STATE FARMS IN RUSSIA.

Putaruru Press, Volume VII, Issue 315, 21 November 1929, Page 6

STATE FARMS IN RUSSIA.

DRIVE AGAINST KULAKS. Probably the most important fundamental change which the Communists are attempting to bring about in Rus- ' sia now is the reconstruction of agriculture on a collective basis (says the Moscow correspondent of the London Observer). Two recent developments have tended to strengthen the drive for agrarian socialisation. One is the satisfactory outlook for the coming harvest, which gives promise of removing the strained food situation which prevailed during the past winter and spring. The other is the success of the strenuous spring planting campaign, which was carried out with great energy by the party and State organisations.

Although the sown acreage last autumn indicated a decrease of some 3 per cent., as compared with the pre ceding year, the extension of the spring-planted area gave a total, gain for the year, of 6 per cent. % and the Communist Party leadership is inclined to interpret this fact as a proof that the masses of the peasantry are not dissatisfied with the new policy, despite the obvious discontent of the 11 kulaks, ’ 1 or more well-to-do peasants, which during the last year has found expression in many murders and other acts of violence against village Communists and Soviet workers

The Communist agrarian policy has | both constructive and repressive as- j pects. On the constructive side one- j may note the investment of large sums J of money in the development of huge j State farms, of which the largest, the , so-called “ Giant*’ in the North Caucasus steppe country, near Rostov, al ready boasts an area of 150,000 acres, the encouragement of peasant collective group farming, and the strenuous effort to provide the villages with more agricultural machinery and fertiliser. The repressive edge of the policy is turned against the kulaks, who are heavily taxed, systematically given the worst land, and practically compelled to sell their surplus grain to the State organs at fixed prices which are far below the very high prices which have long prevailed on the free market, due to the shortage of grain and flour. The use of compulsion to obtain. the ; peasants 1 surplus grain, which was j abandoned with the introduction of the. New Economy Policy in 1921, was re- J vived when the systematic withholding of grain by the peasants in the winter of 1927-1928 caused the application of so-called lt extraordinary measures” to extract it from the holders. In July. 1928, these measures were abolished, according to a decision of the Communist Party Central Committee, but last spring they were revived, at least so far as the kulaks were concerned. It is announced that “measures of social persuasion..” which may be interpreted as meaning the forcing of delivery of grain by the richer peasants on pain of fines and confiscation of property, will be continued during the coming autumn, since the State organs are anxious to take advantage of the favourable harvest and build up as large a reserve of grain as possible before the end of the year. The Communists are attempting to storm the fortress of peasant individu alism by bringing up a constant stream of heavy artillery in the form of tractors, which they distribute, not to individual peasants, but among peasants co-operative groups and State farms. With the outcome of this experiment are bound up many things in the immediate future of Russia; the food supply of the cities, for instance, the dimensions of foreign trade, the prae- / ticability of the projected large-scale . expansion of industry.