TO END THE WAR.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 4, Issue 41, 28 May 1915, Page 4 (Supplement)

TO END THE WAR.

VICTORY MAY BK OBTAINED Foil £10,000,000. BUILD 2000 AEROPLANES. Under those headings, ;i remarkable article appeared in one of the most recent issues of " Land and Water.'' The writer is Mr. L. Blin Desbleds, an acknowledged expert on aeronautics, and the view he propounds is tliat the war can he won inside of six months if Britain were to build a fleet of 2000 aeroplanes and carry the war into Germany. Having gone thoroughly into the subject, he has no doubt of Britain's ability to build such a fleet and to train the pilots neressnry to man it. The whole outlav, he savs, would fall short of £10,000,000. Mr. Desbleds begins bis article by em phnsising the ascendancy which he says the British airmen have acquired ovei the Germans. This it will be necessary to retain, and nothing in his proposals i> intended to impair the efficiency of teconnaissunce work ashore or afloat But after nearly seven months' war experience of the aeroplane, lie says, th<y time has come for taking stock. When (his is Hone, he says, it will l» found that a most important quality of Ibe aeroplane l has l,pon brought to light. This quality is its value for offensive operations. Britain has already, so fails the number of machines is concerned, utilised it in a timid manner in carrying out a number of raids. Is that timidity, he ask-;, due to the fact that Britain has not really grasped the full value of the aeroplane for offensive pttrpnses? Or is it because Britain is so engaged in maintaining the supremacy she has already obtained that she cannot vigorously push the development of a real offensive air fleet ?

Tlic writer has constantly explain >d the* imnortanre of an aerial offensive. Since the publication of his articles, the Admiralty has reported two air raids ly aerial squadrons thirty-four and forty aeroplanes strong respectively. Compare the result of these raids with those undertaken with a still smaller number of machines —the Cuxhayen raid en Christmas Day, 101-1, for instance, and the importance of the number of aeroplanes composing an attacking aerial fleet will be realised clearly. For offensive work of permanent value it is not an air fleet of a few dozen machines that is required, but one about a thousand <" ? "" r " strorj"

With such an air fleet, it is said, Britain could enter on the conquest of a second kind of "supremacy of the air," a kind in which the offensive value of the iiftli arm would make itself felt, in a permanent manner, miles beyond the range of her guns. In fact, such an air Meet would be a force that could not be stopped by trenches, rivers, or fortified plates, it would be a force in whose way no obstacles could be put, and which would carry the war straight into the heart of the enemy's country.

In connection with the employment of aeroplanes at the front, it is important, lie says, to remember that the fifth arm is still somewhat frail in construction. Major W. S. Brancker, Royal Artillery (Royal Flying Corps Reserve), General Staff, in a lecture delivered at the University of London a few weeks before the beginning of hostilities, said : " A good average pilot may fly, day after day, round an aerodrome and make inanj landings without ev"ti straining his aeroplane, or even breaking a wire; but in war the t)ilot must fly in any weather to obtain information, and land on almost any ground to deliver it. The result will be numerous small breakages and strains, all of which take time and skill to repair, and which demand the provision of a large quantity of spare parts and their delivery wherever they are required in the theatre of war. The difficulty of supply of spare parts will bo increased in proportion to the number of different types of aeroplanes employed. The same applies to.engines, which, in addition, require thorough periodic overhaul. alter a comparatively short time ;1 work.

"Again, in war there will he no sheds available for housing machines on the ground. The aeroplane of the moment cannot stand for long in the open without serious deterioration in its flying qualities. All this indicates that*only a small proportion of the aeroplanes in the field will he fit to take the air at any given moment.'' These, and other reasons, show that )1 1000 aeroplanes are to be always ready for offensive purposes Britain must possess at least twice that number of machines and keep on making good the iu-ses.

Now (he says in conclusion) the question which presents itself is whether it would be possible for Britain to build in the space of a few months 2000 aeroplanes, train the men necessary to pilot them, form the necessary contingent of mechanics which would be required to accompany them at the front, and organise an adequate transport service?