CHINA AND JAPAN

Rotorua Morning Post, Volume 2, Issue 391, 28 November 1932, Page 2

CHINA AND JAPAN

FAR EAST SITUATION WHOLE SYSTEM OF LEAGUE OF NATION S AT STAKE. CALL FOR STATESMANSHIP. "Th'e natural partisanship of manknd has diyided the world of 1932 into pro-Chinese and pro- Japanese; and each party tends to condone the fapfits of its favourites," writes Sir rederie Whyte, K.C.S.I., one of the greatest authorities on the East, in the "Contemporary Review." "Widespread an,d strong sympathy for China, though guided hy a true instinct, has none the less blinded many minds to the fundamental cause of the crisis, Japan is justified in ^aying that the C'hinese have not aeted up to the expectations of 1922, and the shrewder Chinese do not deny it. But, with even greater justice, the Chinese make the magnitude of their own task a plea for pati'enee in others and for the co-opera-tion of their co-signatories of 1922 in the regeneration of their country, "In order to understand the case against China in Manchuria it is first necessary to understand the case for China. The nations assembled in Washington understood both, and have shown a great forbearance in their dealings with China (perhaps at times a too patient leniency) ever since; whereas Japan has ehosen to teach China a lesson (which, moreover, China has still to learn) by methods which niake the Chinese hate the teacher and ignore the lesson. "The course taken by the L'eague, before the Manchurian crisis, was the : better way. The Eeague recognised Chinese rights and Chinese limitations alike. It started from the basic acceptance of China's condition and proceeded therefrom to design a policy of progressiye reform well suited to, the needs and the available resources of the country. Those engaged in it faced the facts ignoring nothing, and refusing to be daunted by difficulties. They knew that reform could not be imposed from without, but must spring from some inner nucleus of desire from within; and having found in a small group of genuine reformers the required nucleus they set out in co-ope-ration with these Chinese to put the plan of reform into operation. "It is obvious that the League cannot offer Manchukuo the co-operation which it has given to Nanking. It is equally obvious that Nanking cannot > put into effect any League proposal relating to Manchuria, for the authority of Nanking stops far short of the Great Wall. Further, Japan having created a provisional govemment in Manchukuo and possessing the power to maintain it for a while, at any rate, it follows that the assent of Japan is necessary to any effective action. "Recalling the domestic mood of Japan and viewing the Manchurian scene in this light, it is cl'ear that statesmanship of no ordinary kind will be needed (a) to pi'event Manchuria following the fate of Korea, (b) to secure from Japan a bona fide recognition of Manchuria as Chinese, and, of course, to secure from China an equally bona fide recognition of Japanese rights; (c) to create an administrative authority capable of giving the country better government than Chang Hsued-liang's, and a more real guarantee of order than the Japanese army can ever do in hostile surroundings. A visionary plan, it will be said! "Yet it is only along these lines that Manchuria can be rescued from strife, Japan placated (perhaps accepting it at first with a sullen ill-will), and the future sovereignty of China protected. But why, it will be said again, save for China what she cannot save for herself? The objection is well taken, and must be answered. China cannot, nor does she expect, Geneva to pull her chestnuts out of the Manchurian fire; she has never believed that the League could accomplish the impossible; and most Chinese would say that China is invulnerable. Let Japan do her worst— but the time vdll come . . . and so forth. "That is not our answer; nor do the more far-sighted Chinese wish to rely on the historie power of their people's passive resistance or on the remote revenge of time. They— and W6 — have a more constructive purpose. It is evident to them and to us that more than Manchuria will be lost if events and the headstrong soldiers of Japan are allowed to take their course. "The whole system of the League and the Washington treaties is at stake; and to save them is worth a special effort of statesmanship which must be conducted, not in favour of China or Japan, but in order to safeguard the interests of both and to lay some part of the foundation of the rul-e of law in the international relations of the Far East."