RUSSIA'S STRENGTH.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 211, 22 September 1916, Page 1 (Supplement)

RUSSIA'S STRENGTH.

RECUPERATION OF BEAR A SURPRISE.

POWER OF SLAV UNDERESTIMATED BY GERMANY.

(By J. L. GARVIN, in Chicago "Tribune")

LONDON, July 8. Through all the accidentals of this struggle I have insisted on a fundamental fact. Unless Germany could break Russia, Germany could not win even the land war. Not only so. If the central league could not "ibreak Russia in the present campaign all the hopes based on their previous progress would be broken sooner or later by the action of the Czar's armies wth the other Allies.

From, that (standpoint the month seems likely to be perhaps the most critical period of the whole conflict. So the estimate in advance. The general soundness of that judgment stands verified, but in how different a manner from anything imagined. All life, but especially war and politics, are an astonishing interplay of the calculable and ;the incalculable. Many persons foresaw with a v*sion as intense and sure as that of the Old Testament prophets the coming of this war, but no one anticipated its occasion or its character. PREDICTIONS HALF RIGHT.

The late Lord Salisbury, indeed, with that brooding sagacity he had. often predicted that Armageddon

would break out over some sudden issue coming side-ways, but even he not have anticipated that the assassination of an Austrian duke two years ago would summon armies, not cvly from the older nations, but from the ends of tha earth, and would send millions to the'r graves. Thus i* we say that things are constantly burning 'out as piercing thinkers warn the world for years beforehand, we are half right. And if 'we repeat that " it is the unexpected that happens," we are half wrong in spite of Disraeli and the attractions of the epigram, hike the leaven and the dough, there is always the m'ngling of some unknown factor with circumstances that were plain and obvious.

RUSSIA'S REVIVAL. Forgive this moralising. The war. parallel with its dreadful practical concerns, keeps us musing about old human questions of fate- and dest'iny, law and chance, it brings to mind what wise physcians used to tell us in peace, that men who walk the hospitals, svith their scenes of healing or of doom, are apt to become e'ther mystics or materialists. With that let me put aside the besetting meditations of the time and como to my real matter.

The recovered strength of Russia was obvious, indeed, but we all know it to be still far from its maximum. The smashing force of General Brusloff's onslaught was a surprise almost as startling to the Western Powers its to tho Central Empires themselves. How far that onslaught will go in the present campaign, or at least 'ii the next few weeks, cannot yet be judged HASTY OPTIMISM. The Russians ham far surpassed .ill reasonable calculations based on western sinndards. They may do wonders ngii'ii cither before these words appear iri'type, or soon after. On the oth'T band, though no one could adnvre nioi c than myself the magnificent achievement of our eastern Ally, or take a finner view that the ultimate oflY't of the Russian factor will be enormous. I am not among those who look for the total debacle of Austria during the coming months. It is better to keep the measured views, though to sketch dazzling theories would be much easier.

There has, of course, been tho usual effervescence of optimistic romance on the part of the more facile journalism. The Russian offensive had scarcely gone twenty miles forward when tho headlines were crediting it once more with the weight of the old familiar steam roller, and the speed of a highpowered motor-car. Pictures were conjured up of Cossacks already careening almost within sight of Lemberg, and of Russian infantry divisions sweeping over the rivers as though every man were shod with seven-league boots. CAME EARLIER THAN EXPECTED. As for cannon and shell, they wore doubtless coming on at a rare rate, by some means left vague. Nothing in tlr's corresponds to the ponderous and deliberate realities of war. What is probable we shall consider in a moment. My point is that i£ even the most sober views lie taken the Russian operations are bound to have a far-reach-ing, perhaps a transforming, effect in favour of the Allies as a whole. What has happened on land, in conjunction with the clinching of British sea power

against Germany and with the Allies' reassertion of what I may call their trade power, seems bound to shorten the war and to modify all previous speculation. * Neither the western natrons nor the Central .Empires had supposed that Russia—though i>olieved to be impregnable jagain on t»h:e could strike any blow like General Brusiloff's before the beginning of next year Hcncv the practical and moral preparation in thv? west for the contingency of a four years' war under conditions that would' relieve tne appalling strain on France.

