The Southland Times FRIDAY, AUGUST 21, 1942. The Rehearsal at Dieppe

Southland Times, Issue 24828, 21 August 1942, Page 4

The Southland Times FRIDAY, AUGUST 21, 1942. The Rehearsal at Dieppe

THE Combined Operations raid on the French coast was something much bigger than previous enterprises of a similar kind. It was only a raid; but it was organized on an impressive scale, and was carried out with a time-table precision that promises well for the future. The forces engaged were drawn from all three services. They did not act independently. Indeed, the. most interesting feature of the raid was the evidence it provided of the extent to which the system known as Combined Operations has been developed and extended under the leadership of Lord Louis Mountbatten. It is only four months since this distinguished sailor received his new appointment, and at that time the Commandos had already made a name for themselves. But the methods of co-operation between the three services have now been brought to a high level of efficiency. Combined Operations means a great deal more than the organization of Commando raids. It' can be seen as a growing system which may become the technical framework of invasion. The adventure at Dieppe was bolder and more substantial than on any previous occasion. It involved the use of air power on a grand scale, both to disrupt enemy communications in the target area, and to give the landing parties the fullest protection. These tactics led to the biggest air battle that has been fought in the west since the daylight attacks on Britain in 1940. Although there was no wide difference in the losses on either side the net result was a tactical victory for the Royal Air Force. British fighters were not defending their own aerodromes: they were attacking enemy bases. In shooting down so many German planes without themselves suffering disproportionate losses, they brilliantly succeeded where the Luftwaffe failed in its daylight battles two years ago. The full value of this result can be judged only by those who know the effectiveness of the protection given to the invasion barges and the escort vessels. But it seems fairly clear that the enemy air squadrons were kept too busy defending themselves to be able to interfere drastically in the combat zone. On the evidence of the Dieppe raid it can be said confidently that the Allies will have local mastery of the skies if and when they attempt the invasion of Europe. Yet there are certain implications which should not be overlooked. The air losses, although shared more or less evenly, were heavy. They were incurred in a single day, during landing operations by comparatively small forces. An invasion would be a long, hard and costly enterprise. It is doubtful if either side could afford to lose 100 or more planes every day for a lengthy period. Admittedly, air protection would be achieved if the Luftwaffe were decisively beaten in the initial struggle. And if the Germans were still fighting hard battles in Russia the Allies would have the greater power of recovery in aircraft production. These are problems for the experts. It can be said, however, that the raid was a valuable testing, not only of the enemy’s defences, but of the methods that may later be used to overwhelm them. There was something massive in its scope and arrangement which encourages the belief that preparations are far advanced for the supreme attempt to destroy German military power in the west. It has shown, more clearly than any propaganda campaign, the formidable nature of the task which awaits the Allies on the European coast. But when it is studied along-' side the recent conference in Moscow it becomes easy to believe that the risks will be taken, and that the great offensive cannot be far ahead.