The Southland Times MONDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1942. Japan's Strategy in the Pacific

Southland Times, Issue 24872, 12 October 1942, Page 4

The Southland Times MONDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1942. Japan's Strategy in the Pacific

THE PRESENT phase of Japanese strategy in the Pacific continues to mystify observers. In the last three years British people have learned to beware of wishful-think-ing and of building high hopes on shaky foundations: too many of their carefully-cherished illusions have been shattered. But there do seem to be reasonable grounds for the belief that the enemy has decided that the dispersal of his forces in the Pacific has gone far enough, and even a little too far. In the north aerial reconnaissance has shown that Attu and Agattu, at the western tip of the Aleutians, have both been evacuated, although the Japanese are reported to be preparing to defend Kiska, a stronger base now only 125 miles from the American positions in the Andreanofs. In the south-west Pacific the enemy’s withdrawal in New Guinea appears to be continuing. The Allied forces have not yet reached the flat country to the north of the Owen Stanley range—they, in turn, are having their supply difficulties —and it is possible that the Japanese are awaiting them there, in relatively advantageous positions. But American bomber crews who raided targets at Buna and along the track to Kokoda last Thursday reported that there was no sign of Japanese troops in either of those places. The enemy appears at least to have abandoned his attempt at an overland attack on Port Moresby, and it is possible that he has decided to abandon also his hold on Guinea. Reports are still coming in of the imminence of a Japanese attack on the American forces on Guadalcanar, in the Solomons. But it has not eventuated; and in the meantime the Americans have started what appear to be regular and systematic air attacks on Japanese installations and shipping in the northern Solomons and New Britain. The tide of war seems to be running against the Japanese here also. United States marines and troops have had ample time to consolidate their arduously-won positions in the Solomons. It is hard to believe that they can now be displaced; and if they are not displaced, and can maintain and extend their present superiority in the air, the Japanese bases further north may soon become untenable. Position Still Strong

These facts do justify a more favourable view of the situation in the Pacific. It is a view that may be changed at any moment if the Japanese withdrawals from the perimeter of their new empire prove to be merely the prelude to an attack on Russia or an attack on India. But, for the meantime, from what motive we can only guess, the enemy appears to have decided not to strain his resources of shipping and aircraft by fighting for every outpost, but to withdraw to an inner and more powerful circle and consolidate his forces there. It is a natural decision, for his losses of shipping and aircraft have been heavy and will be heavier still, on the present exposed routes, as America’s output of planes and submarines increases. But this process of withdrawal and consolidation does not necessarily mean, as observers in Australia and the United States are this morning reported to have taken it to mean, that “the tide of the Pacific war is now turning slowly in favour of the Allies.” It means that the tide of Japanese aggression has swept a little too far and has temporarily receded under the checks imposed by the United Nations.' It means that Japanese strategy may have been temporarily shifted from the offensive to the defensive. But the fact should not be overlooked that even if the enemy does withdraw from New Guinea and some of his outposts in the Aleutians, his position in the Pacific is still enormously strong. He is working on inside lines of communication, and his homeland is surrounded by countless “unsinkable aircraft-carriers”— islands and bases which he is no doubt developing to the limit of his power. The difficulty and the heavy cost of recapturing the southern Solomons—a distant and relatively undeveloped Japanese base —were a measure of the magnitude of the problem, of making any big inroads into the zone of bases that the enemy has built around him. Of course, he is more vulnerable from other directions —from Russia, from China, and possibly from Burma, although the mounting of a big offensive from either of the two last-named countries would involve very great problems of supply. But if the process of reducing Japan to defeat has to be carried on in the Pacific, it will certainly be long and arduous; and although the recent news from this zone of the war is encouraging, no one should be misled into thinking that it portends rapid or decisive steps towards victory.