The Southland Times THURSDAY, AUGUST 13, 1942. Strategic Aims in Russia

Southland Times, Issue 24821, 13 August 1942, Page 4

The Southland Times THURSDAY, AUGUST 13, 1942. Strategic Aims in Russia

THE strategic position in Russia would be intensely interesting if it were not so full of disturbing P os " sibilities. It cannot be explained precisely for the simple reason that the Russian leaders permit no statements on their military aims. Those who want to understand what is happening must look beyond the communiques, or use them mamly to discover where the resistance appears to be strongest. Thereafter they can look for guidance to expert radio commentators, or suspend their judgment until events bring more conclusive evidence. But there are certain facts which invite speculation. It will have been noticed, for instance, that the Red Army made the strongest stand at the elbow of the Don, in an area radiating southwestward from Stalingrad. The main defence line is from Voronej to the lower reaches of the Don. We suggested last week that this fact, coupled with the apparent weakness of the resistance south of Rostov, seemed to indicate a Russian intention of holding a line which would have its eastern flank at Astrakhan, on the Caspian Sea. The same view was later put forward in a 8.0.W. message which quoted opinions from military circles in London. It was assumed that “Soviet strategy is still to preserve the strength of the armies at the cost of sacrificing territory which can be abandoned with the least serious results. Consequently, the possibility is foreseen that the Germans may be able to occupy this summer all the area lying northward of the Caucasus range and south of the Volga between Stalingrad and Astrakhan.” Further evidence in support of this theory has been provided by the speed of the German advance towards the foothills of the Caucasus. < The push to Krasnodar, for example, represented an advance of 90 miles in 24 hours, which could scarcely have been possible if large Russian forces were holding any sort of organized defence line in that area. It seemed probable that the Russians were relying on the natural barrier of the Caucasus to impose limits on the German southward drive, while the continued possession of Astrakhan and the Volga line through Stalingrad would enable them to receive oil supplies from Baku. In an article in The Daily Mail, however, Negley Farson has pointed out that the Germans need not cross the Caucasian mountains if their aim is to cut off the main flow of oil to central Russia. This could be done by smashing through to Stalingrad, and by establishing air bases at Makhackala. The second aim may be easier to achieve than the first, for the Russians continue to fight strongly in the approaches to Stalingrad. But Marshal Timoshenko may be fighting for time rather than for oil. Although it is true that the loss of Caucasian supplies would seriously weaken the Red Army’s offensive capacity, it might not prevent the continuance of organized resistance. The southern armies, withdrawing upon the Caucasus, will obtain more oil than they need from the Baku area, which has an annual output of 25,000,000 tons. In the north and centre of Russia the armies which formerly drew heavily on the Baku source of supply will have the output of various smaller wells, which between them produce about 7,000,000 tons in a year. The Russians must also have considerable reserve stocks, especially in the Urals. Roads to the East

There are reasons for believing, therefore, that the Red Army will be able to fight defensive battles; and if its leaders are prepared to sacrifice more territory they may succeed in keeping formidable armies in the field. In a long term view of the war this prospect may seem to favour the Allied cause. It is true, of course, that the Germans cannot obtain a secure hold upon the territories they have already occupied while the Red Army remains organized and effective, even though it is pushed beyond the Volga. But there are other factors which must be causing anxiety to the Allied leaders. From the point of view of general strategy the most dangerous threat has always been recognized in the Middle East. The rough triangle between the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Indian Ocean is the most important link between the Allies ana Britain’s Central Asian Empire, China and Russia. It contains the richest oil deposits in the old world, and the greatest road and air network between the east and west. An area which holds a gateway to Europe (through the Balkans), the back door to Russia, and the overland route to India is perhaps the most important geographical area in the war zones. The Germans have already made determined efforts to reach the Nile Valley from Libya, and were dangerously close to Alexandria when they were checked at El Alamein. According to the latest reports there are signs that fighting on a large scale may shortly be resumed in Egypt. In these circumstances it is hard to believe that the Germans will stop at the foothills of the Caucasus. Most experts believe that Hitler’s armies must break through to the Middle East this year if they are to retain the initiative. Hitler is not merely trying to conquer Russia. The drive around the coasts of the Black Sea is an essential part of the larger operations against the Allies. It has become a little too easy to see the war in Russia as an isolated campaign. The battles in the Caucasian foothills should be a reminder that a great pincer movement is being directed against the Middle East. There are two jaws of the pincer: Rommel’s in the south, and von Bock’s in the north. The battles south of Rostov have brought the Germans to the most formidable of all the natural obstacles in the Russian route to the Middle East. It is impossible to know what forces can be used against them in this area. But there can be little doubt that the present operations are leading up to one of the most difficult and important stages of the war.