MOUNTED TROOPS

Southland Times, Issue 24888, 30 October 1942, Page 2

MOUNTED TROOPS

General Puttick’s Views

In an interview at Wellington the General Officer Commanding the New Zealand Forces, Lieutenant-General E. Puttick, was asked whether it would not be advisable to have more mounted units in view of the fact that New Zealand had no substantial natural fuel resources for its mechanized forces, whereas mounted units could live off the country and negotiate areas unsuitable for mechanized units. Lieutenant-General Puttick replied that New Zealand had sufficient Army fuel in storage to meet any situation that could be foreseen. Mounted troops were far from mobile so far as movements over long distances were concerned. For instance, if there were mounted units at Palmerston North, and an attack was made at New Plymouth, it would take three or four days for them to get there; from the same point motorized or mechanized units could cover the distance in a few hours. And if this attack on New Plymouth was only a feint and it was necessary to divert forces sent there to Napier, for instance, the horses would not be fit to continue the trip without adequate rest. The main consideration must be the mobility of troops. Mounted troops must be somewhere near the locality where they were to be employed. The man-power situation did not permit of the consequent dis- <

tribution that this entailed. If we had more permanently mobilized mounted tops we would have a corresponding reduction in other arms. However he would like to see more m°^ e d troons and was encouraging their formation in the Home Guard, which automatically provided horsemen at numerous points where they might of great value to other forces which proceeded there. In addition, there were independent mounted rinles squadrons. More mounted units existed than was generally realized.