GERMANY'S VERDUN MISTAKE

Hence also the profound strategical mistake, as we here hold it to be, of Germany's determination ,to concentrate against Verdun the masses of guns and men which might have been j employed with for UMJnc 'formidable ' eiect upon some sector in the east but i for the infatuated underestimate o\ : Russia which possessed Berlin and iI on.na alike. t . this is another of Germany's " psychological blunders," and >:ts origin ! goes back for years, almost for generations. Frederick the Great met his bloodiest chocks because he despised the warnings of General Mannstein. | who had served in Russia. The Ger- ' mans assumed a tone of overwhelming superiority towards all Slavs, despite the remarkable proofs of the highest practical ability given b\ Poles and Czechs as education increases amongst thdii.

The present German Emperor was surrounded for years by people like Professor Schiemaiui, who held that ti:e Czar's anny in conflict with Prussian oraii: : sat : on would prove little hot. ter lh;n a rabble. UNDERESTIMATING THE SLAV l.nst August it was believed that for nil serious purposes the "rabble" w;is KM-inanently dispersed. American visitors to Berlin dm-ng the last nine months have been assured again and ijjra : ii on the lii : ghest authority that there was no further danger, not the slightest, to either Austria or Germany from tlie Russian side. Even more extreme views were held by the incorrigible anti-Russian fanaties in Vienna and Budapest. Genera! Konrad von Woetzendorf was toll'ng a Swedish interviewee, just before the

thunderclap, that the Muscovite barbarians must, of course, lie thrust back toward Asia. It was implicitly assumed when batteries and battalions wer.o massed for the attack on Verdun and the great adventure in the Trentno that the Russians bad not a real kick left in them. STUPIDLY ARROGANT VIEW We thought this a stupidly arrogant view and only hoped that the ironic fates would keep the Central Empires in the same complacent mood until circumstances were riper, but very tew in the west, even among the better informed, thought that the Czar's armies were yet in a position to shatter the enemy's defence on any sector. The question of rifles in Russia was no longer a serious difficulty. The supply of field artillery and shells was excellent. But, arguing from western standards, more big guns and still more ly'g guns would be wanted for a long time to come. There would never be too many. From the Baltic to Rumania the armies of the two Kaisers had walled themselves up behind successive lines of extraordinarily solid and elaborate defence. It seemed improbable that tho means of smashing those defences could yet exist. BRUSILOFF'S GIANT BLOW. Then Brusiloff struck with a vengeance. He opened an overwhelming fire along an immense stretch of front and in a few days he had done what had been thought impossible in tho west; twenty and thirty miles ahead not at one point only but on three different sectors, he had swe.pt everything before him and thrown lis cavalry through the gaps. In ten days over 120,000 Austrian and German prisoners had been taken; the enemy's dead and wounded were reckoned in addition at so many again. It was a giant blow such as had not l>een struck in Austria sinc~ the Grand Duke's first invasion of Galicia.

Ev : clently this event must upset all calculations in favour of the Central Empires. It is an unmistakable turning point in the whole European struggle. This is true independently of all extravagant anticipations with regard to immediate Russian progress. If our Allies indeed reconquer the Bukovina —an event which would again cause strong excitement in Rumania —if on the other wing they break the direct Austr-Ge;man communications soutb of Brest Litovsk, and if, as in the autumn of 1914, they again close steadily on Lemberg from throe sides, so much the better. Such events would speak for themselves; there would lie no need to explain their bearin on the war or to enter into any balanced discussion of contingencies.

