“A GALLIPOLI DIARY”

Southland Times, Issue 18824, 18 May 1920, Page 5

“A GALLIPOLI DIARY”

GENERAL AND CORRESPONDENT. MR MURDOCH IN DEFENCE. (Per United Press Association.) CHRISTCHURCH, 'May 17. The following is the full text of Mr Keith Murdoch’s reply to the statements contained in Sir lan Hamilton’s “Gallipoli Diary,” and published in the cable news; — The facts are these: In September the Dardanelles expedition had reached the most desperate of its many crises. The offensives of August, though delivered, Mr Bonar Law told me, by more divisions than Sir lan Hamilton had said were necessary to win complete victory, had utterly failed, and the troops were exhausted. A lew fresh Australian and New Zealand troops were coming forward, and Sir lan was using them up in isolated offensives, frontal assaults against strongly entrenched positions, which brought heavy expense in life without in the opinion of those with whom I was in contact, gaining the slightest advantage. Part of our new Fifth Australian Brigade was thrown in, for instance, against Hill 60, which was not vital to us, and lost frightfully. We were suffering 1000 casualties a day, including sickness. Bulgaria was entering the war, and for the first time our forces were going to be up against big guns sent through from German}". The winter was coming on, and most of the men were still in their rags of summer clothing. The poorness of supplies was in keeping with the lack of support from London. I have a perfectly clear conscience ns to what I did. I went to London and hit Sir lan Hamilton as hard as I possibly could. I thought the vital thing was to get a fresh mind on the spot. The British Cabinet confirmed this view by recalling him within a week of my report being discussed by it. He was not again employed. Sir lan Hamilton misquotes one of the many sentences I wrote about Sir William Birdvvood. I think Sir William will agree that I served him at times with hard work during the war, and that I showed my judgment of his leadership. The sentence quoted by Sir lan was my frank opinion, and I thought it necessary to state it because the recall of Sir lan Hamilton would leave a big possibility of General Birdwood being appointed in his place, especially as Lord Kitchener was a tremendous believer in Sir William Birdwood. The truly essential thing was a fresh mind. Had Sir William Birdwood been appointed the evacuation would not have come off. Sir lan Hamilton was dangerous because he declared time and again that evacuation was unthinkable. Sir William Birdwood was dangerous in the chief command because later on, when Sir Charles Monro went out, he was the only corps commander who declared against evacuation, and the reason he gave was the moral effect on British prestige in India. Sir lan now says that I hit him below the belt. The violence of his language after four years is evidence of the hardness of the blow. That makes me glad, but it was a fair and square blow. As ho says, 1 had the confidence of not only the Australian Cabinet but also the British. The way they had been kept in the dark about the truth of Gallipoli remains to my mind one of the worst, because one of the most dishonest incidents in the muddling of those days. I began with fur Edward Carson, then chairman of the Dardanelles Committee, and Sir Edward put me through a crossexamination at breakfast before he .accepted my statements. Sir Edward :s a good lawyer. He reminded me just the other flay of that strange interview. He took the facts to the Cabinet, and I was invited to meet nearly every member singly, and I met them all except Mr Asquith, to whom I had a letter from the Australian Prime Minister, but who broke two appointments, Mr Asquith was, of course, deeply committed over the expedition. The most pregnant interviews wore with Mr Lloyd Georg': and Mr Bonar Law. 'lhe former said to me: 'i ou are, writing ..to Hr Fisher?” I saa! that I was. He said, "Then it H your duty to let Mr Asquith have a copy of your letter for I the British Cabinet.'’ I sent to Mr Asquith a copy of a very | long letter I had written to Mr fisher for i himself, Mr Hughes, and Senator Pearce, and it was printed as a secret paver by air Asquith, and I shell never regret that it was acted upon, as for dm general accuracy lam quite prepared to In,'re it published and criticised. Cabinet Ministers later told me that Sir diaries Monro's reoort boro out my report with striking similarity as to ] the main farts, and within a very few days Inf this report the 1 root's were off the penin- | siula. I Now as to Sir lan’s charges. I broke no 1 censorship pledge. 1 was on (dalhpoli partly | as a in w-papiT correspondent, ami in thri j connection 1 took the correspondent s pledge i and kept it implicitly. I w:w there also us, ] a represent at ivs of the Commonwealth Gov- | eminent, which had given me a eommi-'.sion I of infinity in certain phase- of the admin--1 iatration. Willem; ecu-or- hip I wrote u re- ( port for the Prime Mini-lcr o; my own i country and. received his ilmnk; and al-o i the thanks of the succeeding Prime Minister. There was nothing in my p>'V‘ torluduing ' that. How could there be when far lan I himself knew I had come to write reports ‘for the Australian Government .’ That rei port was vital to tin- situation and com- \ periled the wavering and he-alant Coalition j Cabinet to make up its mind and send out I new Generals, Monro and Kitchener, who both at once agreed that evacuation was i necessary. I have met many eenertils at ! the front during the war anil I no er heard j one question the absolute necessity o' the | evacuation. As to my war record., I leave ‘that to the Australian Army, to whom I ‘devoted myself through the rest of th° war j as completely and unquestionably a- I did i when, openly and squarely for their sake, il took the action for which I now have to I bear a general’s rebuke. Genera! Hamil--1 ton’s statement that I thought the Turks | better men than those fighting tliem is a I fabrication.

SIR lAN AM) IHS CHIEF. I.OVAUTY TO LOP.I) KITCHENER. LONDON, .May IT In th-D- course- of his <u;.ry ;ur !..i. Hauuitot. says that when lie reached T « n**uo • he found the mine sweepers in- ‘m ic;it. liaar engines were worn out. Mill', more powerful sweepers the business would .have been easy. The Peninsula was we.l lundicd, and our seaplanes could not loc:;! ■; the enemy guns. Nominally the plane* )*osse..sed p“werful engines, "hut, ’ lie add.-, “the damicd things would hardly n-e oil the water.’ After the mishap to the Inflexible and the Irresistible it became clear that the soldiers must do the trick. The War Oliiee notion that the fleet's guns would sweep the enemy from Achi Baba southward became moonshine. While in Egypt Sir lan Hamilton saw Sir William Birdwood’s 1)0,000. "A crowd,’’ he says, “that would straighten the back of the pacifist. There is bravery in their air, and a keenness upon their clean-cut features. They were spoiling for a scrap. The spirit of war had breathed its fires into their hearts.” Sir lan Hamilton displayed, intense loyalty to Lord Kitchener. He determined that he would not write to any public personage except Lord Kitchener, as in war no man could serve two masters. All through he regretted his inability to communicate with Mr Churchill periodically, as he could have relied on his kicking red tape into the wastepaper basket. Several of the “powers that be” told him to keep them fully posted, but there had been so much stiletto work in this war that he refrained from writing.