Naval Losses

Southland Times, Issue 24828, 21 August 1942, Page 4

Naval Losses

STARTLING figures were quoted yesterday in a London message which .. announced British naval losses since the beginning of the war. Compared with 415 warships of all types lost in barely three years, the 207 vessels sunk in the four years of the last war make a comparatively small list. It is true, of course, that the discrepancy is most noticeable in the category of small ships. For instance, only 27 small craft (smaller, that is, than destroyers or torpedo boats) were lost in 1914-18, as against 11 corvettes, 10 sloops, 152 trawlers and drifters, and 20 minesweepers—a total of 193 —in the present war. The explanation can be found in the fact that, whereas convoying and anti-submarine measures were introduced in the last phase of the Great War, they were required from the first days of the new struggle. A closer study of the figures will reveal the changing tactics of naval warfare. Britain lost 16 capital ships in 1914-18; in the present war she has lost only five, excluding aircraftcarriers. This points to the fact that, whereas formerly the battleship was the foundation of naval strategy, its role has now become less decisive. Indeed, there are experts who say that its future is limited; and it is certainly true that the backbone of the typical task force in the Pacific is now made up of heavy cruisers and aircraft-carriers. Losses in cruisers and destroyers are much heavier than in the past. Against the 25 cruisers and 64 destroyers sunk in 1914-18 must be placed 22 and 83 in three years —in spite of the fact that many of their functions have been taken over or shared by smaller vessels and aircraft. The figures for all classes may be explained partly as the result of Britain’s heavier naval responsibilities after the collapse of France. There can be little doubt that the Royal Navy suffered most severely in the period between the loss of French, and the gain of United States, naval co-operation. But the most important factor has obviously been the development of air power. Of the five battleships and battle cruisers destroyed so far, at least two were sunk by torpedo planes and bombers. The heaviest naval losses have occurred in narrow waters where no adequate air protection could be provided. It would be premature to find in the figures any decisive evidence for the bomb

versus battleship controversy. But they show, beyond doubt, that the future of naval warfare cannot be separated from air power. Warships are vulnerable when they venture without air escort into enemy waters. Given air protection, their value is unimpaired. Meanwhile the published figures make sober reading. They reveal the great sacrifices of the Royal Navy in the most difficult period of its long history, the costly nature of the present struggle, and the tremendous strain imposed on British naval yards. To be able to say that “feverish building by day and night” has kept the navy’s strength “at a point where it is still the most formidable sea force in the world” is to claim an achievement that demands respect and admiration.