The Southland Times MONDAY, AUGUST 31, 1942. German Tactics in Russia

Southland Times, Issue 24836, 31 August 1942, Page 4

The Southland Times MONDAY, AUGUST 31, 1942. German Tactics in Russia

AT THE beginning of the summer offensive in Russia the size and composition of the forces on both sides were subjects for speculation in Allied countries. It was believed that the Germans had nearly 1,000,000 men on the northern front, about 850,000 on the central front, 1,350,000 in the south, and reserves totalling 1,500,000. These figures could not be exact; but most experts accepted them as rough estimates of the huge forces to be used in the summer battles of 1942. On the Russian side, however, no information was released which could enable the experts to make any precise comparisons. It seemed probable, after the counter-offensive which surprised the world in the winter months, that the Red Army had substantial reserves. Nothing was known of the supply position, although the persistence with which the Soviet Government urged an increase in the flow of materials from the United States gave an impression that there was room for improvement. Among the reasons for hopefulness was the fact that the Russians had had valuable months in which to strengthen their defences. The Red Army had learned, in the previous summer, to provide counter-measures for the blitzkrieg methods exploited with such success in Poland and France. Against shallow defence lines the panzer divisions were irresistible. Their tactics have become familiar: the swift attack at a weak point, the break-through by tanks which afterwards fan out to cut communications and isolate large forces, and the flooding of motorized infantry through a widening gap. But the Russians were believed to have established intricate defence systems which would receive the tank columns in a vast web, separating them from the infantry and slowing up the advance while “partisan” detachments went into action in the rear. It soon became apparent, however, that the Germans had correctly visualized the type of defences they would have to overcome. For nearly two months they have been advancing steadily on the front where they are exerting the strongest pressure. Their mobile forces swung southwards from Rostov, and have reached the foothills of the Caucasus. The opposition in this region does not appear to have been strong; but. further north, in the elbow of the Don, the Germans have had to fight hard and costly battles. Tremendous forces have been thrown into the sector which guarded the approaches to Stalingrad and the line that runs northwest from Astrakhan. Yet numbers alone are not enough. One reason for the continued success of the Germans js clearly their superiority' in the air. The raids on Stalingrad, organized with cold-blooded thoroughness on the Rotterdam pattern, could not have been carried out with such devastating results if the Soviet air force had been able to provide an adequate fighter protection.

The Problem of Reserves

It also seems probable that the enemy has introduced variants of the blitzkrieg which enable him to penetrate defences in depth at something like his earlier speed. Clues to these methods were given in the limited spring offensives. Around Kharkov the Germans selected a very narrow sector and smashed an opening with a tremendous concentration of dive-bombers. Instead of sending panzer divisions through the gap to operate in fanwise movements, the Germans bored in with closely co-ordinated formations of tanks, artillery and motorized infantry. The tanks were kept in smaller groups, closely in touch with the supporting units. Thus the Russians were unable to break the spearhead, and were forced to straighten their lines by a general withdrawal. Under these conditions the pace is slower, but can be steadily maintained. It is possible, of cpurse, that the Germans revert to their earlier tactics when the battle offers a chance of encirclement. And the basic requirement is clearly a superiority in planes and tanks. So far the enemy has been able to exploit his advantages. But the defence of Stalingrad promises to reproduce the heroic features of Sebastopol, and will therefore compel the Germans to make heavy sacrifices. Moreover, the Soviet counter-offensive on the central front has moved with impressive momentum to the gates of Rjev. Although the Germans have concentrated large forces in this area they are clearly on the defensive. But there is still no evidence that the counter-stroke has brought relief to Marshal Timoshenko’s armies in the south. The unpredictable factor is the number of reserves upon which Hitler’s generals can draw during the next few weeks. Their task now is to hold the Russians in the centre while the armies of the south drive on to Stalingrad and Astrakhan. A long and stubborn resistance at Stalingrad might interfere seriously with a time-table which must be completed before the weather begins to break in October. The Russians have shown that they know how to sustain a siege. And the strength of their counteroffensive on the central front encourages the belief that they have been holding substantial reserves for blows to be delivered in the crucial phase of the campaign. That phase has obviously arrived. The Germans have gone far and fast. But Hitler, with one eye on the approaching autumn, and the other on danger signals in the west, may be wondering if the pace has been quick enough. The answer may be found in the battles of Stalingrad and Rjev.