Moral And Political Sidelights On Prosecution

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 6, Issue 288, 29 June 1917, Page 2 (Supplement)

Moral And Political Sidelights On Prosecution

POLITICS OF WAR MORAL DEBITS AND CREDITS. ALLIES' WILL TO VICTORY ~ Extracts from an article by HILAIRK IJKLLOC in "Land and Water."

I propose to consider those genoral points which have more bearing on civilian opinion than on th« military side of the campaign. L mean the political (or moral) advantages and disadvantages which the present situation produces for either combatant. Tiic.se points it is especially suitable to consider in the short tense period of waiting through which all the combatants are passing, and which will be resolved soon enough into what may be the final dash of the opposing forces. Thesa tnree points are: Ist, the enemy oecti pation ol allied soil: 2nd, the political constitution of the two parties, 3rd, a very different thing, the determination to achieve desired victory .

I-THE OCCUPATION OF ALLIED SOIL. The .'east important strategically, the mast important politically, of all the features the campaign now wears in this, the approach t» its last phase, >s the occupation by the enemy of Allied soil. We siiouJd begin any examination of his political advantages and disadvantages by weighing this fact and its effects. )Vhen we lay that it is strategically of least consequence we mean that -the student of strategics treats the surface of this globe like a chessboard, considers obstacles), artificial and natural, distances, calculations of material resources and so forth, and eliminates frontiers because frontiers are not obstacles or communications or anything else that concerns his study. But to conider war merely as strategics is pedantic and false. The great masters of war have never so treated it. War is a struggle between human beings, and tne action of human beings depends upon the mind; the affection of the mind by invasion, let us say, or any other political side to war, is' an affection of the whole fighting body. It was a great soldier who determined that Carthage might win in Italy through tho political effect of inya-sio'n; it was another great soldier who invented the phrase of "carrying (the war into Africa." To the .student a retreat or an advance is' no more than a military movement, but the greater the captain the better he knows tnat it i- of high consideration to the conduct and to the result of the war, not only over what natural features, but through what a population you advance or retire. The enemy happens at the present moment to hold in Europe territory which before the war was everywhere", save in a portion of Gallc-ia. and the Bukovina, on the Isonzo, and in a few Alpine valleys (and a few square miles of Alsace), the territory of those who are now his opponents. His line includes nearly all Belgium r a portion of North-Eastern France, not large in area, but very valuable in material, and conspicuou. for groat monuments of the past. He holds the whole of Servia and Montenegro; the Wallaehian provinces of modern Rumania, and tne Lithuanian and Polish provinces of the Russian Emmre.

How did it come about, and what is its full effect? The first thing for us to grasp is that it came afcout very differently in the East from what it did in the West. It i< true of nearly everything in this Avar that the Western and the Eastern aspect are in sharp contrast. _ The enemy line in the West, that is, against the British, French, and Italians, is nowhere a result of plan. . .

In the East it is otherwise. The territory occupied upon the East by the enemy at the present moment is territory over which he has advanced of set will long after the campaign was in full swing. The limits to which he has advanced do not represent a limit with which lie is satisfied or a line upon which he had previously determined to stand. But they do represent the results of a successful war movement. To sum up: Upon the West the enemy accidentally oocupie* Allied territory, and fig/its upon it, but fights where he has been pinned, and not where he chooses, although it is upon alien soil. The line is almost immovable for more than two years'.

Upon the East there are successive advances and retirements. The line is far from immovable, but at the present moment it divides territory very unequally, leaving by far the greater part of what wals formerly Allied territory, of what was formerly Allied territory in enemy occupation, and much less of what was formerly enemy territory in Allied occupation. So much for the map. Xow let us consider the nature of the populations affected.

The core of the war morally is the national feeling 0 f the great helligeieirts. Germany suHers politically when a true part of German soil is held b>Jiussi:«ns. Russia, when any part of .Russia proper is so held, and France, when any part of France is so held, as would Britain, if any part of Britain wen- so held. As a political phenomenon therefore, very great weight indeed attach.es to the occupation of even so small a belt of French territory as that now held by the enemy. Such weight attached to the comparatively narrow belt ol East Prussia, which the Russiam.se wer able to hold, talit the

German authorities modified all their plana in order to reiea«e t little toriiei and drive the invader out. In r'rauw . . . the Gorman occupation of Lille and Valenciennes ivnd Itethel and Moziercs, is the tmidiitlg of a nerve. It is of prodigious effe-t poliiciilv upon the war, and of what effect we will consider in n inoiiient. The chief advantage to the enemy of the situation is that no part of his territory proper is administered by an opponent or suffers from an opponent's exactions. Kvon Hungary, the ino>t menaced of the group against u . ifree from actual invasion, while the strips (if An 'trian territory in Italian hands are even including Gorizia, Italian in character. Most important of all, the German Empire, which is the life ot the meat' onglomcration we are lighting (though representing only half its man-power is lighting everywhere upon alien sail. The (ierman citizen is able to regard the position as one ol "'conquest," although the term properly applies only to a settlement, the result of war. and not to an oc upation. It may -wind a little paradoxical to jiV -<>. but I believe it to be true that some : i-advnitage attaches to the ocfil-

