The Anti-Climax at Dakar

Southland Times, Issue 24242, 27 September 1940, Page 4

The Anti-Climax at Dakar

GENERAL de Gaulle’s sortie to Dakar did not end as successfully as was expected. After the British and Free French naval forces had retired, a statement issued in London explained that a major operation would have been necessary to capture the town. The General’s decision to avoid fighting between Frenchmen can be understood and approved; but it is not so easy to understand why the British naval forces did not take the initiative. Equally obscure is the forbearance of these forces towards the French cruisers and destroyers, which were prevented from proceeding southwards towards territories that have rejected the Vichy Government, but were left unharmed and free. One cruiser, suffering from engine trouble, was even escorted by British vessels to Casablanca. The official explanation is that “it is no part of the Government’s policy to interfere with the movements of French men-of-war as long as they are not destined for any ports under German control.” But this attitude was not adopted during the action at Oran, and it seems obvious that warships which obey the instructions of a puppet French Government are working to further the ends of Nazi policy. Moreover, it is now quite clear that Dakar is a port very much under German control. Even if this point is regarded as momentarily unimportant (surely an untenable view), the fact remains that French warships in African waters will have to be watched constantly if they are to be stopped from restoring pro-Vichy regimes in Equatorial Africa. The Royal Navy can scarcely be expected to leave a powerful squadron to repeat, at indefinite intervals, the police duties carried out a few days ago in the seas below Dakar. Perhaps the real explanation of these curious events can be found in the probability, already suggested

in recent cable messages, that the larger African colonies are on the verge of declaring their allegiance to General de Gaulle. In such circumstances the British Government would be anxious to avoid drastic action which might revive in Frenchmen the' bitterness and anguish of Oran. Later developments may prove the wisdom of this policy. Nevertheless the information which led General de Gaulle to make a confident approach to Dakar was so palpably misleading that there is some reason for doubting if proBritish sentiment in North Africa is as strong as earlier repox-ts seemed to indicate. Forbearance is sometimes misinterpreted as weakness, and the Vichy Government will lose no time in exploiting the propaganda value of the anti-climax at Dakar. Whatever the reactions of the African colonies, however, one thing has become certain: Dakax - cannot be left in German hands. The strategic value of the port is sufficiently plain. Under Nazi control, the Atlantic communications will be threatened, and an air service based on the only flying field in this part of Africa could facilitate the penetration of Latin America. It is highly probable that large numbers of German troops have already been flown to Dakar, and that more will follow them. While these activities are able to proceed without interference, the entire strategic zone of western and Equatorial Africa must be in danger of Nazi infiltration. Dakax - has become the key to a major problem which Britain cannot afford to leave unsolved. The Germans act quickly, and from now onwards they may establish themselves more strongly on the western shoulder of Africa. It seems probable that there will have to be anothei’ and more determined attempt to seize their new stronghold.