SIR GEORGE GREY ON CONSTITUTIONALISM.

Poverty Bay Standard, Volume III, Issue 262, 7 April 1875, Page 2

SIR GEORGE GREY ON CONSTITUTIONALISM.

We shall transfer to our columns—probably in four or five issues—the speech made by Sir George Grey recently at the Choral Hall, Auckland, on the political questions of the day; as we deem it of the first importance that the view’s of our leading politicians should be desseminated as much as possible ; and as Sir George is likely to take an active part in the future affairs of this Colony, the following will be read with interest. After paying tribute to Mr. Williamson’s memory, and introducing one or two incidents illustrative of the value of Provincial institutions Sir George Grey said

Entertaining these views, what I would propose to-night to do is this—not to dwell upon mere Provincial matter, nor explain their relation to the form of government; that you hive the most excellent speech of Mr. Swanson to refer to—you have Mr. Bees’s pamphlet, and you have hundreds of writings upon the same subject—most able letters which I have seen in your newspapers, —but there are certain great Constitutional questions upon which your whole welfare and prosperity depend, which I have not seen sufficiently dwelt upon, and what I would ask you to do to-night is really to consider these questions, and then wheu they have been considered, and have been debated, let us all determine upon some common line of policy which the great majority may feel is for the benefit and for the good of all. (Cheers.) Now, in the remarks I make, I shall not assail any one ; what I attack will be the institutions of the country. Many men are in offices or in positions in this country, who may not approve of the very institutions that put them there; who may, to the very best of their ability, be discharging the duties imposed upon them. With such men we cannot find any fault. I shall in no way attempt to blame them. But what is wrong in the government of the country at the present time — what interferes with the prosperity of its inhabitants—what must interfere with their future happiness —what mus ten tail misery upon millions, wealth perhaps ou a very few, —such institutions we have a right to criticise —-such institutions we have a right to consider, and such institutions, if we dislike, we have a right to sweep away. (Cheers.) Now, to begin first — to begin at the very head of all in this country —let me point out to you with regard to the office of Governor, that the rule throughout the British Empire for many years has been this, although there have been departures from it:—When Great Britain paid the expenses of a colony, it was responsible for its debts, and provided it with a military force ; Great Britain nominated the Governor, and that Governor was, to a certain extent, nominated by the British Parliament—that is, it was impossible for the Ministry at home to place a mere follower or dependent in any important office where real duties were to be performed, because every such appointment was discussed in the most deliberate manner in the British Parliament; and the Government, if they -were doing what was even questionable had an enormous amount of opposition to meet. I shall instance my own case 35 or 36 years ago. When I was first appointed Governor there was a great debate on the subject in the British Parliament. When I was first sent to this colony there was a debate, which wonderful to relate, lasted for three days before the question was determined. But when Great Britain ceased to pay any expenses for a colony, the usual rule, not only in ancient times but in modern times, has been that the Governors are selected by those persons who defrayed the expenditure. For example, until I went to South Australia myself the whole expenses of the colony were borne by a Board of Commissioners in England—that is, a board of shareholders in a company that nominated the Governor, and presented him to the Queen, who, as a matter of course, issued her Commission to him. Even in the case of New Zealand, when the Auckland Islands were constituted a separate colony, and were paid for only by a whaling company, that whaling company selected a governor and presented him to the Queen in the same way, they being responsible for the expenditure, and the Queen appointed that Governor. When your own Constitution Act was drawn, the Act was so framed that the General Assembly could make what law they pleased for the appointment of Governor and send it home to the Queen. That is the existing law of New Zealand at the present day. Now, whether this system is to be adopted or not is of course a question. But what I would ask you to do is to consider the effect of the present system and the existing state of things. Where there is an hereditary monarchy the Crown, for the time being, has a strong public interest in the conduct of public affairs. Usually a large number of subjects are from tradition, from the habit of years, strongly attached by personal ties to the reigning Sovereign. The reigning Sovereign takes the greatest possible care to commit no mistake that may injure its subjects or alienate their affection for the sake of the children of the King or Queen that may be on the throne. But under our circumstances, constituted as we are, a Governor who may be appointed from time to time has, in point of fact, no interest of that kind in the country, and the one object that necessarily he must pursue. I say this without the least reflection on the person who does it, because it is a necessity, if possible, to stand well with the Ministry of the day in the colony, to meet all their views, aud, if possible, to, avoid coming in any way in collision with the inhabitants of the country in which he may be, to escape any point of fact without having any disturbance or any difference with the people who may be managing affairs at the time. Therefore, it is almost impossible for him to make a stand against what he may think wrong, or to appeal to the country regarding W’hat he may disapprove of, as the Crown may do at home, and certainly would do, and he becomes

