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MARK NICHOLLS’ FAILURE.

(By “ Touchline.”).

Mark Nicholls’ endeavour to introduce the 3-2-3 scrum in New Zealand has crashed. A message this week conveys the information that after a lengthy period of experiment the Petone Club, Wellington, will revert to the New Zealand formation, the 3-2-3 effort having proved disastrous to the club. Indeed, some competent critics in Wellington attribute the Petone Club’s lowly position in the senior competition solely to the fact that they experimented with their scrum. They are stated to have had the players, but to have failed to make the best use of them. A most remarkable feature of the failure is tbe excuse proferred by Nicholls. He states that the attempt failed because other clubs did not adopt the 3-2-3 formation. In view of the fact that in his booklet on the South African tour he lauded the 3-2-3 formation and stated it would beat the 2-3-2 style every time, this is using the argument both ways with a vengeance.

As the writer has endeavoured to show in previous articles, these critics—Nicholls, McEvedy, Booth and others—who have done their utmost to upset a formation which has placed All Black football on a pinnacle unattained by any other nation, do not look at the game as a whole. They have become monomaniacs on the question of the 3-men-down scrum coupled with the abolition of the wing-forward, and conveniently overlook the many other advantages, more particularly that of having the extra man outside the pack. Though they have been battling for years to obtain a change, it has not been until recently that events favoured them, and enabled them to get a hearing. Chief of these, of course, was “ Black Sunday,” when the notices told of the All Blacks’ severe reverse in the first Test match against the Springboks. The seed, however, was sown long before this, and the damage was in reality done by the adoption in New Zealand of what may be called the Hawke's Bay cult of the big barging forward, and weakness in our interpretation of offside play at the scrum in an endo"'ronr to speed up the game.

The Hawke’s Bay style has now ’’een definitely abandoned by the major metropolitan unions, and in part by the All Black selectors, which committee still contains its authors, and is only maintained by some country unions of which Waikato is a notable example. For years old players—-even when Hawke’s Bay was at the zenith of its form—-maintained that our forward play had deteriorated, and that certain old-time packs would have beaten modern packs hollow. Rugby enthusiasts simply laughed and put the criticism down to old-timers’ lovaltv, and the human weakness in their belief that “ players were better when I played.” Now, however, we can see without a shadow of a doubt that these “ old timers ” were right, and luckily for us, in view of the British visit, certain All Black selectors have had the courage to modify their views, for the present forwards in Australia shew undoubted evidence of the McDonald influence, the Otago man being an uncompromising opponent of the forward who has had such limelight in recent years.

Briefly the position is this: The New Zealand formation—both back and forward—is a scientific one worked out on the supposition of every man knowing the reason for five-eighths and the 2-3-2 formation, and playing his part. The advantages are: Three lines of defence when necessary in the backs and the extra men outside the scrum. For this formation to work to the fullest advantage, every man should know his job. and the raison d’etre or why and wherefore of the fractional position. Further, all forwards must play as one man and pack tight, else tbov cannot hold their own. Finally all hacks—especially the fullback—must play to their forwards. This latter statement sounds simple and natural, ye t is seldom consistently carried out. Even in representative and All Blacks’ games we see fullbacks indulging in play which would make a Wallace shudder in his shoes. Take lust one move.' Both packs have been battling hard in the ruck. The backs have been drawn in a trifle towards the loose scrum when the ball comes clean to a fullback. T r>stead of using the touchline where his forwards are, he dashes across field, tempted by an opening, and finds touch little further ahead that he would have done on the line by his forwards.' It may he spectacular play, but it’s not scientific football and is absolutely fatal against the 3-2-3 formation. A fullback’s main job is to conserve his forwards’ energv at all times, yet the above move m seep day after day in present day football in all classes of play.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/PUP19290801.2.53

Bibliographic details

Putaruru Press, Volume VII, Issue 299, 1 August 1929, Page 8

Word Count
786

MARK NICHOLLS’ FAILURE. Putaruru Press, Volume VII, Issue 299, 1 August 1929, Page 8

MARK NICHOLLS’ FAILURE. Putaruru Press, Volume VII, Issue 299, 1 August 1929, Page 8

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