The Southland Times TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1942. Divided Command in the Pacific

Southland Times, Issue 24885, 27 October 1942, Page 4

The Southland Times TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1942. Divided Command in the Pacific

THE appointment of Vice-Admiral William Halsey to command the naval forces in the South Pacific is the first official intimation that Washington is not completely satisfied with the conduct of operations in the Solomons. American newspapers are hinting at “grave concern over the quality of our leadership.” There is a tendency to emphasize the fairly heavy naval losses, and to see them as evidence of “costly tactical blunders.” It was inevitable that the Americans should lose warships in the type of battle that has to be faced when troops are being landed at strongly defended positions. How far Vice-Admiral Ghormley’s tactics were responsible for losses which experts now seem to think should have been much lighter is a question that cannot be answered until more information is available. The United States naval censors do not release the essential facts until long after the operations are ended. It was not until two months after the four Alllied cruisers were sunk off the Solomons that an announcement was made; and even now there is a suggestion that “this list is incomplete.” When a highly-placed officer is held responsible for losses and failures he has no chance to speak for himself. The reputation of Vice-Admiral Ghormley, like that of naval and military commanders elsewhere, must therefore wait upon the final judgment that can be reached only when the fighting is over. But it is interesting to notice that some commentators are inclined to blame the system of control rather than individuals who are acting as its instruments. “There is room for doubt,” declared The New York Herald-Tribune, “whether ViceAdmiral Ghormley was primarily responsible for the mistake in the Solomons campaign, which has not been concluded, or whether the fault lies in the peculiarly unfortunate division of the Pacific command.” This matter has been more widely discussed in Australia and the United States than in New Zealand, although it will be remembered that the Prime Minister said plainly enough that the decision to establish a separate command for the South Pacific was against the feeling of the Dominion Governments. It was felt at the time that the defence of Australia and New Zealand required an undivided command.

General MacArthur’s Post

The arrival in Australia of General MacArthur gave rise to hopes that operations in the Pacific would be directed from bases which seemed to be the natural starting points for an offensive against the Japanese occupied territories. It has always been obvious that naval, air and land forces required a full co-ordination, and those who had watched with admiration the epic defence of Batan, organized by General MacArthur, believed that that great soldier was the most suitable man to receive the supreme responsibility. This belief has not been weakened by recent events. Some time ago General MacArthur held a Press conference, and talked for two hours in an attempt to explain a position which had caused surprise and disappointment in Australia. An American correspondent later spoke of his impression that “General MacArthur was a most able officer who was determined to obey orders.” This statement was interpreted by the newsmagazine, Time, as a hint that the General “was under orders which made him unhappy, and that these orders had come from Washington. It was also obvious that Washington, not the ‘General MacArthur’s Headquarters’ in the Australian date lines, was dictating the conduct of the campaign in Australia.” It has never been easy to understand why operations in the Pacific should be placed under a system of remote control. Washington is a long way from the Solomons. News, can be flashed as quickly to the United States as to Sydney or Darwin; but there is a mass of information constantly filtering through the airforce stations, and other channels of communication, that gives the local command a far clearer picture of the total situation than can be available for naval strategists who are at work thousands of miles from the battle zone. It has been suggested more than once in the United States that the root of the trouble is the old rivalry between the Navy and the Army, a rivalry which so far has left the Navy more or less in control. Public opinion has increasingly , favoured a united high command for the fighting services. This demand appeared to have been answered when President Roosevelt named Admiral William D. Leahy as his personal Chief of Staff. But later reports showed that the appointment did not go far enough; it merely created an advisory post. Unity of command is a question for the American people, and it is clear from their newspapers that they are still hoping for a more satisfactory arrangement. But if there are reasons why the United States Government prefers the present system it should at least be possible to avoid the weaknesses of a divided command in a special battle area. Vice-Admiral Halsey has his headquarters in New Zealand; General MacArthur is established in Australia. The immediate direction of naval policy presumably comes from Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Com-mander-in-Chief in the Pacific, whose headquarters are at Pearl Harbour. Army orders apparently come directly from Washington. Naval and army leaders in command of the different areas are working to the same end: to drive the Japanese out of the south and south-west Pacific. Their co-opera-tion will certainly be as close as it can be in the circumstances. It would surely be still closer, and more effective, if sea and land operations were brought under a single command.