The Standard AND PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE. (PUBLISHED EVERY WEDNESDAY AND SATURDAY.) SATURDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1876.

Poverty Bay Standard, Volume III, Issue 433, 2 December 1876, Page 2

The Standard AND PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE. (PUBLISHED EVERY WEDNESDAY AND SATURDAY.)

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1876.

“ We shall sell to no man justice or right: We shall deny to no man justice or right: We shall defer to no man justice or right.”

One of the desiderata—if, indeed, we may not write one of the privileges—of our public, and governmental institutions, is that they are held to be schools for acquiring information up to a certain point ; and through the agency of whose machinery, the community are individually, and collectively, enabled to form tolerably correct ideas of, cultivate an intimate acquaintance with, the many cone tri>*,«ud businesses.of life, which, in thei- operation, affect mankind most deeply. Take these privileges away, or stop the machinery, and the result would be chads, confusion, and ignorance. If there is one thing more than another which has made England and her Dependencies what they are —which has educated her sons to become their own legislators, and enabled them to buildup a Constitution, at once the pride and envy of the world—it is to be found in the free and unfettered dissemination of the

ideas of her public and learned men ; and by affording means and opportunities for all classes and conditions of society to benefit by their labors. Take, for example —one amongst the many —our Courts of Judicature. Although there are numbers of forensic opinions, arguments, and judgments recorded by lawyers and judges in the practice of their profession, that are calculated more to obscure than to clarify a lay conception, nevertheless, there is generally to be found in them a sub-stratum of matter, which the intelligent observer systematically cons over, and puts to a practical test as occasion may require There is an old and fundamental axiom that every man is supposed to be, prima facie, acquainted with the law. Ignorance of statutory obligations is not allowed as a plea, and forms no bar, or protection, to any one who infringes on their rights, or disregards their behests, as against the consequences of his own actions. With this principle in view, our Judges and chief rulers, take the most commendable pains, on periodical occasions, to unravel knotty ijifesi tions ; to expound erudite doctrines qi and to elucidate cardinal points of law, and practice, w'hich, if properly learned, cannot fail to be of universal advantage and benefit. So with our Advocates and Pleaders, when in the people’s Forum, they enunciate opinions, and illustrate the workings of the law, as regards a man’s rights, privileges, and responsibilities; and particularly when their advocacy and pleading exercise an influence in the Judicial or Magisterial mind. Of course there are many subtleties in law exposition which may be consistently contended for, on the one hand, and opposed on the other. If the solution of a difficulty depends upon, or is circumscribed by, the small confines of a mere opinion, then each opposing party may be held to occupy a good position, until ousted from it by force of numbers. In some cases conscience has to decide as to what is morally right, as against what is technically, or legally, correct. Where questions of mere fact have to be considered, no such doubt or difficulty, should exist; but atoms of fact are, in law, generally of more value than whole volumes of moral deductions, unsupported by positive proof.. We have considered this subject, from the statements which have been made by a leading counsel in the Resident Magistrate’s Court at Gisborne lately, and which, it is possible, may not have escaped public observation. It is needless to say that we disagree with those statements ; and, believing that they are capable of correction, and calculated to mislead, we deem it our duty to call particular attention to them.

Both the instances which we quote, are in the suit, Tucker v. Read, in which the complainant sought to restrain the defendant, a second time, from using insulting and abusive language towards him, the said complainant in the public streets. For the defence, Mr W. W. Wilson laid it down most distinctly that if there was no other person besides the complainant present at the time of the alleged offence, it was no offence at all; for, continued the learned counsel, “If I came into the streets at “ midnight, and made use of the most “ insulting language, and no person “ about, it was no offence against the “law.” Jokingly, we might wish to see Mr Wilson try the experiment, and put the validity of his law to a practical proof; but, seriously, this view is not correct; and as we think the matter is generally misunderstood we give the 4th section of the" Vagrant “ Act Amendment Act, 1869 ” entire: Any person who shall sing any obscene song or ballad or write or. draw any indecent or obscene figure or representation or use any profane indecent or obscene language in any public street thoroughfare or place or within the view or hearing of any person passing therein ; and any person who shall use any threatening abusive, or insulting words or behaviour in an}’ public place with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned, renders himself liable to a fine of £lO, with an alternative of three months’ imprisonment. By this it will be seen that the wrong lies in the doing or the saying of anything, in order to give insult or offence, or as may be calculated to provoke a breach of the peace, and not, necessarily, in the actual presence of any person. Again, Mr Wilson, on the amended information in the same suit, attempted—in an argument necessary to his own case, but, we submit, illogically—to show that the words used were “ trivial,” and such as it was absurd to suppose did not come within the prerogative of good citizenship to use with impunity. Read, while talking to Sergeant Mills in the street, said loudly, and looking towards Mr Tucker, “ Here comes a pimpand Mr Tucker, a man of different metal to Read, instantly demanded if the remark was intended for him. That it was so intended, was amply proved on the testimony of .Sergeant Mills himself. But Mr Wilson calls it a “ trivial,” trumped up case, and is reported to have said : '

The complainant acknowledged to having called defendant a liar, ha (Mr Wilson) cantended there was a great difference between “ pimp ” and “ liar,” and gave his opinion that if on every paltry occasion, such as this, persons were subject to-.prosecution under the Vagrant Act, it would require a Justice of the Peace to sit every day hi the week to dispose of the cases.

We agree with Mr Wilson. There is a very, great differenee between a “ liar ” and a “ pimp.” ’ Here is the dictionary definition : “ Liar, one who “ lies or utters falsehood.” “ Pimp,

“ one who procures gratifications for “ the lusts of others ; a pander ; to “ procure women for others ; to “ pander.” Pandarus was a“pimp,” as any one who has read the story of “Troilus and Cressida” will know • and as compared with whom, on the score of social etiquette, or precedence, a mere “ liar” is a paragon of morality. There is only one point of difference between the'Magistrate and the public, in dealing with this case, and that is the smallness of the fine. Dr Nesbitt quoted it as the “ second offence,” and still he convicted the delinquent in two pounds less than on the first occasion! To a man who may fancy that times have not changed, and that he can break the law with impunity, a money fine is'no object; he may care little for that; but it is satisfactory to knew- that .a Mimesis is at .jserk which will yisit with Jirpper punishment the autocrats of vulgarity, and help to rid the place of the chief disciples of open air blasphemy whenever they pollute the atmosphere with their impious, filthy, imprecations.