The Battle of Jutland and What it Means.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 209, 15 September 1916, Page 2 (Supplement)

The Battle of Jutland and What it Means.

BY A NAVAL AUTHORITY.

It is well-known that nearly all om great naval battles —not even excepting Trafalgar itself —have been the su ». ject of controversy after the event. In many cases every aspect of the action became :< matter of debate —the strategy the tactics, the conduct of subord; - ate cc n manders, the actual way in which it was fought, and the true ; s liaiate of its results. Thu debate was not confined to tin: publ'c or the Press. As often as rid: opinion was divided both a.s to the facts and the conclusions amongst office: s who were present and had the Ijest means of knowing. Many of the discussions were premature, but many continued long after all the available facts were known, and are even still alive. It would be idle, therefore, so soon after the late battle in the North Sea, and at a time when so little of its dotal can be disclosed without giving undesirable light to the enemy, to attempt anything like a final approbation. All that can be done is to point out certain aspects of the battle which seem to detach themselves from the mass of half-'disciosed detail, and which, so far as can be judged at present, are likely to remain its salient features FORCING THE ACTION. Seen in its broadest aspect, it stands out as a case of tactical division of the Fleet, which had the effect of bringing an unwilling enemy to battle. Such a method of forcing an action is drastic and necessarily attended with risk, out for great ends great risks must be taken, and jn this case the risk was far less great than that which St. Vincent accepted off Cadiz, and that division gave us the battle of tlifr Niie. the most complete and least debated of British victories. Then the two portions of St. Vincent's fleet were divided strategically with no prospect of tactical concentration for the battle. In the present case there was only an appearance of division. The Rattle Fleet was to the Nortn, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet to the South, out they formed in fact one Fleet under a single command acting in combination They were actually carrying out, as they ha:l been in the habit of do : ng periodically, a combined sweep of the North Sea, and Admiral Beatty's fleet was in effect the observation or advanced squadron. The measure of the risk, should he have the fortune to find the enemy at sea, was the length of the period which must necessarily elapse before the Commander-in-Chief would lie able to join the battle. It was a risk that would be measured mainly by the sk'!l with which Admiral Beatty could entice the enemy northward, without be. ing voerwhelmed by superior force. In the light of this outstanding tea ■ ture the action will be judged, and the handling of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and the splendid group of four battleships that was attached to it, appraised.

THE NELSON RULE. When Admiral Beatty got contact with the German Battle Cruisers thev were proceeding northward, and, being interior t:i his force, they 'turned to the southward. The inference was they w.ene cither trying to escape or bont on leading him into danger. When such a doubt occurs there i sin the British tradition a golden rule, and that is to attack "the enemy ; n sight."' It was the rule that Nelson consecrated, and it was good enough for Admiral Beatty. Ho engaged and continued to engage as closely as he could till he found the enemy's battle fleet coming North Then he turned, but he did not break off the action. The enemy was in over, whelming force, but by the golden rule it was his duty to cling to them as long as Ins teeth would hold. Tl|ey had spread a net for him, and it was for him to see that they f,ell into the midst of it themselves. It was a task that demanded some courage. Yet he did not finch, but continued tho fight to the northward and signalled for th« four Queen Elizabeths to turn lb' points. Now was the hour of greatest risk, but he was well disposed fot concentrating in the van of the enemy's line, and the Commander-in-Chief was hurrying down at full speod. For an hour and a half the unequal battle raged as Adnrral Beatty and Admirn 1 Evan-Thomas led the enemy on, before Admiral Hood could appear with his Battle Cruiser Squadron. The act on

(Officially Communicated to tne "Daily News and Leader.")

was then at its hottest, but Admiral Hood without a moment's hesitation, and in a manner that excited the high admiration of all who were privileged ta witness it. placed his ships in line ahead of Admiral Beatty's squadron. No Admiral ever crowned an all too short career more devotedly or in a manner more worthy of the name he bore. THE ENEMY IX THE NET. With his fine manoeuvre the risk was in a measure reduced, but tlier still remained the more delicate work of the Grand P'leet effecting its junction and entering the ill-defined action. Wit!. the exact pos : tion of the enemy's fleet shrouded in smoke and jn the gathering mist, the danger of interference was very great, and before the Commander-in-Chief lay a task as difficult as any Admiral could bo called upon to perform. To the last moment he kept his Fleet in steaming order, so as to preserve up till the end the utmost freedom of deployment, but by what precise manoeuvres the deployment was carried out must for obvious reasons be left in a mist as deep as that whiel was hiding all that was important tor him to know. Suffice it to say that the junction was effected with consummate judgment and dexterity. So nicely wai it timed that the deployment was barely completed when* at 6.15 p.m. the First Battle Squadron came into action with the enemy, who had by that time turned to the eastward and was already attempting to avo'd action.

Thus the fine combination had succeeded, and the unwilling enemy had been brought to action against the con • cenirated British Fleet, They had fallen rnto the midst of the net which had been drawn about them, but in the plan of the sweep there was inherent the inevitable limitation that the tinr> left for completing the business could but barely suffice. There were hardly three horn's of daylight left, and as darkness approached the action must be broken off unless a needless chance were to be given to the enemy for redressing Irs battle inferiority. Still our battle flest was.between the enemy and his base, and there would have been little hope of his escaping a decisive defeat but for the mist that robbed those who had prepared for the chance and those who had seized it with so much skill and boldness, of the harvest they deserved 'BEATEN AND BKOKEN." It was a beaten and broken fleet that escaped the trap. It bad lost many units, its gunnery had gone to pieces, and no one can blame its discretion t it fairly ran for home and left the British Fleet once more in undisputed command of the North Sea. For that, in a word, was the result of the battle. What it was the enemy hoped to achieve we cannot tell. Whatever their effort meant it failed to shake our hoid upon the sea. and that is what really matters. We have fought many indecisive actions, but few :n which the strategical result was so indisputable, few which more fully freed us of all fear of what tne enemy's fleet could do. It is by such standards that history judges victories, and by such standards the country cherished the memory of the men that prepared and won them. Current opinion will always prefer the test of comparative losses. Let th's be applied, and it w : !l bo found that the battle off Jutland will well hold its own against all but a few of our most famous victories—none of which we obtained on a first attempt. From another aspect it is clear the battlo can rank Keside any in our history. In the fringes of the fight, in the work, that is. of enrsers. and destroyers, officers and men bad chances such as their ancestors never knew, and they seized them with all the daring, the sk.ii, and the devotion that the greatest of their predecessors could hav3 hoped. From the vigorous, offensive against the enemy's cru'sers which cost Admiral Arbuthnot Ins life, to the least conspicuous of tho destroyer exploits, all was of the same pattern. It is : mpossibl'3 to read of what they did and what they failed to do without feeling there is one thing at least which the battle has given us. and that is the assurance that the old spirit is stil! alive and vigorous. It .is able and willing to do all the old Navy could do and in the battle of Jutland, as we now know, it has done it.