in this respect a mere machine. (Cheers). Now, we will consider this question on behalf of the Governor. The Governor is absolutely dependent upon the persons at home. He is not appointed now by the Queen, but by the Government of the day, for their own peculiar purposes, whatever that may be. If you attempt here to reduce the salary of your Governor, as was done some few years ago, if an Act is past for that purpose by the Assembly, and it is sent home, it is disallowed. The answer is “ The Governor holds his office for six years ; our consciences are so tender that we cannot commit a breach of contract with him, pardon us, therefore, for advising the Queen to disallow the Act.” (Laughter aud cheers). That is their language to the colonists. They give the colonists no power whatever over the Governor in that direction. What is their language to the Governor? His Commission appoints him to be Governor during the Queen’s pleasure, not for six years; he may be removed at a moment. Within the time that I have lived one Lord-lieutenant of Ireland was removed at a moment’s notice for refusing to give a pension of £4OO a year from the civil list to a lady. I have known other Governors removed for simply differing in opinion with the Queen’s advisers. I have known a Governor instantly removed for refusing to appoint to an office a relation of the man who happened to be Premier of England at the time, because he believed the man was not eligible. (Cheers). There was no period of six years given to him there. If the Minister at home please all his income is taken from him, and what he has expended on his outfit he must attempt to realise, and go at a single moment. That is the view that is taken of it when the Government regard it in their own case at home. When they view it in the ease of the colonies the appointment is for six years and can be in no way interfered W’ith. (Laughter and cheers.) Then in 1867 another very curious circumstance took place. I intended to have quoted the actual words, but I will tell you the case as I remember it. At the time the troops were being withdrawn from the colonies, and the whole expenditure of the colonies being thrown upon themselves, the view was taken up at Home almost precisely in these words : That no man was fit to represent his Sovereign in the colonies who had not been born in the purple. That was the language used ; that is, that no man was henceforth to be appointed to the colonies as Governor, except iu extreme instances, who was not the son of a peer, which is what they call being born in the purple, The rule was partly relaxed afterwards, and if a man had married the daughter of a peer it was thought sufficient. (Laughter and cheers.) Then the next extrordinary statement upon this subject which was maintained absolutely was this : That the colonists earnestly desire to be governed by people who had been born in the purple, and that it was easier to govern them in that way. Now, that may be the case. I don’t know. Some men may worship rank in that kind of way, and may hold that view; but that was, undoubtedly, the statement, and is certainly the belief that existed, and is the practice which has been pursued. Now, I think that iu that way the colonies stand in a very bad position, and the Governor himself stands in a very bad position. But I take another very serious objection to this system —viz.: that it places in the hands of the Government at home a very large sum of money indeed, to be annually expended either in rewarding persons who have given their political support, or in keeping opponents with adverse votes in the House of Peers out of the way in distant parts of the world. (Cheers.) In truth it places at the disposal of the Government a large sum of secret service money which in some instances is actually expended indirectly for electioneering purposes. The whole of such sum of money is withdrawn from the cognizances of the British Parliament and of the British nation, and I do not think in my own mind thatit is right that we should by our taxation contribute to rivet the fetters more firmly on our countrymen at home. (Cheers.) If I am told it is not really used for electioneering purposes, I answer, that of my own knowledgein two recent instances members of the House of Commons, who had damaged themselves by engaging in contested elections in w’hieh they obtained their return to the House, supported the Government in Parliament, and were ultimately enabled to recoup their losses by being appointed to governments in distant possessions of the Crown. And yet, going further than that, I said there was one instance in which an Undersecretary of State, who, having done that in conjunction with the Secretary of State at the head of his department which was considered so injurious to the interests of his fellow countrymen that they were both obliged to leave office at home and to receive other appointments, one of them being rewarded by being sent out to the Colonies as a Governor, with a very large salary indeed. At the time it would have been impossible —such was the state of public feeling in England—to have given him any office within the limits of Great Britain. For all these reasons I think that that is a point which is very well worth the consideration of the people of this country. We have the power entirely in our own hands. I recommend no particular system to you, but we have the power to decide, conjointly with the Queen, what has to be done. Parliament and her majority give us that power, and we can exercise it in such a way as to and do that which we may deem, after consideration, to be the best for the interest of the whole and the entire community. (Cheers.) Such, indeed, is the magnitude of this abuse, that I will give you one instance of what I mean. So little disposal is given to us, even of our own revenues, that supposing the salary here was £lO,OOO a year, the Minister at home may give the Governor leave of absence for two years at any time he likes, and, if it should be required, pay him £5,000 a year the whole time of his absence —as large a salary as the Prime Minister of England receives—and we are not allowed to say whether he is to get it or not. That is settled by the Government at home. Now, I think that is another reason why this state of things should be closely and gravely enquired into, and the salary of the Governor should be fixed upon such a reasonable basis as not to give an excuse for exorbitant salaries. The next thing I would call your attention to is the constitution of the Legislative Council. Now, I have shown you that, in the case of Governor, you positively have

