Sir E. Carson would be constantly in attendance. In the public interest someone with complete and secret information, and independent of the Government, should'be available. i He. could not conceive any ' reason why the story of the Falklands battle should not have been published. Regarding the destruction of the Bacchante cruisers, it was untrue that he had overruled the naval authorities, and that the disaser was due to him. He had no objection to the publication of the papers, but he would not press 'this if such would injure the officers now serving.

THE ANTWERP EXPEDITION. The project of sending an. army to Antwerp originated with Lord Kitchener and the French Government. He (Mr Churchill) was not consulted till large bodies' of troops were actually moving. He summoned a conference at Lord Kitchener's house on October 2, when Sir E. Grey and Lord Fisher were also present. Then be learned of the project to send a relieving army,, and also that after the preparations to aid Antwerp were so far advanced the Belgian Government telegraphed their decision to evacuate the city and abandon its defence. All were extremely distressed to learn this. It seemed that everything would be thrown away for the sake of three or four days of continued resistance. He accordingly offered, and did not regret it one bit, to proceed to Antwerp immediately, to tell the Belgian Government what they had done and to see in what way the Belgian defence could be prolonged. His colleagues accepted the offer, and he crossed the Channel immediately. Having consulted the Belgian Government and the British Staff officers at .Antwerp he made a telegraphic proposal that the Belgians should continue] their i resistancp |t|> the utmost' limit of their power,, amb that the British and French Governments should say definjtely. in. three days whetherthey would be able to send relief. Britain was also - to encourage' the de-' fenders of. Antwerp ,by. sending, naval, guns and a naval brigade. His proposal was accepted,-, and he was told that a relieving army would be sent. He was told that everything possible would be done to maintain the defence. There had been a great mistake in regard to Lord Kitchener's effort to relieve jAntwerp,, ag itvonly.. resulted- in, misfortune. History, however, would determine that it resulted greatly to

the advantage qf the Allies ; an. the' West, causing the great battle on the Y.S£r ! instead of further, south. "The real operations .were. taken too late; On September! Ghe .had,'directed the jittentiori of ;Mr..lAsqu'ith,A Lord.' Kitchener, and Sir E. Grey to the dangerous situation developing at Antwerp,- and the grave consequences possible. Admiralty interests suggested that Territorial divisions should be sent to stimulate the defence, and he made

other proposals, but no action was taken until the situation on October 2 supervened. He took the responsibility for sending the naval brigade, despite their want of training,, but the situation was desperate and they were the only men available. THE DARDANELLES. Mr Churchill stated that he would not have it said that the Dardanelles campaign was a plan foisted by a political amateur upon reluctant officers. He regarded it as a legitimate war gamble, of inestimable value, in which there was a reasonable chapce of winning. On that basis he accepted full responsibility. Russia, in November, asked the Foreign Office whether action against Turkey was possible, to relieve the pressure in the Caucasus. In consequence he began to direct the attention of Lord Fisher and otl\er naval officers to the possibility" of action in Turkish waters. He sent a minute on November 30 to Lord Kitchener, offering facilities for the transportation of forty thousand troops, and was informed that no army was available.

Early discussions in the House showed that the prevailing opinion was that even if a force were available it could not be used in attacking Gallipoli Peninsula. As the necessity for action in the Eastern Mediterranean had been con-. stantly pressed upon the Admiralty, Mr Churchill said he telegraphed, on January 3, to Admiral Garden, and

asked, if he considered that the forcing of the Dardanelles by ships alone was a practicable operation. Admiral Carden replied that the Dardanelles could not be rushed, and suggested a sus- ' tained bombardment. Admiral Carden, in a detailed telegram on January 11. stated his requirements. The Admiralty War Staff examined the ! *plan. Vice-Admiral Jackson expressed 'full concurrence and advised attacks I on the outer forts as early as possible. JLord Fisher never expressed any I opinion against the operations at his I stage. Lord Fisher's memorandum did not question the feasibility of the operation, but deprecated reducing the 1 margin of the fleet in home waters. The first operations had produced an electrical shock in the Balkans, and when joint military operations were decided on Lord Fisher regretted the delay. He refused an order for resumption of a purely naval attack during the period between March 18 and April loth. This was one of the least pleasant experiences in his . (Mr Churchill's) life. He did not regret Lord Fisher's return to the Admiralty, because he had produced a new design of ships land swelled like a tide their delivery. I

THE MILITARY OPERATIONS. Lord Kitchener was responsible for the military operations at Gallipoli, which should have been carried through with the utmost vigor and fury. Throughout the summer the army stood within a few miles of a great victory, and an advance like that at Neuve Chapelle would have decided the whole situation. He did not intend to be drawn into further controversy, no matter what was said in reply, He had left his documents with I the Attorney-General. When Lord Fisher had resigned, he himself had offered to resign, but Mr Asquith had asked him to continue. "We have no reason to be discouraged by the progress of the war," said Mr Churchill. "We are passing through a time probably worse than before. It is not necessary to win the war by pushing back the Germans in territory that is now held, while the German line is extended far beyond the frontiers, and military success has apparently attended the German arms. Germany might still be defeated more fatally in the'second'or third year than if the Allies had entered Berlin in the first year. The shortage of munitions governed the campaign of .1915, and the campaign of 1916 ouglii to' be' settled against Germany by the shortage of men." ■ • . , ,„

