The Southland Times FRIDAY, AUGUST 28, 1942. Facts Behind the Air Offensive

Southland Times, Issue 24834, 28 August 1942, Page 4

The Southland Times FRIDAY, AUGUST 28, 1942. Facts Behind the Air Offensive

ALTHOUGH the Royal Air Force bombing offensive continues at a fairly even pace there have been no recent raids on the 1000-bomber scale. The three great raids of May 30, June 1 and June 25 captured the imagination of the free world, and seemed to mark the opening of a powerful attack on Germany. Since then there has been a return to what are generally described as the “normal operations” of the Bomber Command. The general public, stimulated by the implications of the four-figure raids, may be disappointed by the evidence of a more modest activity. To a certain extent they were misled by the optimistic broadcasts of Air Marshal Harris, which raised expectations that could not be fulfilled in the near future. A more sober note . Was sounded by the -Secretary for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, in a speech summarized* in an official wireless message, printed on Monday. “It has taken, and is taking, a long time to build up the strength of the Bomber Command,” he said, “but the harvest we have sown through all the months of patient, strenuous work is at last beginning to ripens. . In a few months’ time four-figure raids would be less infrequent occurrences, and in the meantime the forces that could be sent against Gemiany any normal night could drop a heavier load of bombs than the Germans had ever been able to drop on Britain ” It will be noticed that Sir Archibald Sinclair, looking “a few months” into the future, could not promise the beginning of a regular series of 1000-bomber raids: he could only say that they would become “less infrequent.” When Air Marshal Harris said a few months ago that if he could send 1000 bombers to Germany every night the war would be over by the autumn he may not have been exaggerating; but he was certainly drawing a picture that had no relation to present realities. Bad weather prevents the dispatch of a bombing force every night. To reach and hold an average of 1000 it would be necessary to send frequently an air fleet of 3000 planes. Just what this means in organization can best be explained by quoting the comments of an air correspondent in the London Sunday newspaper, The Observer. Assuming that two squadrons operate from one aerodrome, more than 120 aerodromes would be required. Pilots and crews would number about 18,000. “To operate heavy bombers a total ground staff of at least 20 is required, directly and indirectly, for each man sent into the air, so that to prepare for ‘heavy’ nights a staff of between 360,000 and 400,000 would have to be on duty.” These figures give some idea of the magnitude of the operations. To see the offensive in its true perspective, however, it is better to resist the attraction of numbers and to place the emphasis where it properly belongs—on bomb loads. Heavier Machines

The R.A.F. bombing force does not consist entirely of heavy machines, although the day may come when it will. During the 1000bomber raids the squadrons were a mixture of twin-engined and fourengined aircraft. When it is realized that a Stirling can carry as great a bomb load as a whole squadron of Blenheims it can be seen that numbers are not accurate guides to the scope and effectiveness of the more recent operations. Moreover, two twin-engined bombers require a crew of 10 and a ground maintenance staff of 10, whereas one fourengined machine needs only seven men in the air and another seven on the ground. The weight of bombs dropped on the cities of Britain in a single night was never much more than 450 tons, and the Germans used between 500 and 600 planes. Yet in the Osnabruck raid of August 9, fewer than 200 planes dropped over 450 tons. The R.A.F. is using heavier machines and heavier bombs. It can be seen, however, that although Britain’s air striking power is steadily increasing it is stiff a long way from the pool of 5000 heavy bombers visualized by experts as the instrument of a quick and total victory. Nor must it be forgotten that Allied air power must be distributed. As Sir Archibald Sinclair pointed out, “there is more than one urgent strategic requirement to be considered in deciding the employment of our heavy bombers.” Large numbers of planes have to be used in the Middle Rast. And although the United States Air Corps is building up a formidable organization in Britain it must also send a growing number of squadrons to remote fronts. The Flying Fortresses and Liberators that are helping to smash the Japanese counterattack in the Solomons, for instance, represent a heavy drain on the central pool in Britain. Allied air policy has never been clearly defined. But the facts beyond the present situation are sufficiently plain. To build up a striking force powerful enough to cripple Germany within a few months would take more time than can be spared while decisive battles are impending in Egypt, in Russia and in the Pacific. Armies cannot fight without air co-operation, and the bombers must go where they are needed most. Yet the campaign in Russia has given the R.A.F. a unique opportunity to strike hard and often at the heart of Germany without fear of serious reprisals. To maintain and develop this offensive, while at the same time meeting urgent strategic needs, the Allies are calling upon their immense productive capacity. Their power is growing; but it would be wiser to look for steady improvement rather than for sudden and spectacular results.