Fn tin" case of Franco and of Italy, w-tiii-Ii are lionn gonoous, tin- thing goeswithout :i>-illir- In the services of liotll tlh'-c Cowers tlic enemy is opposed bv ;il! ax liv one man. The Ea-t of I'hiropn cannot show the same complete unity. Tin 1 Palkans arc mixed. Polo was compelled to light against Polo. Gormanspeaking men from Courland and from the Kingdom of Poland also fought Gorman-speaking men under tlia Crowns of the IJohenzollerns and tint Hnpslnirgs. JJni even here the mass of the |H)liticnl action was united. N'mv it i. a difficulty of the enemy's which will not he recognised publicly perhajM liiitil tile last stages of his do feat, that he is in no such case. Tho enemy Alliance, though it enjoy. ,-. single direction and, being besieged and standing interior to the KntoiiUi Powers Ls the more thrust toiMlicj nieehanieally and made one, continues to consist in four quite distinct and national groups, one of which i not fully homogeneous, and Lhese four

pation ol eneni\ -oil in the last stages of a, war. especially if that occupation is subject to blunders and meets .with very strong opposition. It is tnue to say that Carthage was weaker for her

Italian position before the Metaurus, and it is true to say that Napoleon was weaker for his Spanish position. What the feeling among the Allies would be, a,nd paiticularly among the French, after 2i years of" terribly expensive war if the siege hdd been" conducted upon Senium soil, it is impossible to say, though all my personal judgment would incline to the tenacity of the Allies even in that case. But what it is with one whose Department occupied and portions of several others occupied with slave raich and executiomj and robberies and worse going on upon French soil, we all know. Tt makes any thought of compromise impossible. Such a situation might not be to the disadvanage of a military power the relative strength of whieii was increasing with time'and which was on the read to hut Germany is in the exactly, opposite portion. She has admitted what is after all obvious enough, that victory has failed her. And under these circumstances to be under the necessity, as it were, to exasperate your opponent, is not an advantage, it is a disadvan tage.

Whether tin i is a political a.sset or not only the future can determine. It is obvious that if tiie war were to end in a peace which : ,till left Germany unoccupied and Prussia in the saddle, it would be a very great political asset. Future generations would see clearly that Prussia had been able to inflict a terrible wound upon the physical nature of an opponent, and had suffered no retribution.

There is something of the same sort on the Italian front. It is conceivable that by bombardment from the air or from the sea the Autrians could destroy things of immeasurable value to mankind and glorious to Italy. There is nothing of the sort on the other side within reach of the Italians upon their present line. But it is with tin's as with the question of invasion just discussed; the effect of such things upon your opponent is that of a spur. He may not win, but his determination to win is vastly increased, and if you are upon tho whole on the losing side it is a disadvantage for you to Have applied that spur, for it will make him the more ruthless when he can act in his turn.

POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE TWO PARTIES. The second political con is the nature of the populations at war. The popular phrases used up and down Europe are very misleading here, although tuey come from the recognition of what is perfectly true—the preponderance of ihe German Empire in tho Alliance against us. The French, the British and tho Russian publicist always speak of defeating "Germany/' and even the Italians, though tno troops opposed to them are entirely Austro-Hungarian, fill a great part of their description with the " Herman" nienM;e. This is hecau.ve, but for North Germany, or to bo accurate, but for Prussia, which is the master of North Germany, neither would the war have broken out nor would it have taken tho character it has," The conception of a sudden spring upon Europe was Prussian. Tne disregard of treaties was Prussian, 'file puerile confusion of brutality with strength is uniquely Prussian. The very blunders liavo been Prussian. The three decisivo blunders of the Maine, Verdun and the Trentino, in particular the latter, ■which, though carried out by Austrian troops was Prussian in organisation and plan. At the same, time the strength of the huge alliance against us is Prussian. It is the Prussian discipline and the Prussian conception of war which has permitted the resistance to be ao prolonged . . . When we look back into the compositon of the forces opposed to ui, their moral composition, we appreciate what is too often forgotten : That the Entente Powers though far more divided in structure, geogra phically separated, and only able to'coopei'ato by agreement, arc morally more homogeneous than the enemy. It is if very important point, and it is a point upon which the enemy himsell has gene hopelessly wrong/ Take tho ■ :ase of the British forces. : Thorn was iiere an Kmpiiv of the most complex sort, the links between which I "ere iii many cases as loose as they could be. In the case of one very essential department, the Irish at home and abroad, there was notorious disaffection. But there ha.s been no compulsion. _ no enlistment of unwilling nationalities, no dragging of a train i f political units each with some soparato cans, to serve. All the force brought into the field by the British Crown in the amazingly great and spontaneous effort of the last two and a half years have one purpose. To t:uke a complete te t. Nn desertion can be conceived as pro; ceding from disaffection to the Britis.i Crow n ill these forces.