no control whatever. In the case of the Legislative Council you are still worse off. Now, I do not say a word against the gentlemen composing that body. I have many friends there ; I believe they have done their duty to the very best of their ability. But such a thing was never seen in the world before, until the present age, as that the Minister for the time being should have the power of calling whom he likes to the Upper House —any number of people—and to give them a salary which is to last for life. Only ask yourselves—those who recollect the old rotten borough system—-is it right that a Minister for the time being should be able to take a man chosen by no constituency representing no single individual iu the world, except the Minister himself, aud to put him into the Council and make him Governor of this great country? This is done now because the Governor is nobody here ; he has to take the advice of his Ministers, and I say it is not respectful to us, and not respectful to the most humble individual in the community, that a person representing only the Minister who appointed him should be chosen and at once made Governor of this great country with absolute power over us all. With all my heart and soul I object to this, (Cheers.) Well, this institution is in point of fact a gigantic and most expensive sham. (Cheers.) In illustration of w’hat I have said before, and what I mean, that in point of fact it is not created for your good, or in your int Test, or in the interest of the people of Great Britain, but in the interest of a class at home, I will give you one instance : —A Minister iu England agreed with me that there should be an elective Lipper House. I was promised that there should be such a chamber. The whole Constitution Act w’as drawn with that view. But the doubt arose, if there are elective Upper Houses all over the rest of the Empire, if the rest of the Empire is governed well while under such elective Upper Houses, if it is governed better perhaps even than Great Britain itself, how can an hereditary Upper House stand in Great Britain ? It won’t do. (Cheers.) That is the real view of this question; but I say, at least if you entertain that view, don’t give us such an institution as you have given us. You can give us something far better, and don’t clog us with conditions which are hurtful. Now, their reasoning on the subject, when they are not personally interested, is absolutely pitiful. They say, if an Upper House is necessary at all, why then the members must alw’ays be present in the Upper Chamber to do their duty. It is either altogether useless, or they must attend. Therefore, the law we make in the case of New Zealand is this : —Any member of the Upper House who is absent for two years forfeits his vote. Well, what do they say of their own Upper House? If they want to reward a man who has voted for them, and to get rid of a man who has voted against them, they will send him out to this end of the world for seven or fourteen years. (Cheers and laughter.) I give that as an instance of the way in which the most beautiful reasoning regarding other persons is so often little applied in practice by individuals to themselves. It must be in the knowledge of everybody here that that has been done in all these colonies lately. It is a most objectionable system, and it is terrible—l can’t say how terrible, that bill after bill may be passed in the Lower House in this country, and rejected by the Upper House who represent nobody, though occasionally they may represent Ministers who appoint them, and who in some cases had made fortunes and gone. home. I can produce argument after argument to show how foolish this system is, how adverse to the best interests of the whole community, but will detain you no longer upon that point. To be Continued.