When Admiral ICarden' was;' stricken ; with illness, Mr Churchill said that he sent a personal secret telegram to Admiral de Roebeck,, asking whether" he approved of the 1 Admiralty's arid 'Admiral! Garden's decision to press the attack on March 17; also to say whether, in his independent judgment, immediate operations were wise and practicable. If not, he was not to hesitate to say so; if he approved, he was to execute them without delay.(( • Admiriil *le* Roeheck replied, fully eonciirring with' the Admiralty plans,' and added, "I will attack on the 18th." ■■:•'■ Mr Churchill declared that if, in the weekfc elapsing between the naval and military operations, we had known what! we knpw'nowy he could not conceive that anyone'would have hesitated to face a loss of prestige hy breaking off the Dardanelles' attack. isSm wished to make clear that he...encouraged the War Office to the utmost to prosecute the military enterprise, and he had counselled the Government all through the year to take Constantinople, either by naval or military operations, but to take it quickly while time remained. But the situation was now altered entirely. A FAITHFUL FRIEND. Mr lAsquith said that Mr Churchill had dealt with a delicate situation with loyalty and discretion. He had said some tilings which he (Mr Asquith) would rather he had not said, and omitted some things which would he saad hereafter. He had always found ill' Churchill a wise counsellor, a hrilliant colleague, and a faithful friend.

H I London, November 15. The House of Commons was crowd. ,ed. There was no demonstration at Mr Churchill's entry, but an encouraging cheer when he rose. When ho concluded there was a. hurricane of applause. A number of members on both sides went up and warmly shook hands with him. There was nothing apologetic in the speech, and the references to Lord Fisher were spoken in firm tones of condemnation. PRESS COMMENT. London, November 15. The Morning Post says that it is relieved that Mr Churchill lias left the Admiralty, and the paper hopes that

he will not he allowed to occupy a superior position in the Army. ; The Daily Telegraph and the Chron- | icle .say that Mr Churchill refuted j many allegations, but they regret his j attempt to shift the blame on to Lord Fisher and Lord Kitchener. The Daily Mail says that, on Mr Churchill's narrative. Lord Fisher must hear the blame for the naval attack at the Dardanelles, but Lord Fisher has yet to be heard. It is disconcerting to discover that the Government persisted in the expedition 'alter it had failed, and yet poured [troops on to a terrible peninsula to see them slaughtered against increasingly formidable positions. i The Times says that Mr Churchill's speech was an undoubted Parliamentary triumph, but the country should have been told months ago of everything that was said yesterday. There was no good military or political reason for keeping silent. | The Bombay Chronicle hopes that Mr Churchill's resignation will give him an opportunity of succeeding Lord Hardnge as Viceroy of India. Amsterdam, November 15. German newspapers ask whether Mr Churchill, will be the only victim. Some of them regard his retirement as only temporary. I LORD* KITCHENER.

: London, November 1(5. In the Commons on discussion of the four hundred million pounds vote. Sir A. B. Markbam hotly attacked Lord Kitchener, who, he said, had taken the censorship into his own hands, and ' thought he could treat the people of, this country like dervishes. While Lord Kitchener remained "in office no good could come from the War Office. He was a man who persistently bullied everyone disagreeing with him, and he could not bring the war to a successful conclusion. Lord Kitchener, in . every stage of life,, bad broken every man who interfered with him. Mr Bonar Law condemned Mr Trevelyan's speech. Not a member of the House believed that Germany would restore Alsace to - France, or the Polish' people their nationality iintil she was beaten. Referring to Sir E. Carson's speech, lie said: "It is .untrue that Sir Edward: Carson; and myself galloped up to the fence together. Sir Edward Carson took, it, but I refused. I found no reason for, resignation. It is true that tehe. Coalition Government was not succeeding as was hoped, and therefore it was necessary that smaller body be entrusted with executive, action. ... , ■ s- . Rpnie, November 16. It is'reported', that'Lord Kitchener has ajrrivcd at Mudros, on the Island of Lemnos.

LORD FISHER'S DIGNIFIED REPLY. :_ ; (Received 11.5 a.m.) 1 , i - London, November 16. Lord Fisher, in the House of Lords : said:!*Ce|tain references .were made to melbykr Churchill in his speech, and I-can only say that. J have been sixty%e {years l| the service of the country, and Ll|aye niy record in the hands'ofi my I 'countrymen. Mr Asquithlfhal stated that ;Mr Cliurchill said things Wlaieh vm$ better- left unsaid and :had\jciot. said things which should have been said. I am content to wait, as it is'not fitting to makei personal explanations affecting the national interests when the country is in the midst of a great war. Lord Fisher then left the House.

PSEUDO-PATRIOTISM. MRS PANKHURST TURNE33 DOWN (Received 11.50 a.m.) London, November 16. The Council of the Royal Albert Hall withdrew Mrs Pankhurst's permission for a so-called great patriotic meeting to demand the vigorous conduct of the war. Her private circular showed that the main object was to protest against Mr Asquith and Sir Edward Grey, and such a meeting could not be regarded as patriotic.