Rangitikei Advocate. WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1908. EDITORIAL NOTES.

Rangitikei Advocate and Manawatu Argus, Volume XXXIII, Issue 9072, 12 February 1908, Page 4

Rangitikei Advocate. WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1908. EDITORIAL NOTES.

IN the National Review “Ignotus” supplies some unpublished pages of German diplomacy, in which lie shows the manner in which the Kaiser has managed to exert an influence on international affairs. He remarks that there are certain cardinal facts which it would be unwise to lose sight of. Firstly, the rockbed of Germany’s foreign policy is the axiom that the next phase of her legitimate development presupposes a successful war with Great Britain. And reasonably. He who pursues the end mu st adopt the means that leads to it. And our Teutonic cousins push forward towards their goal with admirable energy and perseverance. Great Britain and Germany are two rivals who may at any moment become adversaries, the one wielding, the other claiming, supremacy at sea and a corresponding influence in shaping the affairs of the world. Unless the one voluntarily gives up part of her possessions or the other abandons her claims, the two must inevitably clash. Postprandial professions of friendship will neither hinder the struggle nor put off the day; such courtesies are controlled by one motive-tight compartment and the pursuit of the great national aim is sustained by the ocher.

Looked at fairly without bias there is much to be urged in favour of the German view. Hitherto sway and prestige among nations went in the long run to the most worthy, which usually proved to bo also the most powerful State. It was this historical fact that underlay the theory that right and might cou-

verge. But now that Great Britain and her friends are the lucky possessors heati possidentes, they are seeking to insure themselves against the operation of this law of history hy discouraging appeal to arms. The sufferer hy this innovation would be Germany, who is undoubtedly the most worthy among European nations, and the only one which no other Continental Power could withstand single-handed. She abounds in the stuff of which leaders among nations are made. The annals of her public life enrich the traditions of civic virtues; the patriotism of her people is unexampled in Europe. The zeal and conscientiousness of her officials, the eagerness of her citizens to defend their country in person, their readiness to make large sacrifices to extend the nation’s possessions, the subordination of personal and party interests to the furtherance of the common weal are amongst the qualities which have made Germany what she is, and bid fair to make her what she deserves to be. The genuine enthusiasms and ardour of her young men, the wisdom of her elders, the wealth of her toilers all flow into this patriotic channel ever ready to enter into the vital action of the nation. On sacrifices such as these “the Gods themselves throw incense. ’ ’ And despite the peculiarities of the German psyche it is almost impossible to imagine that the leaders of a nation, endowed with such noble qualities, inspired by such lofty aims, and cheered by such alluring hopes, would resolve upon a policy of inaction which must seem not far removed from treason.

The Germans are fully convinced that Great Britain’s present status in the world is out of all proportion to her moral and military qualities, of which power and prestige should be the meed. They hold that pur people love their ease too dearly, shrink too anxiously from hardship to avail themselves of such inspiring force as they may still possess. Grown lethargic they long for finality in the settlement of international aflairs, for exemption from a sudden summons to arduous duty and painful exercise, for the undisturbed of their present possessions. How far this view corresponds with the reality is" "a secondary consideration. Entertained by a valorous and pushing nation, whose one aim is to oust us from our international position, it must combine to form a most powerful motive for action. Consequently it is not in the power'of the British Press or the British people to avert the calamity by. professions of admiration, offers -of friendship, or resolutions passed at the Hague Conference. We may ward it off just so long as our naval force is superior to that of Germany, and the preliminary conditions of the contest operate as a deterrent upon our would-be aggressor. So long but no longer. What |we won by the sword we must defend by the sword. This significant fact should be borne well in mind by those who are answerable for the naval strength of the nation.

