Poverty Bay Standard. PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING. FRIDAY, AUGUST 11, 1882.

Poverty Bay Standard, Volume X, Issue 1120, 11 August 1882, Page 2

Poverty Bay Standard. PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING. FRIDAY, AUGUST 11, 1882.

Affairs in Egypt still continue to exhibit little less'than a hopeless tangle. There are treaties which compel England to exercise a strong moral influence upon the internal affairs of Egypt: there are treaties which restrain her from the unlimited exercise of physical force, without which moral influence becomes reduced to a senti-

tnent: there are treaties which recognise the suzerainty of Turkey over

Egypt; and there are treaties again which reduce that suzerainty to a diplomatic nonentity. Above and about, around and beneath these original conventions there are treaties which admit the other Great Powers to a common guardianship with England and France of the sovereign rights of the Khedive, and assign to England and France a direct concern in the financial administration of that potentate’s dominions. The difficulty which has now arisen, and which has developed into an alarming crisis, is only one which inevitably must have arisen some day, which every step in diplomacy has fostered, and which has certainly lost none of its complexity by delay. Although it has arisen at an unfavorable juncture for England, indeed, it could scarcely have arisen at a more embarrassing moment, there is not, with the single exception of Mr Bbight, who acts on religious grounds, a Minister of the British Crown who shrinks from the

task which these circumstances impose upon him. All Europe is awaiting with eager anticipation the solution of the problem by the countries having the greatest stake in Egypt. The shortest way, although one not unfraught with peril, of disposing of this Gordian Knot was to cut it, and that appears to us the only safe course England could have adopted. It seems clear that some treaty must have been set aside if moral pressure were exercised beyond its evidently futile limit. By relying on such moral, in preference to physical, pressure, England must have permitted Egypt to fall into a state of utter anarchy, and thereby have sacrificed not only her material interests in its National Government, but the rights and property of English people who have settled in Egypt, besides deserting in his extremity a Prince who has relied thoroughly upon England’s good faith for support, who has adopted her counsels, who has accepted her schemes for the development of the internal resources of his country, and who, above all, has shown' exceptional prudence and capacity in the Government of his nation. Turkey evidently feels sore on the point of' British intervention, and the Sultan does not lack specious counsel from St. Petersburg and Vienna, but, spite of all Machiavellian diplomacy, English power must do that which is absolutely necessary to the peace of Europe, and which the Sul. tan is unable and unwilling to do for himself. The sick man has always been a fruitful source of trouble, and never, in a single instance, a source of gain to England, but that country has little to gain from an embroilment with Turkey, or any unnecessary military occupation of Egypt. Such gain would bo easily discounted. But material gain is not, and should not be, the chief factor in the solution of a political problem. There is moral firmness : there is the right perception and prompt acceptance of national responsibility ; there is the claim of kindred to succour and protection. It would be difficult to point to any great war that yielded permanent strength to a nation. Many have given glory ; many have added territory ; most have misapplied national wealth, and paralysed national industry. England will avoid these errors and in the wise exercise of her physical strength will keep her guarantees intact by reinstating the Khedive in the position to

which he is entitled, and is only temporarily removed from by the base action of a rebel servant and a treacherous master, thus placing the interests of England and France on a better and surer basis. She has in her action adopted the right course. The only other one open to her would have been to cut wholly adrift from all obligations with Egypt or with Turkey, which only yield now what they have ever yielded—disquiet, discredit, and tribulation.