CONTROL OF SEA VITAL

Southland Times, Issue 24825, 18 August 1942, Page 5

CONTROL OF SEA VITAL

Japanese Counter

Offensive

The Press Association’s correspondent at a South Pacific port states that the latest reports of the fighting in the Solomons emphasize the cardinal truth which underlies the whole future of the operation. This is, that now the Americans have established satisfactory footholds on the various islands attacked,

victory must eventually go to the side which controls the sea. The Allies • cannot win islands so long as the Japanese can fling in fresh forces, and they .cannot hold and maintain a group for their own future strategical purposes unless they can keep their marine supply lines open. It is upon his fleet and his aircraft that Vice-Admiral Robert L. Ghormley must depend for preventing the Japanese from reinforcing the enemy troops now in action. Reports that their fleet has been in action after bridgeheads were achieved clearly show that the Japanese are worried about the future of the land fighting and are attempting to clear the seas and reinforce their own troops at will. If they succeed the battle is lost. Some such counter offensive as the Japanese now seem to be taking in the Solomons area was anticipated by the Allies. Dispositions have undoubtedly been taken to meet it. If the airfield reported captured on Guadalcanar _ is usable and not subject to dangerous interference by Japanese machines from the remaining airfields, its possession by the Americans will strongly help the fleets at sea, especially if bombers from New Guinea are now being based there. SET BATTLE MAY DEVELOP The correspondent also suggests that the battle is likely to develop rather than diminish in magnitude. Once the Solomons are in Allied hands and become offensive in character, the Japanese tenure of New Britain _ and Papuan ports will become increasingly precarious. It is not likely that the enemy will yield the Solomons until he is decisively defeated at sea. If the Japanese do not try to overpower the American naval units in the area they may well attempt a counter offensive in strength at some other point in the South Pacific, thus hoping to draw off some of the Allied ships and giving them a better opportunity to deal with them piecemeal.

It is impossible at the present time to assess the Allied naval losses. No such operation can be carried out without severe losses, but it can be said that so far there is no indication that these have exceeded expectations or reduced seriously the strength of the offensive.