The Southland Times MONDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1942. The Campaign in North Africa

Southland Times, Issue 24884, 26 October 1942, Page 4

The Southland Times MONDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1942. The Campaign in North Africa

WHEN General Alexander and General Montgomery received their appointments in the Middle East it was reported in The New York Times that orders had been given “to smash Rommel rather than make territorial gains and consider costs.” At the time the report was published there was nothing in the news to make it seem more than the guess of an enterprising journalist. But it was strikingly confirmed when General Montgomery issued his order of the day to the Bth Aj-my, on the eve of its new offensive. The order was terse and explicit: “Destroy Rommel and his army!” As usual, official comment is cautious: it can scarcely be otherwise while the battle is in its opening stage. Moreover, some pains have been taken to warn the public that rapid and spectacular advances must not be expected. Much has happened since the Sth Army last took the offensive, in November 1941. Both sides were then able to command vast desert spaces for tactical manoeuvre. Tank battles in the frontier area were followed by a German withdrawal. It had been expected that the first clash of armoured forces would decide the issue. But after a 350-mile retreat to Jedabaya, and thence to El Agheila (where heavy reinforcements were waiting) Rommel struck back, recapturing Jedabaya, Benghazi and Barce, and establishing a desert ascendancy which allowed him, towards the end of last May, to take the initiative in a devastating sweep almost to the gates of Alexandria. Even at that time, however, the nature of the North African campaign was visibly changing. Rommel had to feel his way towards the British positions through vast minefields. Although land mines had been used by both sides since the Italians first marched into Egypt, this was the first time that the communiques mentioned their use on any large scale. At one period it began to seem probable that a numerical equality in tanks, plus the use of minefields in a defensive strategy, would rob the desert fighting of its spectacular mobility. But Rommel was able to recover the momentum of his first advance, and again his tactical genius prevailed. The offensive was stopped at El Alamein; and when Rommel struck again, on the last day of August, it soon became clear that he would have no scope for the swift battle of manoeuvre. Since then both sides have prepared elaborate defence systems. The terrain has fixed a definite pattern upon the battlefield. Between the Mediterranean coast and the Qattara Depression are barely 40 miles of level country, broken in the south by ridges that have seen hard fighting. There is no room here, as Rommel found in September, for a breakthrough by tank columns. And this tactical restriction will now be felt by the Bth Army as it moves against the defences organized in depth by the Axis forces.

The Wider Background

It is significant that the official bulletins are already making comparisons between the present operations and the frontal assaults of the last war. Such comparisons, however, must be studied against a larger background which includes a number of important features. Most important of all, perhaps, is the intervention of air power. This is not merely a question of bombing the coastal supply routes, or of “strafing” enemy formations in the concentration area, although both these activities are certain to be reported. The Royal Air Force is cooperating, not merely in Egypt, and at Libyan ports, but also in the skies over Italy. When the bombers flew across the Alps to drop their loads on Genoa and Milan they were striking at industrial, assembly and transport centres that help to hold together the Axis web of supply and communication. Rommel’s lines stretch from his desert positions to the ports of Libya and Italy, the railway system that links Italy to Germany, and the heavy industries of the Reich. Every blow which falls on the nerve centres of the system must weaken the defences against which the Bth Army is advancing. The process of long-distance interference is not confined to one side. It is being carried on by German submarines that go out from Dakar to attack the convoys steaming along the Cape route to the Middle East. But Dakar may become less dangerous when American planes, based in Liberia, keep watch over the central Atlantic sea lanes. And although it might be unwise to expect early developments’ in French West Africa the opening of a new front in his rear must constantly be a possibility at the back of Rommel’s mind. The complete picture of the North African campaign has potentialities far greater than any that could be discovered in the past. Larger forces are engaged. The actual battlefield is small; but it may become one of the crucibles of the war. Rommel must receive heavy reinforcements in men, planes and tanks if he is to hold his ground on that narrow front. It is in the terms of force expended, rather than of territory gained, that the new offensive will be judged. For the Germans, baulked at Stalingrad, still have their main forces in the east, and must keep them there even when they have stabilized their winterlines. The strain placed upon thenindustrial and transport system will grow heavier as the Egyptian battle increases in power. If the United Nations have been able to mobilize sufficient forces in the Middle East they can make the battle a means of diverting more and more German troops and machines to a front which hitherto has required comparatively small forces. The Allies have taken the initiative in a crucial period of the war. This time the battle for Egypt should play a far bigger part in shaping the decisive issues of world strategy.