Unity of Command?

Southland Times, Issue 24825, 18 August 1942, Page 4

Unity of Command?

WHEN General Sikorski commented in London on Germany’s alleged peace aims he went on to make an interesting and significant reference to “the negotiations now going on in Moscow.” This is the first time that the negotiations have been openly,, discussed by a responsible spokesman. It was known that a special envoy fron. President Roosevelt had reached Moscow, and that the British and American ambassadors had arrived shortly afterwards. At the same time it cannot have escaped attention that Mr Churchill is not in London, and that no hint has been received of his official engagements for some time past. His whereabouts will become the subject of lively speculation now that diplomatic activities of the greatest importance are known to be taking place in Moscow. There may be a number of reasons for the discussions at the Kremlin. The fighting in Russia has reached a critical stage which makes Allied support one of the most momentous questions of the war. Beyond the immediate problems of the eastern campaign are the wider issues of the war as a whole. Up to the present there has been no serious attempt to frame a co-ordinated strategy, or at least to give it the constant attention of a council with members authorized to speak for the Allied nations. Britain and the United States are working in close co-operation. But grand strategy for a world war cannot be devised successfully without the assistance of all the nations involved in the struggle against the Axis. The claims of widely separated theatres of war (and they include China as well as Russia) must be balanced against the needs of a changing situation. It is true that the Allied Governments are constantly in communication with one another. There have been special missions. The London visit of M. Molotov, for instance, was one of the best-kept secrets of the war. But these methods have the weaknesses of delay and of imperfect representation. One difficulty is the reticence of the Soviet Government. It is known that the Allies have not been able to obtain the military information which would simplify their problems of strategy and supply. The same tradition of secrecy may have influenced M. Stalin against any proposal to arrange Soviet representation on an Allied war council. General Sikorski has expressed the hope that the Moscow talks “would harmonize the efforts of all the Allies who so far had been deprived of the benefits of a supreme joint Command.” Germany has been able to exploit the divided, or imperfectly co-ordinated, aims of the

Allies. The lack of central planning for a war on so many fronts has made it more difficult than it need have been to wrest the initiative from enemies whose strategic plans are closely unified. If this difficulty can be removed the Allies will enter with new strength upon the great tasks which await them on the world’s battlefields.