CONSERVATIVE PROPHECY. But take the mora cautious view. Suppose that the Czai 's armies by Mo end of June were held up <:■ even had to recede, the conchurons adverse 10 the Central Empires would not be altered. Conwvve as possible a formidable concentration of Krupp power which Brusilolf for the present could not overcome. What would it prove 0 Nothing but that Russia, in order to strike a rent blow for the relief of her French and Italian allies, had moved, in a loyalty as splendid as her prowess, a little before the time that would have been best for herself. The chief advantage of the Burprse is ever. German and Austrian transport facilities' are still incomparably superior. Prodigious is the output of heavy battery by Krupps and the Skocii works.' The Russian guns can be brought up only gradually to create an art'llery situation as favourable as that which existed whan Brusilolf. with accumulated stocks of ammunition in hand, opened the destroying fire of his preparatory bombardments. The farther the Russians advance indeed toward the enemy's chief railroad centres in Galieia and South Poland the more stubborn nrght he their task for some time.

BOUND TO PRESS ON. All that might mean that there would lio long pauses for rsorgairsat.on between ths Russian whirlwind attacks. There might be fluctuations and oscillations of fortune. The rising forces might be delayed. Their nature would not be altened. Their pressuiv would continue; sooner or later their advance, would lie resumed with more eruslr'ng weight and more sustained progress. Examine the hypothecs on which son-,- friends of-1 lie Central Powers still build. Suppo.se Hindenburg attempts the perilous adventure of an offensive, seeking to cross the Dvina. He might expose his flanks and endanger Iris connection unless the redoubtable Brusiloff could be surely contaned a guarantee no longer easy to insure. But even if Hindenburg could advance a certain way—the Russians might well chos.se to draw h'm on what would he gam?

MISTAKE OF LAST YEAR. We mav take it for granted, T think, that by no human possibility can th'j Teutons repeat Mackcnsen s and Hmtriumphs after the Galican "diirchbruch" of last year. The entire situation is different. Then the Russians had just made their greatest strategical mistake at the t me of the disastrous breakdown of their -Eternal organisation; their military position was about -as bad from wry point ' I view as an army ever stood in. They had fought then; «/.»« the Carpathians at the price of oOO.WIU casualties. Exhausted by these losses, their lines of retraat through the mountain passes became precarious as soon as Mackensen broke through. On tli- other side their armies in the 1 olHi snlieiit were immediately threatened bv envelopment. At such n moment t!"> munitions supply faded. N'ow the : r front is fairly straight. Their communications are everywhere ~. nre. They leave behind them what K ,i, v |,'<> helievcd to he an impregnable t of prepared lines to fall back up,mi with immovable stolidity it an.rtliin" "oes vetv wrong with the sequel of their present offens : ve. Grant another stiff cli'vk. and,what thou- H'l, Hussia would get stronger and strongw not oiilv in equipped reserves, but n liig guns, munitions and every apprancp of war.

" Take one verv siurgestive eompai - son. Russia in the Inst ten days has alr-adv inflated almost as much loss on the Centail Empires as Germany in the last four months has infliete.l on the western Allies. Again. Russia must, have added to her equipped mini-

ber in the last four months as many fresh men of the prime fighting ago as the Germans before Verdun have iost in casualties, though these by now must amount at the least to well nign over 400,000 men, and are probably h gher. SEES AUSTRIA OVERRUN. It is a moderate conclusion to say that Russia's relative fighting strength would be twice as graet by th ; s timenext year if the war went on. Nothing then could prevent her ,in conjunction with hor Allies, from overthrowing Tu.'key, mastering the Balkans and destroying Austria also, whose destruction, indeed, may be the only means of establishing a permanent settlement and reconstruction to he reached in Europe. Thus, even if Russia were held up for a time, worse storms again would bur%t from that quarter. Certainly Hapsburg troops could not stand uprignt against them, and Germany, with hoi: dwindling reserves, will ' e less and less able to provide for safety everywhere. I might have pointed out that before next winter, apart from the double track to Archangel. Russ'a will havo at the terminus of the Kola railway ? new ice-free port in Europe. All the supplies she requires to make final use of her trained numbers will come in more rapidly than ever. This is the prospect in the east. No matter how you look at it, the prospect is worse for the Central Powers than : t has been. GERMANY AT THE CRUX. Well may Germany want to get out of the Avar this year. She has nothing to gam by continuing it, and will have more and more to lose. Germany has come to the crux. Whence can sn> expect any solution in her favour? Not by the surrender of France. It is always just possible that the enemy may take Verdun.

