REPRESENTATION.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXIII, Issue 5374, 18 June 1878, Page 3

REPRESENTATION.

TO THE EDIXOn OP THE NEW ZEALAND TIMES. Sin, —It is to bo hoped that the Government in their Representation Bill will not bo content with allocating a certain number of members proportionate to population contained within certained defined geographical divisions, to bo returned by simple majorities of such districts, whether such districts shall be entitled to return one or more members; although the larger the constituency the loss objectionable would such a system be, inasmuch as it would, in proportion to its size and number of members, afford less chance for the successful action of political cliques at elections, and the better prospect of able and independent men obtaining a seat in Parliament, —but will make provision for tbo representation of the whole population as against simple majorities ; a want that has been long most keenly felt in all representative Governments throughout the world. This question of personal representation, by which minorities of comparatively small numbers would be represented in the councils of the State, was first brought before the British Parliament in 1867 by John Stewart Mill, and has since that time been occasionally brought forward in the House of Commons for discussion, without, so far, leading to any very decided or practical result, beyond the growing conviction in the minds of British statesmen that sooner or later the question must be grappled with, and the principle of personal representation applied,—it being a principle, as Mr. Mill very justly observes, “neither democratic nor aristocratic, neither Tory, 'Whig, nor Radical; or, let me rather say, it is all these at once. It is a principle of fair play to all parties and opinions without distinction ; it helps no one party or section to boar down others, but is for the

benefit of whoever is in danger of being borne down.” Should the Government not see their way to the adoption of. Mr. Hare's system on this question in its entirety, by constituting the whole colony one electorate or electoral district, with its various local constituencies, they could, I think, with safety adopt a limited application of the principle, by dividing the colony into, say, ten constituencies, and apportion the number of members according to the population or number of electors in each division. The number of members for each constituency would then range from six upwards, from whence it would follow that the highest proportion of the unrepresented in one or other of the members returned would be necessarily less than a sixth of the total number of electors, while it would often happen that each individual elector would have voted for one or other of the successful candidates. Such a limited application of the principle would confer a great boon on the electors of the colony, as against the present system of bare majorities in each constituency returning all the members, however many. As, for instance, in Christchurch and Dunedin, each returning three members, a bare majority of the electors may return all three members, while an equal number, less one, may not only have no representative, but whose views and interests may be positively misrepresented by the members so returned. The three-cornered system is being spoken of as a remedy for this evil, by which no elector shall vote for more than two members, thereby enabling a large minority to return one member. But the cumulative system of Mr. Hare, applied to three members, is far preferable to the one contemplated, as it would give the electors a wider range in the choice of their candidates, and secure a far more certain result. Suppose the constituency for three members to comprise 3000 electors, two-thirds being in favor of one interest, the other third holding opposite views, this respectable minority of one-third under the proposed three-cornered system would have no chance of having their views represented in Parliament, if- the two-thirds were properly manipulated between three of their candidates, as they would hold 4000 votes, which would be 1333 votes for each of their three candidates, while the' minority of one thousand electors could only give to their candidate the 1000 votes. On the other hand, if the majority of two-thirds, who were agreed on general principles, but differed as to the candidates best fitted to represent their views, should bring four candidates into the field, and the division of the votes between them should be equal, it would enable the minority with two votes over one-third to place two candidates at the head of the poll. But under the cumulative principle first, by apportioning votes given to condidates in excess of the quota, or requisite number, to those whose names are second on his list; and then by striking out the name of the candidate who has the lowest number of votes, and dividing the number two on his paper to the other candidates in proportion as they stand second on the list, and so continue taking and appropriating the lowest number until you arrive at the requisite number of members, and the quotient or highest number of votes. No matter under this system how many candidates each party brought into the field, provided they entered eaclx candidate of their party on their list, the two-thirds could return two members and no more, while nothing could prevent the one-third returning one member. Another advantage would be that every section of each party would bo enabled to bring forward their candidate, and so try the strength of their party, without endangering the success of the party as a whole, as I have shown would ho the case under the proposed three-cornered system.—l am, &c., W. Wellington, June 15.