WHY THE ALLIES ARE BOUND TO WIN.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 219, 20 October 1916, Page 3 (Supplement)

WHY THE ALLIES ARE BOUND TO WIN.

JMPENDING DISASTER TO THE LONG GERMAN LINE. By VISCOUNT PEEL The confident [note of Mr. Lloyi George's speech 011 the war, in which he foreshadowed victory in a few months, must liave reminded mosi people of almost the last thing which Lord Kitchener said, which was tha*. though lie had crigjinally estimated th<s wai to last thieo years, he thought now it might perhaps be over sooner. Whether it is profitable or not to dwell on the possible length ol' the war h a matter for varied opinion; what seems to me to be important is that at last we can see tne indexj-finger ol events pointing towards victory

Wo can now say with more confidence than ever that we are bound to win. Examining the factors that tiespeak victory for the Allied cause, we must pay due regard to the importance of the co-ordination of the Allies' plans. The Allies are fighting on one concerned plan and ihe enemy is met wita the same pressure everywhere ri France, in Russia, in Italy, as thoug.'i these several fronts were really one indivisible front.

Fighting the enemy on one concerned plan, the Allies are able to give the fullest effect to all their great resources and the vast armies of which they d'.« pose. The strength of all the Allies is exerted at one and the same time, resulting in remorseless pressure being exerted on the enemy. So far as Great Britain is concerned, it is a considerable gain towards ultimate victory that the day of side-shows is over. We have liquidated that unfortunate ana i.l-starred enterprise, tin Dardanelles expedition, and the experience of both Gallipoli and Mesopotamia, in which latter expedition we have suffered severely, forbids any prospect of such side-shows being revived elsewhere. One can say with certainty that tliero is not tire slightest dange;of any fuure dissipation of our forces in minor or secondary theatres of war. I have always held the opinion that to divert forces away from the 111 am theatre of war is pure folly, and we seem to have paid a bitter pr;c,e to have this lesson impressed on those who had been responsible for our war strategy 111 the past.

"WEAR THEM DOWN." Out' principal enemy is the German, and it is against hint We have to concentrate; if we defeat him the defeat of his dup r s follows as a matter f course. I have dealt early with the liquidation of the side-show form of strtegy becauso I attach great importance tc the results likely to flow from the centralisation of our military forces. We are rapidly overcoming the handicap under whi it we have suffered 111 the matter of snells and guns of :: II calibro which the German have possessed and turned out in prodigious quantities, and the mobilisation of our industrial resources for the purpose of munition output is beginning to tell in what must bo an unpleasant manner for ilit enemy. Also the world's industrial resources are open to us, and il we have not vet overtaken the Germans as regards armament and shell output we should soo-t be in that happy position. As it is the great arsenal of Britain is turning ut shells and guns ot every calibre in quantities that >we could never have dreamt possible. This munition factor, and tJie oordination of the Allies' plan and the centralisation of our fighting strength are leading reasons that induce me to say that we are bound to win. The moral equation is beginning to assume greater signnicance. Poditical considerations r.re having an undue influence on the enemy's strategical conceptions, always a dangerous thing te happen. The Germans have represented to their countrymen that the war lias been one uninterrupted series of victories for the German arms, and that it is only a question of time whet* the unfortunate Allied Powers will recognise that they are really "beaten." Fed 011 lies, the confidence of tlio German people would be rudely shaken by anything like a retreat on the pars of their soldiery; hence it is almost impossible for the German Higher Command to sanction a retirement of its own accord o£ German troops 011 either the Eastern or Western front. With diminishing forces tli*> Ue'mans, under the restraint of their own dishonesty, are compelled to attempt to achieve the impossible—hold inordinately long fronts. When these lines grow too thin and retreat becomes impeiative, the very delay in holding them so long may cause an appalling disaster. If anything is certain it is that the Germans will stiller from their iniquitous methods of sustaining tho war.

Tho present strategy of the Allies is to wear them down 011 these long lines, to pin them there and force them to accept battle rather than prematurely to attempt to drive them back 011 to shorter lines which can bo held with fewe" No doubt a great deal of false new? comes from Germany, but there is little reason to question the authenticity of the numerous reports that speak of the German people fieing restless about the length of the war—long in comparison with the victory in three months which they had conceived. This war weariness and the restriction of the food supply exercises unquestionably a serious influence on their patience and the general moral-remsting power of the community. The reaction of this change of nun 1 must be felt in the trenches, and this much is true, that while the German soldier is still fighting extremely well and vigorously, yet the morale of German troops has suffered, as sliow.i by tho fact that there are surrenders now where there have been no surrenders a year ago.

These signs are an earn'est o c ultiiniti victory, but we need to rcmemljer ilia; though the German forces may find it difficult to replace casualties with good human material or increase the number of their cadres, they still are in great strength ar.d fighting desperately for tho maintenance of a system which has kept Europe for the last fifty years in a state of nervous unrest. These soldiers, led by representatives ol a militarist easto that has all at stake, will not easily relinquish their hold on ambitions for world rule. The task of driving the Germans out of I'Vance and llelgium and making the woignt of our armies felt in Germany it self must, under the most satisfactory circumstances, take a considerable period of time and demand the mos't unremitting efforts on our part. With .loffre I would say that patien e ami onlidenee are necessary, but more than these abstract virtues we need tli > influence of solid achievement. The *:i!' contribution of tho nation to the war must be forthcoming, wh'ether that conributioii. so far as the individual is concerned. In? paid in blood, in work, in money, or in all three. Every man and woman must do his or her rightful share towards the common end, s i that the only victory that will satisfy

v.s,'complete victory, may not be denied the Allies.

We must further organise ourselves so that the fittest men find tho : r way into tlw fighting line, an 3 the least fit men do the work .for which they are better suited. The process of combing out sturdy young fellows from factories, munition shops, and other favourite resorts of the embusques, must be accelerated, so that the benefit of the nation's manhood in felt in the trenches.

. OUR MA a POWER. That organisation will be the be?cfclculated to give us victory soonest that disposes of each man according to his physical qualifications—the strong est for the firing line, the weaker Hit the rear and lines of communications. I understand that Mr. Lloyd George, as head of the War Office, realises tin necessity for making the best possible use of our manhood reserves, and wi'l .see that the combing-out process ha; the necessary impetus behind it. Anything that helps towards victory demands attent : on. In discussing the strengthening ol the fighting units one is bound to tako notice of the frequent references that have been made to the waste of good material arising from the non-empioy-mcnt of native fighting rates other than the Indians Personally I fail to see the slightest objection to recruiting coloured troops for certain defined purposes. They mav find the western winter rather tryingbut that seems to be a drawback that could be go over in time. They could bo used in the rear of the line or oil communications, if not actually :n the trenches, relieving so many more men foi the lighting line.

WHY NOT NATIVES? I imagine many nxtiv.e races of martial spirit would welcome the opportunity to express in this practical fashion their love for an Empire thfit rules over them so humanely; fncleed. they must have wondered why try? opportunity of participating in the war has sollo t ; been denied them. Our Allies the French have drawn freely on the warlike material of their African colon;es, and our rulers should realise in practical fash-on that we have in the native races of oar Empire vast resources yet untapped. 1 have given my reasons why I thiiK wo are bound to win, but, needless 'o say, I am assuming that the whole nation will maintain the effort now worthily being exerted, so that we may depend on the maximum of benefit from our preparations and resources. If the people at home do their part we can take courage of heart an dlook with confidence to the future. "Weekly Disoatch."