Dearly as we hope the French may hold it to the end, its local defence, in view of the larger purposes of the war, is not worth more than a certain cost in lives. By raising the bid tho Germans may come nearer to thedr object. We assume that they will mafce another huge effort on the Meuse, no matter what the result. But even the fall of Verdun would not bring one inch nearer the surrender of France, nor relax her grip on Germany. After the galling disadvantage in* artillery during the last few months, her relative gun power will begin to increase again almost from now on. The Italians have secured an invaluable breathing space, thanks both to their own tenacity and tha Russian intervention.

BRITAIN RjiADY FOR FOURYEAR WAR. Of the British Army, we prefer not to say much just now, but every day has contributed to build up rts resources ;n men and above all in guns. It will hi heard from in due time, and whatever happens Britain,Jike Russia, will in various ways he much stronger three months hence than now, and stronger agarn six months licnce, and still stronger later. Nothing Germany can do w".l alter Hint process. The British army has resources enough for a four year war or a fivyear war, and in equ'pment it is going to be second to none in the world, We rather think that is going to help in the making of lrstory. Germany and her confederates will soon l>e kicking aU around against the pricks—tho harder the kicking the worse the consequences for the central league.

ON THE SEA. So much for the land situation. Now add the sea situation. If we had U fight Germany single-handed it would 1)0 a comparatively cheap war which wo could continue indefinitely. She iwvor could resume normal commerce witi the world at large before she had eoncded satisfactory terms of peace, She cannot get out into the Atlantic either by tue straits of Dover or hy the nortliabout passage. Austria cannot use either the Adratic Sea or the JEgean. The throttle grip on Turk:sii maritime commerce closes the Dardanelles, the Gulf of Smyrna, the Syrian Levant, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf. If the war goes on the Allies with absolute, certainly can dispose of Turkey. They can debar thp Central Empires from intercourse with nine-tenths of the world. Tho : r trade power, if I may coin the expression, is even more overbearing and invulnerable than their sea power. Not a single inch of colonial ground throughout the world can be recover}l by German force. THINKS PEACE IS NEARER. We hoard German efficiency extolled, and with : n its technical Tmits it deserves admiration; hut tin combined judgment and energy Britain has been too much for Germany. We are inclined to think that peace is nearer—not lor Heir von Bethmann-Holhveg 3 reasons, but for others the clean contrary. The German Chancellor thought that the war map as it stood a tew weeks ago must be taken as the baa.s of negotiation. We emphatically reject that bas : s. Herr Bethmann imagined that the war map could be modified onlv in favour of tlie Central Empires We think that the longer the war continues the worse U must be for the enemy in every way—military, maritime, commercial, social—and the more w II the war map l>e modified n favour of the Allies. Great Russian forces have not yet come anto action, even on the eastern main front. OTHER SURPRISES IN STORE? It is improbable that the full fighting plan of General Alexoieff and his colleagues has not yet lieen disclosed. In it least one of the outlyng theatres and in perhaps all of them, a complete ohangc of the existing positions will lie effected or insured before the end -it autumn. By that time Germany, we believe, will be ready to offer u-nus that would have been unthinkable n Berlin and Vienna a fortnight ago. Whether the terms will bo sufficient wen then to form the basis ol a got :1 ,ind listing peace has yet to ho seen. If not, the war will go on, and that, ne we hold, could mean only a darkening prospect for Germany herself and death to both Germany's partners We bo'iin to see the possibility of -. nearer peace, as sailors after a long vova't? might describe the first din. that prove imMi to be uc». clouds but land.