The Paremata Case.

Poverty Bay Standard, Volume I, Issue 108, 17 April 1884, Page 2

The Paremata Case.

DISMISSAL OF APPEAL. [Per Press Association.] Wellington, April 18. Judgment was given by Mr. Justice Richmond at the Supreme Court to-day, in the case of Wi Te Huke and others v. the New Zealand Native Land Settlement Co. The relief asked for was that the Court would order the Company to give up the Memorandum of transfer in this case to be cancelled, plaintiffs undertaking to repay a cash advance of £9OO. The main ground now relied upon by the plaintiffs was that the transaction, as effected by two deeds, was not a sale within the meaning of the 59th section of “ The Native Land Act, 1883.” His Honor was of opinion that the transaction was truly a sale, and that the property passed absolutely to the company. This left no ground to the plaintiffs, save that which was afforded by the character of the proceedings in the Native Land Court. His Honor was certainly of opinion that the suppression of the deed of covenant was a most improper act, though probably nothing worse than an error of judgment. The jury had negatived the existence of actual fraud in these proceedings, and the true character of the transaction between the natives and the Company must be a matter of public notoriety, and the ignorance of the Judge of the Native Land Court, was in all probability merely official. It would be going a great deal to far to say that improper conduct on the part of the Company’s agents constituted a sufficient ground for the cancellation of the deed of conveyance. The jury had negatived all fraud in the means by which that conveyance was obtained. The transaction must be taken to be, and must appear to be a fair one. The wrong done was simply in the mode by which the assent of the Native Lands Court had been obtained, and in that wrong the plaintiffs themselves were participators. So far as His Honor could judge, the true transaction, had it been fully disclosed, was entitled to receive the approval of the Native Lands Court, the case, therefore, was certainly not one for the interference of this Court. By the cancellation I of the deed it appeared that the Native Lands Court was not functuous officio and it might

not be too late for plaintiffs to apply for a rescission of the order which had been made, That was their appropriate remedy and the only remedy under the circumstances, There was ground to which he had not yet adverted on which it was quite plain that the plaintiffs could not in any case be entitled to present judgement in their favour. The former co-owners of the plaintiffs had not been made parties to this suit, it would be obviously impossible to make a decree in favour of plaintiffs without first bringing these persons before the court. Plaintiff’s motion was therefore refused with costs.