We have goinp; ahoiit ,ns current speech the ba-rhario phrase "a will to vi'torv." It is net even English. \do not know of what German phrase ft may he a. translation. Put the idea e\-')i'cl el ia decent English! we nil know. It i- the determination to win. Vol i" hold cut, lint to win. to have the better of tile opponent, and to oppose our ; o d will against his evil one. Thai fundamental spiritual factor 's present with if*. It is absent in him.

groups carry with them alien, indifferent or hostile population^. You haive the Germans who are distinctly divided into Northern and Southern (including the German-speak-ing subjects of the Hapeburgs); vou nave the Magyars; you have the Bulgarians and you have the Turks. Tho subject and disaffected recruitment m the enemy's ranks must not >o exaggerated a., to number. Those for instance, in the German Empire Who, though compelled to fight for it are permanently its enemies, do not number altogether as much as 7 per cent, of its forces. Those in a similar situation under the Hapsburg Crown Hardly number 20 nor cent. A much larger proportion, of course are neitiier German spoaJiing nor ATagyar, but it in io be doubted whether even as much as one-eighth are actively opposed to the Government of the JJual Monarchy. Bulgarian recruitment comprises a few districts which are di*. u, ~. Tl,O - v co,int little in the whole. The Hotch-potch of Turkish recruitment is composed, to at least 50 per cent., of men quite indifferent to the present quarrel or actively" opposed to 1 urkish rule, but that recruitment 19 but a small factor in the whole encmv mass against us. The real weight of this point is not the size of the enemy's disaffetcted remuting fields. It is rather the fact that they exist aft all. In the western armies the problem does not exist \on have got to ask whether 5, 7 12 or 20 per cent, of the French, Italian or British armies desire the victorv of tho enemy, for there is not a man anion? them who desires it. The number who desire victory, though enrolled upon our opponents' side, is small but it exiits, and tiiat is a profound difference between us.

THE MOOD OF-' THE BELLIGERENTS, The third political dement in the present situation of expectancy before the final shock is the eleaenl of Propaganda. In another aspect is it the element of Mood. We have to contrast tno mental atmosphere mainlv produced by I ropaganda, hut also produced by national temperament and by the tray in v, inch the various governments have anected their own people, bv the restriction or the communication of news and we must considerJn that field the neutrals also.

In this field there are two great outstanding facts which we must recognise at once and always keep in mind it we rre to judge affairs rightlv. Ihe first fact is that the enemy Powers, and in particular tne authorities of the German Empire, have kept the mentality of those they govern in a state of security, while the Allied Powers, upon the whole, informing their people better (though less copiously), and depending much less upon artificial means, hove given the population which they govern a better and therefore a more severe view of the great struggle. ( The second fact in this creation of % "mood" is that the determination to complete victory is strong on the Allied side in peoples and Goternjnejits alike, and has long di appeared fuipon the enemy si side.

So Tar, then, as this first category is concerned, the political advantage is with the enemy. It is undoubtedly true that, no matter how produced, th'e certain expectation of easy victory, and much more the feeling of a certain destr;,- and certitude in arms, is a political rsset to the party enjoying it, But note the contrast when we come to tho second fact: The resolve to b« the vi tor.

In this, which i■; no les? a moral fact than ground or climate w a physical fact, the Allies have had for many months | ast, and fully maintain today, and will maintain to the end, a superiority no less striking than that which the enemy has over him in his original confidence, nourished as it is by the perpetuation of the .war outside hi, boundaries. The enemy has frank.lv conle-sed hj» inability to achieve definite victory. He has been compelled to that attitude |o r the first time in Prussian history. He ha.s asked for what is, if one looks at history, largely an armistre or truce. It is the Allies who have refused. In tho political held a- aw hole there is no more significant f-anrv than this: The great niasa of the Allied populations would be unable to tell you why they re-fused. Very many of them have long looked ii|>en the war as an [•von more dillicult task for them than it is. But there 1$ no doubt whatsoever of their reply to the advances of the enemy. They ire determined upon a decisive si; ;( . ss . 'P],,, p ni » m y | 1;ls ■ >;. only abandoned l>h hope < f tho'same. Be believe..' indeed, that the prolongation of the war will only maku things wotVe for iw, but only because we and be w ill continue to suffer. He believes, indeed, that he is invincible but only in the sense that be oelievos bis defend ive tii be invincible. Of victory, in his oriuinal sense, he has long despaired, and he h-i»s '•onfoj.-ed lu's despair. Such are the three great political or moral consideration- a- I see them during this | cried of preparation before the Ir.ist great shock, and I confess that of thnii all tho ino-.t important seems to me the last.