Anotbr leading fact of the situation is that the real director of Germany’s foreign policy is neither Herr von Tschirschky, Herr von Schoen, nor Prince von Bulow, but Kaiser Wilhelm himself, who, not content with sketching its general lines, determines many of its details as well. Thus he aloue is really, though not technically, responsible for too far-reaching changes in the policy inaugurated by Bismarck : in the first place he withdrew from the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula the help which Bismarck had thought well to accord them, and made himself the protector of Mohammedans through world. Bismarck had never defended the Turks in their massacres of Christians, solely no doubt because he set that down as bad policy. Emperor Wilhelm thinks differently, and although he is a bishop of the Lutheran Church and has declared that none but Christians can be brave soldiers, he courageously and publicly offered his active friendship to the Sultan of Turkey and all the Mohammedans throughout the world. Why? Was it because there are so many of them under British rule? Was it to possess an additional and powerful lever? Mohammed the Prophet in his political testament told his followers that their future strength would lie more in the dissensions of the Christians than in the unaided endeavours of the faithful, And his prediction has been continually coming true ever since. When, for instance, his successor, Mohammed the Conqueror, was besieging Constantinople he boasted that he had more Christians in his army before the walls than his Christian enemy possessed behind them. And in our own days, when the Morocco question first. became acute, the Sultan of Turkey despatched a deputation of fervent Moslems to the Court of Fez with this message: “The Sultan of Morocco would do well to bear in mind the Prophet’s warning that Islam’s strength lies in the feuds of Christendom, and to look to the German Emperor for help. ’ ’

IN tho second place, remarks the writer, the Kaiser gave up, the plan of isolating France and substituted for it the isolating and defeat of Great Britain. Delonda esfc Carthago, the formula round which the

historian will group his subsequent acta, is a rough statement of the aim, the means of attaining which are unbounded, whereas our lines of defence are strictly and narrowly limited." Therefore we are at a disadvantage. For some of the means of attack are embarrassing because tortuous. Take for instance the pains taken by Germany in 1901 to fan the flame of resentment against Russia in the breasts of the Japanese. In Tokio many attributed them to a sentiment of friendship for Japan on the part of the Kaiser. Others accounted for the solicitude by the fact that a Far Eastern War. had it then broken out. would materially further the Kaiser’s policy. But the Japanese mastered their resentment and kept the peace while gathering up their forces. In the following year modified tactics were tried. Germany strongly urged our Government to strike up an alliance with that Japan who was bound to war with Russia. The Kaiser himself, the painter of the well-known antiBuddhist picture, advocated the rapprochement warmly, being especially anxious to see the British and the Japanese people linked together by a strong bond of friendship that would last say for a generation. And that desiro of hia Majesty’s heart once fulfilled, the German Foreign Office took it for granted that all fears or hopes of an Anglo-Russian understanding were dead, and would not revive for at least a generation. And to keep Muscovy permanently estranged from England was one of the aims by which Germany’s relations towards Great Britain, France and Russia were continually shaped. The indispensable condition of Germany’s success in her mission was, in the belief of the Wilhelmstrasse, that she should always be able to play off Russia against England and England against . . . Now the Anglo-Japanese alliance, it was felt was the very thing to create an impassable barrier between the Thames and the Neva, hence the tidings that it was at last concluded were hailed with exceeding great joy on the banks of the Spree. "When after the wished-for war had broken out, the Mikado’s troops had won engagement after engagement and peace seemed desirable, the Kaiser, as a friend in need, administered consolation to the Tsar for Russia’s reverses, and strengthened him in his resolve to go on with the campaign. In August 1904 • informal peace negotiations were started by a proposal coming from the Japanese. The Kaiser’s advice to his imperial brother was still in favour of fighting out the good fight. And the pourparlers were then broken off by order of the Tsar. Post hoe ergo propter hoc? However, this may be, one cannot but admire the unselfish devotion of the Kaiser to the interests of his people as he understands them. His gaze is passionately turned upon every event, every incident throughout the globe dikely to bring about the opportunity for which he has been impatiently waiting since he ascended the throne. Above praise are the unflagging energy and untiring perseverance with which he gathered together the means of furthering his aims from the uttermost ends of the earth, from Japan, Chnia, the Dogger Bank, the South African Republic, Morocco, Egypt, Persia. Everything was fish that came to his Imperial net.