The Southland Times. THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1940. Spanish Policy and Axis Strategy

Southland Times, Issue 24241, 26 September 1940, Page 6

The Southland Times. THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1940. Spanish Policy and Axis Strategy

FJIHE ALTITUDE of Spain may -*• shortly introduce new problems in British strategy. According to a cable message from London, printed this morning, the Spanish Press has intensified its attacks on the Vichy Government, and is declaring that Spain should- intervene actively to restore order in North Africa. The main argument, that Spain is “called on to impose security both from geographical and spiritual viewpoints,” may sound fantastic to those who believed that the Civil War was being followed by a period of peaceful reconstruction. But Spanish nationalism, in spite of its close association with Italian Fascism, is a genuine political force in the Peninsula. “It is the duty and mission of Spain,” said General Franco recently, “to command Gibraltar and expand in Africa. Spain has 2,000,000 soldiers ready to defend her rights.” The Falangists (members of a militant fascist organization) are reported to have used the following slogan on their posters; “So that Spain may be great—Gibraltar, Tangier, Casablanca, Fez, Oran, Algiers!” And no slogans are permitted in Spain which do not receive the approval of the secret police.

Non-Belligerency

In the sphere of official policy the Spaniards now seem to be at the point reached by the Italians just before their entry into the war. The Press and the politicians have been pro-Axis from the beginning. Three days after Mussolini declared war on the Allies, Spain abandoned neutrality for the new and ambiguous status of non-belligerency. The next day the International zone of Tan- : gier was occupied by Spanish forces. It is true, of course, that Spain wanted to control the Straits of Gibraltar and to expand into North Africa long before she came under the influence of the Rome-Berlin Axis; but the difference today is that troubled world conditions are now providing opportunities for aggression. More important still i" the fact that Spain’s policy would be largely determined bj r the demands of Nazi strategy from the moment of her entry into the war. Left to her own resources, Spain could do little to change the North African situation. Although she has a large army and a considerable amount of German and Italian equipment (including, it is believed, as many as 1370 planes) her economic position is not good. Bad crops and the wastefulness of the Civil War affected the country’s agriculture so severely that it has been necessary to import 850,000 tons of wheat to meet this year’s normal requirements.' Although the country is not at war, most foodstuffs (including bread, the staple food of the workers) are being rationed. Even tobacco and cigarettes can be obtained only in very limited quantities.

A War-time Budget

Yet in spite of this evidence of post-war poverty, and of the need foi' reconstruction on the widest scale, the Budget for 1940-41 cannot be described as the basis for a peace-time programme. Of the total amount involved, only 14.7 per cent, has been allocated to agriculture, education and public works, while military preparations account for more than 25 per- cent'. The poverty of Spain is not the only restraining influence. With the aid of Italian and German legions, and helped also by the miserable Anglo-French farce of non-intervention, General Franco was able to defeat the Republicans, thereby establishing a fascist and pro-Axis regime at the gateway to the Mediterranean. ' The Spanish people have been forced into the mould of a narrow solidarity; but the embers of political strife have not been stamped out, in spite of a bitter and cruel persecution. Under the strain of a major war effort the old enmities would almost certainly break through the thin crust of national unity. The tragic events of the Civil War have not been forgotten: if political discontents received the dry fuel of hunger, there would be a quick and destructive outbreak of revolutionary forces. For these reasons it can be assumed that General Franco shares Mussolini’s hopes for a short and fortunate war.

A New Front?

The important fact from Britain’s point of view is that, if Spain were tempted to throw in her lot with the Axis Powers, she would at once become the instrument of German strategy. Even before the collapse of France frequent reports .were reaching London that from 60,000 to 80,000 German troops were established in Spain. According to a Spanish correspondent of The Economist, a large percentage of these forces is said to have been concentrated in Galicia, the north-west corner of the Peninsula, “with sufficient war- material to suggest the formation of an expeditionary force.” In the light of recent events at Dakar it is not irrelevant to speculate on the possibility that at least some of these troops have been flown to the African base. Control of Dakar would be only a first step in long-range plans that might even include an attempt to seize Portugal. In spite of a good neighbour policy wisely implemented by the Portuguese dictator, Dr Salazar, it is known that the Falangists aim at the ultimate possession of the entire Peninsula, and the Nazis would certainly be ready to encourage 'this sort of aggrandizement if it allowed them to become masters of the Atlantic seaboard down to the Straits of Gibraltar. These are possibilities rather than probabilities; but they are based on facts which have been made suddenly significant by the unneutral trend of Spanish policy, by the symptoms of an approaching upheaval in North Africa, and by Britain’s decision to force the issue at Dakar. It would not be surprising if, in the near future, the war entered a new and active phase in a region somewhere between the north-west of Spain and the western gates of Africa.